Essay On Kierkegaard Essay, Research Paper

Willed Faith and Belief

An essay on Kierkegaard

1. Introduction

Can we will to believe what we choose? Are at that place times when we should at least attempt to believe in something? If it were easy to pull strings our ain beliefs, low self-pride would disappear, the divorce rate would worsen, and over-consumption would vanish with the reminder: & # 8220 ; I already have adequate stuff. & # 8221 ;

Yet there is something fishy about willed beliefs. Possibly it is non ethically responsible to alter beliefs without respect for the truth of the matter.1 And the epistemic coherency of the impression is questionable. Possibly belief provinces are merely non the sort of things that are under the influence of our will & # 8211 ; correspondent to the fact that we can non make up one’s mind to comprehend blueness when looking at a ruddy apple.

This is an issue that has attracted some involvement in the class of the history of idea. In this paper I will be looking into the positions of a modern-day writer who sees the relationship of willing to belief as an issue repeating thoughout the history of doctrine.

In his book Religious Belief and the Will2, Louis Pojman identifies Soren Kierkegaard as a direct normative volitionalist, i.e. a mind who holds that beliefs can and ought to be ( at least in some fortunes ) straight willed.

C. Stephen Evans, in & # 8220 ; Does Kierkegaard Think Beliefs Can Be Directly Willed? & # 8221 ; 3 responds to Pojman & # 8217 ; s place, reasoning that the ascription of direct volitionalism to Kierkegaard is excessively strong a claim. Evans does admit Kierkegaard as an indirect volitionalist, i.e. as keeping that we can convey about belief provinces indirectly, as effects of other actions that are themselves straight willed. ( An illustration might be my taking up a winter athletics, in order to bring forth a belief that winter is an gratifying season. )

Additional articles4 have appeared in the literature late, which respond to Pojman & # 8217 ; s place in Religious Belief and the Will, every bit good as positions presented in Pojman & # 8217 ; s book entitled The Logic of Subjectivity5, and a paper Pojman late contributed to the on-going treatment, viz. & # 8220 ; Kierkegaard on Faith and Freedom. & # 8221 ; 6 Various related issues are dealt with in these treatments, many of which would do interesting subjects for another paper.

In this paper I will be analyzing Pojman & # 8217 ; s analysis of Kierkegaard & # 8217 ; s positions, as articulated in Religious Belief and the Will, and Evans & # 8217 ; s paper, as it relates specifically to statements contained in Pojman & # 8217 ; s book. For support of their varying places, both writers rely chiefly upon mentions to Philosophical Fragments7 and Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments8, by the pseudonymous writer Johannes Climacus. These are the Kierkegaardian Hagiographas that I will be mentioning to every bit good. The inquiry of the relationship between the positions of Kierkegaard and the positions attributed to the pseudonymous writer will non be discussed here. I will mention to the writer as Kierkegaard when reacting to a treatment that refers to & # 8216 ; Kierkegaard. & # 8217 ; When reacting to a treatment which refers to & # 8216 ; Climacus, & # 8217 ; and in my ain analysis of the The Fragments and The Postscript, I prefer to mention to the writer under the anonym.

In the first subdivision of my paper, I will depict Pojman & # 8217 ; s positions refering Kierkegaard, and I will rephrase the definitions of volitionalism laid out by Pojman. I will explain the proffered evidences for his analysis of Kierkegaard, and will see the strength of his place. In the 2nd portion of this paper, I will analyze the extent to which Evans successfully replies to Pojman. The issue of the strength of Evans & # 8217 ; s ain place will be addressed. I will offer an option to Evans & # 8217 ; s review.

In my concluding subdivision I will look into the relevancy of the treatment of volitionalism to a general reading of the Postscript. Are at that place evidences for saying that Climacus is recommending either direct, or indirect, or normative volitionalism? Is at that place ground to surmise that he would oppose these places?

