The Role of Intelligence Failures in the 21st Century an analysis of the intelligence landscape

            In recent years the failure of American intelligence services to provide accurate data on foreign and domestic threats has become a major story. Criticism has come from a number of angles. Some claim that the intelligence community has been hamstrung by policies that make it impossible to operate in today’s environment. More cynical critics decry the politicization of intelligence. In other words, they claim the intelligence community has become an arm of Presidential policy; a tool to further international initiatives. All sides agree that the nature of future threats will be more complex than ever.

            For this reason intelligence services must become more sophisticated in order to accurately identify and define future threats. A failure to do so could have catastrophic implications.

            Failures of the recent past provide an opportunity for improvement. They also open a window on the importance of accurate intelligence in context of 21st century threats.

Recent experience shows the need for cutting age technological methods. At the same time the human element of intelligence gathering is as important as ever. A framework that provides independent scrutiny of intelligence will be critical in the current century.

Background

            There are three agencies under the Homeland Security umbrella that are primarily responsible for day to day intelligence operations. These agencies are designed to weave a comprehensive web of protection for the United States and its interests. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the domestic law enforcement portion of the web.

            The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is charged with handling foreign-based threats. The National Security Council (NSC) is part of the President’s cabinet and makes strategic decisions and recommendations to the Commander in Chief.

            Of United States intelligence agencies, the CIA has the most privileged access to the President. In having this access, it carries what may be an inordinate amount of influence. Dissenting voices within other agencies are often squelched. The bureaucratic nature of the agency may work against its effectiveness in a 21st century threat environment. Contrary to popular belief, the agency is not equipped with the latest in technical and analytical tools. Its “antiquated capabilities are devoted to exploitation of clandestinely acquired information sheds only a narrow light on the broad array of national security threats” (Russell, 2009). While the organizational focus is relatively narrow, the bureaucratic structure becomes successively wider. The CIA employs “a top-down organizational model rather than the bottom-up model that succeeds in the information technology sector” (Russell, 2009). The bureaucratic drag on the agency has led to some significant shortcomings.

            In the wake of 9/11 the lack of agents and contacts within terror groups and terror-supporting nations became well known. As a knee-jerk response many of the agencies analysts were put into field training programs. The net result of this may have been negative however. Richard Russell writes that “Stripping the analytic ranks for the counter terrorism war may meet the crisis du jour, but it risks denying the analytic capabilities needed to forecast the next battles and wars” (2009).

            In an attempt to remedy these problems while also increasing inter-agency cooperation, the Department of Homeland Security was created. It has made some progress in recent years. Its sheer size and the vastness of its responsibilities give rise to problems of its own though. The agency is still finding its footing.

The Anatomy of Intelligence Failures – 9/11 and the Iraq War

            The lack of human intelligence assets within the Al-Qaeda inner circle became apparent after the attacks of September 11, 2001. The DO, or operations division of the CIA was primarily responsible for this state of affairs. This lack limited the options that could be undertaken while also creating a void of reliable information. Into that void came more distortions, guesses and gut feelings.

            The intelligence failure that preceded the terrorist attacks of 9/11/2001 was devastating. At the same time, it affords a rare opportunity to revamp the intelligence structure. It was not as if there was no warning at all – Here lies the challenge for the intelligence apparatus in the 21st century.

            After the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole, the CIA had learned much about Al-Qaeda. The FBI had reams of un-analyzed data about operatives within the United States. The perpetrators themselves were on the radar of the FBI, if not local law enforcement. Both agencies had intercepted “chatter” – a sudden increase in communications between suspected terrorists. This was a sign that something major was in the works, but what?

            The 1993 attack on the World Trade Center had awakened the intelligence community. If not for a relatively small miscalculation on the part of the terrorists, the tower would have been brought down then. The attacker who parked the truck bomb under the Center escaped the country, vowing to come back and complete the job. Intelligence reform efforts were made at that time, but were not substantial or coherent enough to prevent the series of failures that led up to 9/11.

            A lack of skill and manpower in the analyst sectors of these agencies led to very non-specific warnings being provided to the President and the NSC. The lack of specificity made it impossible to bolster targeted prevention efforts and adequately prepare first responders. Al Qaeda agents were able to enter the country, obtain legal ID, take flight lessons and eventually board the doomed planes. No specific warnings about terrorism had gone out to the airlines on that day.

