Descartes Meditations Essay, Research Paper

In Descartes? Meditations on First Philosophy, he offers two chief statements from which he concludes the being of God. In the Third Meditation, Descartes proposes his metaphysical statement, which states that God must be, because his existent being is the lone cause, which could hold produced Descartes? ain thought of God. In the Fifth Meditation, Descartes contends that being is contained in God? s kernel, so a non-existent God is by definition, a contradiction. This paper will analyse the strengths and failings of both statements, and will postulate that the metaphysical statement, while flawed, is more believable than Descartes? ontological statement. I will demo that the metaphysical statement is the more successful of the two because of its ain virtuousnesss and because of serious lacks in the ontological statement.

Descartes postulates his metaphysical statement in Meditation Three, where he begins his contemplation by sing the beginning of all of his thoughts. He notes that all his thoughts are every bit existent in the sense that they are all & # 8221 ; merely manners of thought. & # 8221 ; However, non all of his thoughts are endowed with an equal magnitude of nonsubjective world, intending that all of his thoughts may non stand for something which truly exists. He so concludes & # 8220 ; that it is manifest by the natural visible radiation that & # 8221 ; if the object of an thought of something involves some degree of world, the thought must be caused by that which has a greater or equal degree of world. Descartes uses this foundation to ground that since his thought of an all-perfect God, who is an infinite substance, contains more world than he thinks he possesses, he can non be the beginning of that thought. The thought must be caused by something which has every bit much flawlessness and world as the object of its thought. By Descartes? definition of that which is & # 8220 ; supreme? space, omniscient, omnipotent, and the Godhead of all things, & # 8221 ; this cause of his thought must be God.

One of the virtuousnesss of this statement is its cogency. Descartes clearly enumerates his premises:

? he has an thought of an space and perfect God

? thoughts have causes which have nonsubjective world, which is equal to that of the object of the thought

? he could non hold produced his ain thought of the space

? God must hold produced his thought of the space

? God exists.

If these premises are true, his statement is a successful and sound one. Like the ontological statement, the premises of this work draw a batch of expostulations. Yet Descartes maintains the strength of this an inductive statement by turn toing some of the most potentially detrimental expostulations to his metaphysical statement.

Descartes? whole metaphysical statement presupposes that he has an thought of an all-perfect, infinite God. Yet the thesis that Descartes? finite head can comprehend the space lends itself to powerful contention. One could explicitly dispute Descartes in the undermentioned mode: It is inconsistent to keep that one has a clear thought of an space and perfect God. Because the person? s head is by Descartes? ain admittance, finite, eternity is impossible to the person.

Descartes? statement can defy such unfavorable judgment if we are unstable in our reading of what may represent the thought of an infinite being. Descartes explains that & # 8220 ; it does non count that I do non hold on the space? it is adequate that I understand the infinite. & # 8221 ; This divide between hold oning and understanding may look obscure, but it is important to the legitimacy of the metaphysical statement. Descartes? apprehension of the space is an acceptable get downing point from which he can continue to seek for the cause of his thought of the space. Yet his coincident inability to hold on the space conciliates the relation of a finite mind to the inexplicable nature of the space.

Descartes? progresss his statement by exemplifying the theory that his thought of the space must hold been caused by that which has space world and flawlessness, viz. , God. Descartes? belief welcomes the contention that an thought of eternity need non be caused by the space, so long as one can contemplate the space as that which is non finite.

Since the person is finite, one demand non look outside of one? s ego to happen a cause for an thought which lacks the belongings of being finite.

In the instance of false thoughts, we may so hold the thought of a positive quality which is truly merely formed from the deficiency of some positive existent quality. Descartes explains, & # 8220 ; if it is true that cold is nil but the absence of heat, the thought which represents it to me as something existent and positive deserves to be called false. & # 8221 ; Descartes so qualifies the space as a true thought, which can non be produced by sing a want of its contradiction. He offers a strong logical account to back up his place. He says that the thought of the space must needfully be prior to the thought of the finite because otherwise, the person would hold no criterion by which to state that he or she lacks or desires anything. All Descartes truly needs to keep is that an aim, finite cause is deficient in accounting for the space and finite thoughts we have. It does non damage Descartes? place if it is shown that our apprehension of the space and of the finite might trust on each other at the same time. While these two keen counter-objections solidify the footing for Descartes statement, non all of his counter-objections are as acceptable. To Descartes, it is obvious that & # 8220 ; for a given thought to incorporate such and such nonsubjective world, it must certainly deduce it from some cause which contains at least every bit much formal reality. & # 8221 ;

Descartes? readers have a right to doubt his clear and distinguishable perceptual experience, including his observation that God? s kernel must affect being. Descartes explicitly recognizes that & # 8220 ; the manner [ he is ] made makes him prone to patronize error. & # 8221 ; The fact that Descartes is of all time prone to mistake is needfully a grant that there is some lack in his mind which causes that mistake. Descartes may non lawfully laic claim to a absolutely clear and distinguishable perceptual experience after he recognizes that that same perceptual experience is the merchandise of a fallible mind. Descartes defends himself in this regard by keeping that that none of his fallible perceptual experiences of all time struck him as clear and distinguishable in the first topographic point. But the exclusive fact that Descartes? clear and distinguishable perceptual experiences have non yet proven themselves faithlessly does non ask that they are true. Basically, the lone credibleness with which Descartes can endorse up his perceptual experiences, is the fact that he clearly and clearly perceives that whatever he clearly and clearly perceives must be true. This begs the inquiry and leaves any reader who does non portion his lucidity of perceptual experience at a loss.

Besides Descartes? trust on his clear and distinguishable perceptual experience, there are other feasible expostulations to the ontological statement which he is unable to suppress.

Descartes claims there is no incompatibility in his derivation of God? s existent being from what must arise as a conceptual belongings of a conceptual nature. Descartes argues that any property which can be predicated is an acceptable belongings of something? s nature. On one manus, Descartes is right ; existent being meets the cardinal standard for being a belongings in the sense that it describes. But as being still maps grammatically, this statement won? Ts have the visual aspect of a logical predicate. Hence, Descartes may utilize semantics to pull experiential decisions from conceptual premises, but he has no footing to claim his decision is logically accurate.

In the metaphysical statement, I have shown that Descartes is able to logically turn to serious unfavorable judgments, and his resort to clear and distinguishable perceptual experience is damaging, yet secondary. In the ontological statement, nevertheless, Descartes relies on his clear and distinguishable perceptual experience to confirm his most cardinal statements and the fact that something appears to be clear and distinguishable is non plenty to confirm one? s claims. If one grants Descartes the truth-value of his clear and distinguishable perceptual experiences, his ontological statement still gives the reader equal chance to can dispute the logical cogency of the statement. These defects discredit the legitimacy of the ontological statement and back up the metaphysical statement? s makings as the more successful of the two.