2. Pojman & # 8217 ; s position that Kierkegaard is a volitionalist

In Religious Belief and the Will, Pojman offers an overview of how the relation of willing to faith and belief varies throughout the history of western idea. He provides descriptions of assorted well-known minds in order to exemplify types of volitionalism, and he presents statements intended to sabotage the cogency and coherency of direct and normative volitionalism. I am taking issue merely with Pojman & # 8217 ; s word picture of Kierkegaard as a direct normative volitionalist.

Pojman defines volitionalism as the position that believing is an act that is under our control. Direct volitionalism is the place that one can get beliefs straight, merely by willing to believe certain propositions. Indirect volitionalism is the position some beliefs arise indirectly, from basic Acts of the Apostless of the will. Pojman identifies an extra set of differentiations. Some volitionalists are normative, some are merely descriptive. The latter is the psychological place that the & # 8220 ; voliting & # 8221 ; of beliefs is possible. The former goes a measure farther, and asserts a normative component, keeping that it is allowable or obligatory to take the necessary stairss to get beliefs based on nonepistemic considerations ( Pojman, 143-144 ) .

It appears that it is the place of normative volitionalism that Pojman finds peculiarly confusing. Rejection of the value of this place is a major drift behind the authorship of his book, as evidenced by certain comments made by Pojman in the debut to Religious Belief and the Will:

This work arose from two experiences in my life. As a kid I found myself doubting spiritual statements, and being told that there was something disloyal or apostate about such attitudes. I frequently found it impossible to do springs of religion into orthodoxy, as I was supposed to make.

The 2nd experience that led to working out these thoughts was analyzing the work of Soren Kierkegaard, the Danish Christian Existentialist. Kierkegaard, as the reader will see, was a masterful volitionalist, seemingly believing that every belief was a merchandise of the will in some manner. It was seeking to come to clasps with his idea in graduate school that convinced me there was something incorrect with, at least, some types of volitionalism ( Pojman, xii ) .

We can sympathise with Pojman here, as he rebels against the impression that he is someway morally in the incorrect if he does non bring forth religion at will. But is this Kierkegaard & # 8217 ; s place? Does Kierkegaard keep that we can and ought to will belief? Is the & # 8220 ; spring of religion & # 8221 ; constituted by a determination to believe in God & # 8211 ; despite deficiency of grounds, or even grounds to the reverse?

Pojman does non do an expressed designation of the & # 8220 ; spring of religion & # 8221 ; with the willing of religion. However, this designation does look to be one that is implicitly assumed, as evidenced by comments made in his debut, quoted above. Pojman is non entirely in this popular reading of Kierkegaard & # 8217 ; s construct of spring. But in my ain reading of the Fragments and Concluding Unscientific Postscript, I failed to happen a strong indicant that Kierkegaard intends the look & # 8220 ; leap & # 8221 ; to be understood in this sense.

I will reexamine some treatments of & # 8220 ; leap & # 8221 ; found in the Postscript, in this paper & # 8217 ; s concluding subdivision, below. The point I want to do here is that Pojman seems to hold a peculiar axe to crunch with Kierkegaard. Pojman is responding to the normative direct volitionalism he ab initio saw in Kierkegaard during his yearss as a alumnus pupil.

Pojman offers mentions to the Hagiographas of Kierkegaard as support for the claim that Kierkegaard is a normative, direct volitionalist.

Pojman points out that, harmonizing to Kierkegaard, & # 8220 ; Even if we had direct cogent evidence for theism or Christianity, we would non desire them ; for they would take the venture out of the spiritual experience & # 8230 ; For him [ Kierkegaard ] religion is the highest virtuousness exactly because it is objectively unsure, for personal growing into selfhood depends on uncertainness, hazard & # 8230 ; & # 8221 ; ( Pojman, 71 ) . Pojman & # 8217 ; s beginning for these comments is the chapter & # 8216 ; The Historical Point of View & # 8217 ; in the Postscript.