            Another one of the most conspicuous intelligence failures in recent years occurred prior to the Iraq War. The politicization of intelligence and the failure of the DO to provide inside operatives would haunt the agency again as they prepared, this time, to mount an offensive war.

In the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks the United States had adopted a more aggressive stance toward potential threats.

            The Iraqi dictatorship of Saddam Hussein was a continual thorn in the side of the United States and its allies. Many times the dictator violated the terms of the peace agreement reached at the conclusion of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. The Iraqi Air Force violated “no fly zones” and the Army fired at U.S. warplanes. Saddam also resisted international efforts to monitor his chemical weapons and nuclear programs. These actions were provocative, but not serious enough for the Allies to resume the war prior to 9/11.

            In the end pre-Iraq War intelligence was not based on hard data and reliable witnesses “But rather on the advice of a handful of partisans with a political axe to grind” (Preble, 2004). A void of good information created the room for misinformation. Several sources were more than happy to exaggerate or guess about the level of risk Saddam posed. In their defense many of these individuals had either suffered under the brutality of Saddam’s regime or had been permanently exiled.

            After 9/11 several anti-Saddam factions tried to take advantage of the more aggressive American stance. The CIA had few language-trained agents in-country at the time. Therefore Iraqi dissidents became primary sources. The reports they gave were far from conclusive. In one instance the Secretary of State was left to interpret a confusing mass of information. “He (Powell) examined an intelligence chart that supposedly outlined the development of Saddam’s nuclear program – It looked like a bowl of spaghetti” (Drogin, 2007).

            Only after the war was well under way was it discovered that all Allied intelligence, not just that of the U.S., was critically flawed. Saddam’s weapons stockpile was not nearly as vast as was widely believed. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) were never found.

            In the run-up to the Iraq War, the intelligence community was overly reliant on political sources, such as Ahmed Chalabi of the exiled Iraqi National Congress. That organization produced reports that overstated Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein’s military capabilities. Chalabi later admitted the intelligence flaws, claiming “We are heroes in error” (Preble, 2004). Chalabi himself had not actually lived in Iraq since 1956.

            The CIA had combined high-tech methods with the opinions of Iraqi dissidents to produce the reports it provided to the President. A lack of internal quality control and the lack of viable human intelligence were critical flaws in the intelligence gathering process. The failures go beyond this mis-identification of possible threats. Intelligence failures can have a multiplying effect, as shown during the Iraq War.

            The war was launched on the assumption that a relatively smooth transition to democracy would occur after Saddam Hussein was deposed. This was hardly what happened. Instead an insurgent war erupted that has cost many thousands of lives. Some officials had warned that a chaotic situation would unfold. Their voices were largely squelched – a problem the post 9/11 intelligence establishment was supposed to correct.

            The CIA was, in effect relying on hearsay evidence that had already been politically skewed before reaching U.S. officials. Arguably, that politicization was then repeated in the American bureaucracy. The information the President eventually received was heavily distorted. The CIA, despite being an agency designed with few partisan influences, still allowed the political atmosphere to effect its evaluation of the Iraqi threat.

            It is not likely that the CIA or other intelligence organizations consciously set out to become a tool of American foreign policy. They did not have to in order for a major error to occur though. Their inability to provide enough solid intelligence allowed for the political arena and American citizens to make their own evaluations. Once public opinion was formed tremendous pressure was put on politicians and intelligence officials to frame the information within the predominant interpretation of the situation.

            As an intelligence agent of sorts himself, the President of the United States shares some responsibility for the failures prior to the Iraq War. President Bush, certainly aware of the lack of inside information, seemingly put an inordinate amount of trust in the words of Iraqi dissidents. This underlines the point that intelligence failure can occur at many levels.

            Clearly an element of wishful thinking bled down from the Executive branch through the intelligence structure. Also, the paranoia created by the 9/11 attacks had caused the administration to lash out in many directions. Osama bin Laden was the boogeyman at least until it became apparent that he could not be captured. Saddam Hussein then became a viable substitute. He ruled an oil rich dictatorship not from a cave, but in plain sight. He also had a past history of aggression against his neighboring countries, and of making belligerent statements against the United States.

