Rules of battle that the United States followed were formulated to restrict the force of operations in North Vietnam. The focal point was to destruct North Vietnam’s abilities to contend. but in a manner that would non upset China and Russia. The last thing the United States wanted was a full blown war with the Communists ( Moss. 2010 ) . The ROE with limited war political orientation and its premises are seen through the positions and experiences of six degrees.
The soldier’s position was that limited war political orientation made their lives more disputing. They were concerned with making the assigned undertaking and avoiding being sent place in a box. Soldiers felt the Vietcong were brave in comparing to the ARVN ( Moss. p. 203 ) . They felt they were contending person else’s war.
Battalion Commander’s mission were to carry on operations. The aim was to hold maximal consequences with limited resources. They had to follow ROE. but understand how to pull strings the regulations to do combat effectual. They had more functional independency so the higher ranks.
The Division Commander such as ARVN 7th Division. Lieutenant Colonel John Paul Van. who was known for winging a spotter plane during the Ap Buc Battle. felt as though the ARVN were unqualified ( Moss. p. 97 ) . He did non swear ARVN officers and it appeared to him that the recruits had no passion for the battle. “They had no chauvinistic feelings for South Vietnam” ( Moss. p. 100 ) .
Robert McNamara. Secretary of Defense. was 2nd in bid merely to President Johnson. He was accountable for developing ROE for U. S. military forces in Vietnam. McNamara requested more military personnels and wanted to use Reservist and the National Guard ( Moss. 2010 ) . President Johnson did non let this to go on. He had many concerns with how the remainder of the universe would see the United States. To some grade. these ROE were so limited that the U. S. was set up for failure.
General Westmoreland. commanding officer of the U. S. military personnels. was finally responsible for strategically carry oning the war. His abrasion scheme was thought to take to triumph. He believed that the United States monolithic firepower and ability to seek and destruct would kill enemies faster than they could be replaced ( Moss. p. 179 ) . Finally. the Vietcong would be so worn down that triumph would be inevitable.
President Johnson’s function as Commander in Chief gave him the concluding say on the ROE. These were restrictive regulations that provided boundaries for the war. The President did non desire China and the Soviets to step in and the battle with the North Vietnamese going a monolithic war with its Alliess. Johnson frequently was torn between the dovish and militant demands of his military advisers ( Moss. 2010 ) .
The United States continually underestimated the Vietnamese tactics. Guerilla warfare and the Vietcong’s air defence had crippled the United States aims. The thought that finally the North Vietnamese would wash up and triumph was in the close hereafter was destroyed.
Mentions:
Moss. G. D. ( 2010 ) . Vietnam: An American ordeal. ( Sixth ed. ) . Upper Saddle River. New jersey: Pearsons
Education. Inc.