As I read Pojman, these, and similar mentions, are intended to demo that Kierkegaard reasoned:

1 ) The truth of Christianity can non be objectively demonstrated hence,

2 ) religion develops non as a effect of grounds, but can merely ensue from a determination to believe & # 8211 ; regardless of the deficiency of grounds, and irrespective of the absurdness of what is believed.

The former of these claims is an accurate description of Kierkegaard & # 8217 ; s positions as represented in the Postscript. The being of God, and the truth of Christianity, can non be known with certainty. Furthermore, it is non merely a affair of equal grounds non yet holding been accumulated. The searcher of nonsubjective grounds for Christianity commits a sort of class error, & # 8220 ; [ a shifting of one genus to another ] & # 8220 ; ( Postscript, 136 ) . Proof of God & # 8217 ; s being is non to be found in the nonsubjective kingdom. & # 8220 ; An nonsubjective credence is Paganism or thoughtlessness. & # 8221 ; ( Postscript, 130 ) . It is pagan religion, because it regards God as immanent, or as within the nonsubjective kingdom. The strong belief that God & # 8217 ; s being is incontrovertible assumes His immanency, instead than His transcendency beyond the cognizable nonsubjective kingdom.

At issue here is the illation to the 2nd claim. I maintain that Kierkegaard does non keep the latter position, nor is he obliged to keep it ; it does non follow from the first claim. The fact that a belief does non ensue from nonsubjective grounds, does non connote that that belief consequences from merely willing it into being. Alternate accounts are possible.

Pojman interprets Kierkegaard as non merely a direct, but a normative volitionalist as good. But nil in these mentions justifies this reading. In fact, there is much in the Postscript which would back up an opposite decision, i.e that Kierkegaard rejects the whole impression of one single ordering values to another person. Though Kierkegaard frequently describes the subjectively bing mind as ethical, ( which, presumptively, we all & # 8220 ; ought & # 8221 ; to be, ) and he speaks of religion as the highest virtuousness, he adamantly avoids straight ordering anything to the single reader. A major dogma held by Kierkegaard is that an single must happen his or her ain manner. Kiekegaard admires Gotthold Ephraim Lessing for understanding this: & # 8220 ; [ Lessing ] understood and cognize how to keep, that the spiritual pertained to Lessing and Lessing entirely, merely as it pertains to any human being in the same manner & # 8230 ; & # 8221 ; ( Postscript, 65 ) . Ordering a manner of life to another would be to do an ethical judgement sing how that single ought to be populating. But this is exactly what Kierkegaard says we can non make. & # 8220 ; One individual can non ethically judge another because the one can understand the other merely as a possibility. & # 8221 ; ( Postscript, 322 ) .

There are extra mentions proposed by Pojman as connoting a direct volitionalist place in Kierkegaard. Pojman comments that harmonizing to Kierkegaard, the ego believes by virtuousness of the absurd. He quotes from the Postscript. & # 8220 ; Faith is the nonsubjective uncertainness due to the repulsive force of the absurd held fast by the passion of kernel & # 8230 ; & # 8221 ; ( Postscript, 611 ) . Pojman continues with an amplification on this quotation mark: & # 8220 ; The will is non able to believe what is basically absurd. Grace enables us to overthrow rules of the apprehension & # 8221 ; ( Pojman, 73 ) .

This statement is non different in sort from the illations based on the old mentions. It is the instance, harmonizing to Kierkegaard, that Christianity is absurd, and involves a paradox. But the ineffability of Christianity is non evidences to reason that religion can merely be attained as a consequence of a direct act of the will.

Pojman & # 8217 ; s statement does non do to connote that Kierkegaard thought we can, or should, will faith. The most that his mentions support is the contention that it is possible to believe something that is contrary to ground. Grant, for the interest of statement, that we can believe something that we at the same time acknowledge appears to be logically inconsistent. There can be accounts for a belief in something that is seemingly absurd. We can non deduce that the lone account for such a belief is that one has merely forced oneself to believe it.