            With little reliable evidence to count on, analysts probably gave this history too much weight in their evaluation of his current capabilities. Setting a dangerous precedent Secretary of State Colin Powell went before the United Nations with incomplete evidence framed artfully to prove a predetermined point.

            The President felt that the costs of inaction are greater than the costs of action. Intelligence failures had provided room for the policy makers to draw their own conclusions and craft corresponding policies. Inevitably these policies were filtered through a political prism.

            There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein was a terrible dictator. Bodies of his victims are still being unearthed by the thousands. Millions still suffer the physical and psychological effects of three decades of brutal rule. From that perspective it can be argued that the war was, in fact, a good thing. It would be a fatal mistake, however, to ignore the flawed intelligence that played a large part in leading the United States into war.

            What cannot be argued with is the fact that intelligence failures altered public opinion, foreign policy and international relations in ways that will be felt for decades to come. This provides a dangerous warning about the possible effects of failed intelligence in the 21st century. The stakes are higher now than they ever have been. The problems are more complex and our enemies are driven by motives we still do not fully understand.

The 21st Century Intelligence Landscape

            The 21st century promises to be one of new, more difficult and more complex challenges. The biggest threat to the United States is no longer another superpower. This does not decrease the overall threat level but it does change its nature, along with the nature in which U.S. intelligence will have to operate in order to avoid mistakes.

            For the intelligence community, the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole, the attacks on embassies in Africa, the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 9/11 attacks changed almost everything. Instead of primarily focusing on events overseas, the CIA and other agencies were now forced to play defense. The homeland had to be defended and the agencies had to defend themselves from a higher level of public scrutiny than ever. Any failure to protect the homeland could result in major political and bureaucratic upheaval.

            The CIA, by its nature, is a secretive and internally focused organization. Personnel and visitors are prevented from bringing any kind of electronic devices into CIA headquarters. The agency’s secrecy fit with the Cold War context it was constructed under.

            Today’s and tomorrow’s threats are different however. The agency may be better served by increasing its cooperation with outside, even international agencies and corporations. These outside entities can provide much needed expertise in areas such as data collection, debriefing techniques and internal security. This would require recognition of the global nature of information in today’s world. As Shorrocks puts it:

            Due to the global dissemination of information and communication technologies

            were all enmeshed together in a global infrastructure that has become critical

            to the U.S. intelligence apparatus.                     (2008)

            If anything, the terrorist groups are currently taking better advantage of this reality than are U.S. services. Groups such as Al-Qaeda are doing everything from sponsoring webcasts to training computer hackers to break into vital U.S. systems. The threats of this century will be more dynamic, smart and ruthless, availing themselves of every possible tool to pursue their goals.

Recognizing the multi-faceted nature of today’s threats, intelligence agencies have begun to establish partnerships with outside agencies.

            This does carry with it some dangers which the CIA, for one has already experienced. For the agencies these relationships must be formed from a position of strength, not desperation. Outsourcing does not mean intelligence agencies can stop developing themselves – quite the contrary. Dealing from a position of weakness can result in situations such as the following:

            Given the huge increase in contracting…and the widespread use of outsourcing

            in the CIA’s clandestine service, it’s a near certainty that contractors today are

            also breaking foreign laws hundreds of times a day.

                                                                                              (Shorrocks, 2008)

            The corporatization of intelligence gathering has huge potential for decreasing errors if it is done right. As seen from the Shorrocks quote over reliance and lack of regulation can open a can of worms. In the 21st century the single biggest potential asset for U.S. intelligence is the cooperation of other nations. Understandably, most nations will have a low tolerance for law-breaking U.S. contractors.

            Some elements within the agencies also remain highly resistant to corporatization. This refers not so much to outsourcing or contracting, but to a restructuring of the organizational structure itself. Even after the successful terrorist attacks and the failure in pre-Iraq War intelligence the inverted organizational structure of the CIA remains largely intact. The only difference is that the organization has now been brought under the aegis of the Department of Homeland Security. It remains to be seen whether that organization will smooth the flow of information or just add yet another layer of bureaucracy, which is at least party responsible for some of the endemic problems the intelligence community still faces..

            The lack of Arabic language skills is still a hurdle the intelligence community is trying to get over. This lack hurts the agencies on two fronts. First, it makes it difficult to develop operatives who can work unnoticed in Arab-language countries. Secondly, it makes it difficult for analysts to interpret chatter. These communications are often cloaked in rare dialects, symbolic codes and other deceptive forms. A variety of regional cultural differences make it all the more difficult to develop a substantial number of inside contacts.

            Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups have proven themselves to be extremely resourceful. These organizations are capable of playing and winning a global political chess match. They will try to cause intelligence errors in the United States and other countries because they know that when these errors are exposed political systems and regimes become destabilized.

            There is also a danger in becoming overly focused on the Arab-language world. For example, a terrorist group might disseminate false information in Arabic, through middle Eastern channels. Meanwhile their real plans are being communicated in some other language or format.

The effects of these shortcomings should not be lost on the intelligence agencies. Some had a front row seat to the effects of these failures.

            The Trade Center burned for a hundred days. All during that time the acrid

            stench penetrated the office of the FBI. A sickening reminder of their

            failure to stop the attack and their own narrow escape from death.

                                                                                              (Wright, 2006)

            In future decades the fallout from failure will not necessarily come in the form we expect it to be. The 21st century intelligence community can never afford to let its guard down from this point on. Some agency improvements are measurable. Others can only be judged in the context of whether or not our enemies can execute attacks and how effective the response is when they do occur.

            Seeing opportunities in past failures is often difficult. The agencies responsible for intelligence gathering and analysis are still publicly run and funded year-to-year. In a sense they are competing for the same dollars. The high level of public scrutiny of these agencies is likely to continue. In order for them to survive and be effective a re-committment to public service is needed. From that perspective, needed reforms can take root.

Going Forward and Conclusion

            Having accurate and actionable intelligence will be critical for survival in the 21st century. Conversely, intelligence failure is more possible than ever and can have devastating effects. The key for intelligence agencies is to learn from failures. There were plenty of examples to choose from within the last 30 years. Broadly stated, the reasons for these failures include: A general lack of vigilance, the politicization of intelligence, the lack of human sources and the lack of communication between the various agencies charged with protecting the homeland and evaluating potential threats.

            Have these problems been solved? Only to a small degree. For example “The CIA concluded an internal review of the bioweapons mistakes in early 2007 but refused to release the review” (Drogin, 2007). The efforts to correct the problems have unearthed problems of their own.

            The pre-9/11 intelligence structure was like a cob web present in all corners of the room but not connected in the middle. According to Wright, “the failures of the FBI, CIA and NSA to share intelligence that could have prevented the 9/11 attacks” (2006). The 9/11 terrorists exploited these gaps with terrible results. Since 9/11, there has been an ongoing effort to “close the web”.

            There are now better communications and analysis links between intelligence services, law enforcement, immigration officials and first responders. The web is far from complete however.

More sophisticated screening and training programs are needed for security, transportation and other infrastructure employees.

            In the most likely trouble areas the U.S. still lacks reliable human assets. Dependable, native language operatives are desperately needed. The military occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq provide a possibility to develop such sources. Meanwhile U.S. based training of future foreign operatives must continue to increase. It is not an impossible task. During WW2, the Allies developed operatives whose efforts resulted in the breaking of the German Enigma code and an effective program of deception leading up to the D-Day invasion in 1944. From that point on the Allies were one step ahead of the Germans for the rest of the war. The challenge is more difficult now. Technology benefits both sides of any conflict. The United States faces an enemy more oblique, scattered and probably more fanatical than that of earlier wars.

            Technology is capable of casting a wide net around potential threats, thereby giving analysts the opportunity to identify and assess them in more detail. Technology also has its limits, as shown in the lead up to the Iraqi War. It provided us with images of facilities that  “could be” related to the production of chemical weapons. Audio intercepts did not prove the purpose of these facilities, but also did not disprove the WMD thesis. This type of data combined with the opinions of dissidents and the hunches of policy makers led to major errors. The conspicuous lack of inside information was not given due consideration.

            The intelligence failures in the past decade were so spectacular as to provide a rare opportunity for reform. According to Richard Russell the intelligence crisis allows a chance to “crack heads and force the force the sorts of consolidation and cooperation that have been inhibited by bureaucratic constipation” (2009). If this opportunity is not taken, 21st century intelligence failures could end up being more problematic than the potential threats they are designed to defeat.