Pojman besides cites the & # 8216 ; Interlude & # 8217 ; of the Philosophical Fragments. Pojman points out that Kierkegaard is discoursing a type of belief that is & # 8220 ; the organ for groking history, & # 8221 ; i.e. a type of ordinary belief, as opposed to faith. Though Pojman is chiefly concerned with spiritual belief, he finds in Kierkegaard & # 8217 ; s authorship, comments refering both types of belief. Pojman interprets the & # 8216 ; Interlude & # 8217 ; as indicating that Kierkegaard respects ordinary beliefs as straight willed. He says that harmonizing to Kierkegaard: & # 8220 ; In believing what happened in the yesteryear, the will is active in animating the scene or proposition. It takes testimony and reworks it, transforming the & # 8216 ; what & # 8217 ; of the yesteryear into an active & # 8216 ; how & # 8217 ; of the present, doing the history modern-day & # 8221 ; . ( Pojman, 73 ) . A close reading of the & # 8216 ; Interlude & # 8217 ; gives no indicant that this is the sort of thing Kierkegaard is stating. Rather, he is occupied with the construct of necessity, and how the construct of necessity can non use to anything that has & # 8220 ; come into being & # 8221 ; ( ( Philosophical Fragments

Pojman places great accent on a few lines from the & # 8216 ; Interlude & # 8217 ; : & # 8220 ; Belief is non so much a decision, as a declaration & # 8230 ; Belief is non a signifier of cognition, but a free act, an look of the will & # 8221 ; Philosophical Fragments, 83 ) .

Pojman concludes: & # 8220 ; The thought is that the imaginativeness ( of which nil homo is more free ) takes over in belief attainment. & # 8221 ; He continues, & # 8220 ; This is every bit extremist a volitionalism as Descartes & # 8217 ; s. We are free to believe whatever we please & # 8221 ; ( Pojman, 73 ) .

3. Evans Replies to Pojman

It is this statement of Pojman & # 8217 ; s, based on the Fragments, that Stephen Evans responds to in his paper & # 8220 ; Does Kierkegaard Think Beliefs Can Be Directly Willed? & # 8221 ; Evans comments: & # 8220 ; The evidences for this reading [ of Kierkegaard as a direct volitionalist ] are likely most strong in the Interlude & # 8221 ; ( Evans, 175 ) .

Evans accepts Pojman & # 8217 ; s statements against the cogency of the direct volitionalist & # 8217 ; s place. But Evans challenges Pojman & # 8217 ; s reading of Kierkegaard as a direct volitionalist.

Leting that Kierkegaard & # 8217 ; s positions on ordinary belief have deductions for his positions refering religion ( religion is a type of belief, ) Evans returns to consideration of Pojman & # 8217 ; s statement based on these transitions from the & # 8216 ; Interlude & # 8217 ; .

Evans explains that in this treatment, Kierkegaard is reacting to spiritual Hegelians, who claim that historical truths can be understood as necessary truths ; Christianity therefore could rest on a solid foundation ( Evans, 175 ) . Evans points out that Kiekegaard is keeping the place that historical averments are contingent, that the historical kingdom can non affect necessity. Historical truths are hence susceptible to the statements of the sceptics, and can non anchor Christianity. For aid on this point, Kierkegaard recalls that the classical sceptics:

& # 8230 ; doubted, non by virtuousness of cognition, but by virtuousness of the will & # 8230 ; [ the sceptics held that ] uncertainty can be terminated merely in freedom, by an act of the will ( Philosophical Fragments,82 ) .

We can admit, with the sceptics every bit good as Kierkegaard, that what is non known with certainty can be doubted. We are free to doubt what is contingent. Nothing coerces the decision ; the regulations of logic do non ask our credence of a contingent fact.

It is merely if a few lines from the & # 8216 ; Interlude & # 8217 ; , such as those quoted above, are taken out of context that it appears that Kierkegaard is reasoning ( in the words of Pojman ) that we are free to believe whatever we please.

But like Pojman, Evans ( though he presented a limpid sum-up of the subject of the & # 8216 ; Interlude & # 8217 ; ) seems to read these transitions without equal attending to context. He analyses & # 8211 ; without respect to overall message of the Interlude & # 8211 ; the description of the sceptics & # 8217 ; concluding that was quoted by Pojman, in order to beef up his claim that Kierkegaard & # 8217 ; s comments refering the sceptics do non connote direct volitionalism. Evans recalls a important Lin

vitamin E that Pojman quotes, and emphasizes Kierkegaard’s reasoning phrase: “… uncertainty can be terminated merely in freedom, … something every Grecian sceptic would understand, inasmuch as he understood himself” ( Philosophical Fragments,82 ) . Evans respects this comment approximately self-awareness as grounds that Kierkegaard is non a direct volitionalist. Evans points out that that direct volitionalism assumes self-awareness. If an single doesn’t to the full understand what he is willing, he can’t be said to be capable of straight commanding his beliefs.

Evans says:

In following belief to will, Climacus by no agencies needfully implies that beliefs are consciously chosen. If anything is apparent approximately Kierkegaard as a psychologist, it is that he is a depth psychologist. While Kierkegaard surely assigns will a cardinal topographic point in the human personality, he thinks that human existences barely of all time do picks with full consciousness of what they are making. ( Evans, 178 ) .

Evans is stating that the ground this relationship to the will doesn & # 8217 ; t entail direct volitionalism, is because the skeptic may non be wholly aware of the fact that he is doubting as a consequence of his willing the doubting.

It may be that human existences and sceptics do non to the full understand all their ain actions. But this point of Evans & # 8217 ; s does non efficaciously undermine Pojman & # 8217 ; s position that Kierkegaard is a direct volitionalist. It may still be that in some instances, instances when we to the full understand what we are making, we are cognizant that beliefs and uncertainties are Acts of the Apostless of the will. If direct volitionalism presupposes self-awareness, so the willed belief can still happen, but merely when the person has understood him or herself. Therefore, Evans & # 8217 ; s statement does non wholly discredit the thesis that Kierkegaard is a direct volitionalist ; it does, nevertheless, undermine the strength of Pojman & # 8217 ; s statement, as based on the & # 8216 ; Interlude. & # 8217 ;

Evans is non opposed to the thought of Kierkegaard as an indirect volitionalist. He points out that the transitions from the & # 8216 ; Interlude & # 8217 ; , though non an indicant of direct volitionalism, do bespeak indirect volitionalism. Indirect volitionalism, Evans points out, ( and Pojman agrees, ) is non an obnoxious thesis.

Evans explains the transitions quoted from the & # 8216 ; Interlude & # 8217 ; : & # 8220 ; Kierkegaard may hold in head the well-known fact that beliefs can be modified indirectly, in the class of making other things & # 8221 ; ( Evans, 178-179 ) . Evans points out that Kierkegaard emphasizes that the sceptics are exerting their power of will. The skeptic volitions to forbear from pulling decisions. Evans quotes Kiekegaard.

Insofar as he ( the sceptic ) uses dialectics in continually doing the opposite every bit likely, he does non raise his incredulity on dialectical statements, which are nil more than outer munitions, human adjustments & # 8230 ; By the power of the will he make up one’s mind to keep himself and keep himself back from any decision. ( Philosophic Fragments, 84-85 ) .

As Evans claims, there is indirect volitionalism happening within the disbelieving logical thinking described by Kierkegaard. The sceptics utilised indirect volitionalism to accomplish a province of suspenced opinion, by sing the opposite every bit likely. But any reading of an issue of volitionalism, of any type, into these transitions, is losing Kierkegaard & # 8217 ; s point. Kierkegaard is non discoursing control of mental provinces. He is discoursing the construct of necessity and our freedom to deny contingent facts.