            The politicization of intelligence inevitably leads to leaks. These leaks are tidbits of information, often classified, that are released to the public. Typically these leaks are removed from context and framed in a way to promote the interests of a certain individual or group. The increasingly contentious political environment in the early 21st century increases the risk of incomplete and distorted information reaching the public.

            Once in the political sphere these leaks can result in public pressure that ultimately directs intelligence agencies down the wrong path. Accurate intelligence means little if it cannot be acted upon. Actionable, but inaccurate, intelligence can lead to disasters, the effects of which unfold for decades. The Iraqi War revealed a disturbing politicization of the intelligence gathering process. This led to major errors and, arguably, to a war that needn’t have been fought. The extended effects of this war will be with us throughout the 21st century.

            Corrections were made after 9/11, but not enough to prevent the intelligence failure that preceded the Iraq War. If pre-emptive war is becoming the rule rather than the exception major intelligence errors must somehow become a thing of the past. A flurry of efforts took place as the fires at the Pentagon and the World Trade Center were being doused. Evidence suggests, however that the agencies are beginning to slide back in to the bureaucratic malaise.

            For America, the reformation of intelligence agencies may be a life or death issue. The same sequence of errors that led to the Iraq War could also cause analysts to miss a threat to the homeland. Our political system and way of life could be altered as a result.

            Legislative steps must be taken to maintain the non-partisan status of the CIA and other intelligence agencies. Similar steps should be taken internally. The FBI, for example, is notorious for internal turf wars and the currying of political favor in order to increase its funding.

            A widening of the intelligence structure has potential benefits that outweigh the pitfalls. Private sector intelligence gathering agencies that do work on behalf of the government must be regulated, monitored and evaluated closely. Obviously, this costs time and money.

At the same time, many of these agencies have a worldwide reach and access to state of the art technology. Competition for government contracts can also foster highly advanced training programs for agents and a sophisticated analysis network. Proponents of the status quo may argue that this type of information must remain solely in the hands of the government.

            In the information age this level of control over information has become less and less likely to maintain. Instead of fighting the inevitable, the U.S. intelligence system would be better served by taking advantage of corporate intelligence capabilities. In the meantime evaluation of its past failures can help ensure future success.

            Did intelligence failure cause 9/11? Not directly. However the terrorists expected and depended on it in the planning and execution of their deeds. Better intelligence quality and better coordination would have raised the odds that the plot could have been completed.

            Did intelligence failure cause the Iraq War? Partially. Ultimately, Saddam’s belligerence and disregard of United Nations resolutions sealed his fate. Intelligence failure probably resulted in the war being fought at a different time than it might have been otherwise. It seems a small distinction but the political and cultural fallout could have been much different.

            Intelligence failures do not occur in a vacuum. For instance, the implementation of a preemptive war doctrine could be traced to the unique timing of the Iraq conflict. This paper examines the threat of intelligence failure in reference to the most well known intelligence agencies. In fact intelligence failure also comprises the flawed ways in which leaders, allies and enemies react to information. The world is increasingly dangerous. Leaders are more likely to react severely to perceived, but unproven, threats. Fallout from acting on flawed intelligence is widespread, unpredictable and unintended. The effects are world changing.

            Intelligence failure became a more serious problem toward the end of the 20th century. The events of the early 21st century show just a few of the consequences of such failure. The problem can be fixed, but it is not one that can be fixed overnight. For this reason the prospect of intelligence failure remains at least as dangerous as the threats it attempts to defeat.

Sources

Barnfold, James. (2004). A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq and the abuse of America’s intelligence agencies. New York: Doubleday.

Drogin, Bob. (2007). Curveball: spies, lies and the con man who caused a war. New York: Random House.

Friedman, George. (2004). America’s Secret War: inside the hidden worldwide struggle between America and its enemies. New York: Doubleday.

Gaffney, Frank. (2006). “Intelligence Failures.” Accessed 3/15/2009 from: http://www.military.com/opinion/0,15202,95364,00.html .

Preble, Christopher. (2004). “Intelligence Failures: now and then.” Cato Institute. Accessed 3/15/2008 from: http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=2733 .

Russell, Richard. (2009). “Intelligence Failures.” Hoover Institution. Accessed 3/14/2009 from:             http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3440396.html .

Shorrock, Tim. (2008). Spies for Hire: the secret world of intelligence outsourcing. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Wright, Lawrence. (2006). The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the road to 9/11. New York: Knopf.