It might be said that the skeptic volitions to doubt the world of a state-of- personal businesss, or that he wills non to doubt, i.e. he wills to believe that a state-of- personal businesss is the instance. But these looks are non precise preparations of what is really happening. The skeptic does non literally make up one’s mind non to believe in something. Strictly talking, he decides that a specific decision does non follow from grounds that is given. The skeptic doesn & # 8217 ; t have the power to believe or discredit whatever suits him ( whether he to the full understands himself or non. ) But he does hold control over his illative logical thinking. He can see as insufficient, grounds that is by and large accepted. This does non amount to ownership of control over belief provinces. Rather, this control shows ownership of an ability to exert discretion refering the cogency of certain types of inferencing and the strength of grounds.

The sceptics were concerned with the procedure of concluding. They did non desire to put on the line false decisions. Kierkegaard explains their undertaking: & # 8220 ; I am deceived merely when I conclude something about that stick [ that looks broken in the H2O ] & # 8230 ; this is why the skeptic supports himself in suspenso, and this province was what he willed & # 8230 ; ( [ the sceptics say that the terminal in position is a head suspended, which brings with it a repose like its shadow. ] ) & # 8221 ; ( Philosophic Fragments, 83 ) .

If they are willing a province of head at all, that province of head is in suspenso. The sceptics are non willing uncertainty, any more than the fleeceable are willing belief.

The contention that passages in the & # 8216 ; Interlude & # 8217 ; connote that Kierkegaard thought we can will beliefs likely consequences from a blurring of the willing of belief with the credence of a decision. The visual aspect of such an deduction is a effect of an ambiguity in Kierkegaard & # 8217 ; s linguistic communication. If I decide to keep back opinion until I & # 8217 ; m better informed, I & # 8217 ; m non consciously willing a province of uncertainty. If I accept grounds, I & # 8217 ; m non willing a belief. The belief is a effect of my act of accepting grounds. It can be said that I am free to accept or reject grounds, except in certain instances, for illustration, instances of logical deduction, or possibly in instances of self-evidence. But in the instance of matters-of- fact, uncertainty is by virtuousness of the will, i.e. no type of necessity coerces acquiescence.

4. See a broader reading of the Postscript

Direct volitionalism, the position that we can make up one’s mind what to believe, is a philosophy that would to be most suitably held by a metaphysical dreamer, a solipsist, or possibly a New Age convert & # 8211 ; minds that deny, in some sense, the difficult world of the nonsubjective universe. Pojman views willed belief and religion as debatable because he sees it as coercing ourselves to believe something, even though nonsubjective grounds would steer us in the opposite way. If Christianity is without nonsubjective grounds, religion must merely be created, in a manner correspondent to a solipsist & # 8217 ; s constructs which are unconstrained by the worlds of the external universe. Pojman grounds, if we are to believe it, we must somehow merely force ourselves to believe it.

Ironically, a really similar description of the spring, but intended as a imitation, can be found in Kierkegaard & # 8217 ; s treatment of Lessing. Kierkegaard relates how Lessing sees an attempted spring: & # 8220 ; One closes one & # 8217 ; s eyes, grabs oneself by the cervix, a La Munchhausen, and so & # 8211 ; so one stands on the other side, on that other side of sound common sense in the promised land of the system & # 8221 ; ( Postscript, 99 ) .

In this mention to a spring, the metaphor does non picture how we might come to accept the paradox. On the contrary, it is an overdone description of what systematicians erroneously believe is possible, viz. that contingent historical truths could show ageless truths. Climacus maintains that a quantitative passage does non take to a qualitative decision, i.e. determinations about affairs refering to the eternal can non be based on affairs of fact, as if the illation were from one thing to another of the same sort.

In the words of Lessing, quoted by Climacus, & # 8220 ; That [ passage, ] that is the ugly wide ditch that I can non traverse, nevertheless frequently and nevertheless seriously I have tried to do the spring & # 8221 ; ( Postscript, 98 ) . Climacus enjoys Lessing & # 8217 ; s temper, when Lessing negotiations of seriously desiring to do the spring. It is humorous, exactly because this spring can & # 8217 ; t go on merely by desiring it ( no affair how seriously. ) Climacus so, would likewise react to Pojman ; this leap doesn & # 8217 ; t go on merely by desiring it ( or willing it. ) If a spring is possible, it is non like a determination made within the kingdom of historical matters-of-fact ; it can non go on by raising oneself up by the cervix. To go a Christian, and someway traverse this divide, an absolute determination is involved, a qualitative spring.

This point approximately historical truths being unequal to land Christianity is of major importance in the Postscript. Climacus regards the Hegelians as self- cheats when they believe that they can anchor Christianity in a system of being. Climacus maintains that a system of being can non be given: & # 8220 ; In order to believe being, systematic thought must believe it as annulled and accordingly non as bing & # 8221 ; ( Postscript, 118 ) . This is because a system is by definition complete and across-the-board. The systematic mind, himself bing, can non be portion of his complete system. Climacus says: & # 8220 ; Who is supposed to compose, or complete such a system? & # 8221 ; ( Postscript, 120 ) . It is merely a transcendent God that can hold this bird & # 8217 ; s oculus position. But the Hegelians want to be able to include Christianity within the system.

In jointing the sense in which the truth of Christianity is unknowable, Climacus makes usage of the construct & # 8216 ; paradox. & # 8217 ; Christianity involves the absolute paradox of the Godhead bing in clip ; it is the thesis that God has existed in human signifier. Climacus says & # 8220 ; The lone possible apprehension of the absolute paradox is that it can non be understood & # 8221 ; ( Postscript, 217-218 ) .

Pojman might inquire, if Climacus is non claiming that we can will faith, how so is he proposing that we arrive at religion ( given the deficiency of rational grounds to back up faith? ) I would react, it is non clear that Climacus intends to steer us to faith at all. He discusses at length the importance of individualism and subjective thought. He speaks of the transmutation to inwardness and a reorientation off from objectiveness. Rather than proposing that we develop faith, Climacus describes a turning subjectiveness through which the absolute paradox can be realized.

Though Climacus does non demo an involvement in volitionalism, he does set much attempt into a treatment of willing the absolute telos ( willing in the highest sense ) . Remember the treatments of the Pathos subdivision ( Postscript, 387-431 ) . Climacus speaks of the single whose being is transformed because he has renounced everything but the highest good, which is willed for its ain interest.

Absolute willing does non prevent comparative willing, but the absolute relation can necessitate repudiation of all comparative end.Postscript, 405 ) . The subjectively bing single experiences continual enticement to associate perfectly to the world- historical, and must continually regenerate resoluteness. The subjective person, associating to the absolute, acts, but non for celebrity, money, love, etc. , non even for the good of humanity. These are comparative terminals, and are non willed perfectly. Merely one thing is willed perfectly, viz. the absolute.

In these pages, Climacus is non merely non saying that we can or should will faith, but, on the contrary, is stressing that the transformed individual perfectly wills merely the absolute, to the exclusion of all else. Clearly this sort of absolute relationship precludes actions that control or transform one & # 8217 ; s ain belief province, for the intent of going a Christian.

This kind of effort to command one & # 8217 ; s ain belief province for the intent of bring forthing religion is correspondent to the state of affairs of the monastics of the Middle Ages to which Climacus refers. In the monasteries much attempt was put into making a life and a frame of head which, to all visual aspects, was close to God. Climacus declares: & # 8220 ; True kernel does non demand any mark at all in externals & # 8221 ; ( Postscript, 414 ) . The absolute relation to the highest good does non follow from external actions. Cultivation of the outward visual aspect of Godliness can go the terminal in itself, ensuing in the loss of the starkness of the relation to the absolute telos. Climacus comments & # 8220 ; repudiation of everything is nil, if it is supposed to deserve the highest good. & # 8221 ; Postscript, 408 ) .

A standard of the absolute relationship to the absolute is the absence of any subterranean intent, or any outlook of effect or wages. & # 8220 ; The specific mark that one relates oneself to the absolute is there is no wages expected. & # 8221 ; Postscript, 402 ) .

Willing to believe, straight or indirectly, is a comparative willing, and therefore a motion off from kernel and the absolute relationship. To will a belief province, in order to accomplish religion or ageless felicity, is willing something for effects. Self-manipulation can merely function to divide the person from the absolute. The absolute relationhship is non something gained by willing to accomplish it. The act of willing anything other than the absolute undermines the absolute relationship.

The willing of the absolute good is the absolute determination, the qualitative spring. The will is involved in the procedure of going a Christian. But one doesn & # 8217 ; t effort to will the absolute in order to go a Christian, for so the absolute International Relations and Security Network & # 8217 ; t being willed for its ain interest. However, Pojman & # 8217 ; s place might be rephrased so as to let a related expostulation to develop. Rather than reasoning that there is no nonsubjective grounds to back up belief, one might reason that there is nil that would occasion willing the absolute. Since there can be no nonsubjective grounds to convert an person to will the absolute, willing the absolute telos can merely be something you must merely coerce yourself to make. However, as in the instance of the objectively uncorroborated belief, there can be accounts for the absolute determination.

Evans suggests: & # 8220 ; The truster might be convinced that the self-contradictory nature of the god-man is a world by a first-person brush with the god-man. The belief is the consequence of the brush with world, non of some arbitrary act of the will & # 8221 ; ( Evans, 183 ) . This brush could non be considered rational nonsubjective grounds, but it could ensue in a transmutation of an single & # 8217 ; s being. Climacus intimations at the happening of such brushs with phrases like & # 8216 ; the minute the ageless touches, & # 8217 ; and & # 8216 ; co-knowledge, & # 8217 ; and assorted other looks which connote an experience of integrity.

Investigation into possible accounts for the absolute determination & # 8211 ; accounts that are options to rational and nonsubjective grounds, and the impression that it is arbitrary & # 8211 ; is a undertaking that is suggested by the decision of this paper. In his book Transforming Vision9, M. Jamie Ferreira emphasizes the function that the imaginativeness plays in the Hagiographas of Kiekegaard. The solution to the inquiry of the account of the absolute determination may lie along these lines. A truster spring, non as a rational being, but by virtuousness of the power of imaginativeness.

Notes

This concern relates to the inquiry of whether we ought to detect and/or acknowledge & # 8220 ; nonsubjective truth. & # 8221 ;

Pojman, Louis P. , Religious Belief and the Will. ( London and New York: Routledge & A ; Kegen Paul, 1986 ) Subsequent mentions to this work will give the writer & # 8217 ; s name and the page figure.

Evans, Stephen C. & # 8220 ; Does Kierkegaard Think Beliefs can be Directly Willed? & # 8221 ; International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 26 ( 1989 ) : 173-184. Subsequent mentions to this work will give the writer & # 8217 ; s name and the page figure.

See David Wisdo, & # 8220 ; Kierkegaard on Belief, Faith, and Explanation, & # 8221 ; International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 21 ( 1987 ) :95-114. See besides M. Jaimie Ferreira, & # 8220 ; Kierkegaardian Faith: & # 8216 ; The Condition & # 8217 ; and the Response, & # 8221 ; International Journal of Religion 28 ( 1990 ) :63-79.

Louis P. Pojman, The Logic of Subjectivity: Kierkegaard & # 8217 ; s Philosophy of Religion ( Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1984 ) .

Louis P. Pojman, & # 8220 ; Kierkegaard on Faith and Freedom, & # 8221 ; International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 27 ( 1990 ) :41-61.

Mentions in this paper are to the undermentioned edition: Soren Kierkegaard [ Johannes Climacus ] , Philosophical Fragments, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong ( Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992 ) .

Mentions in this paper are to the undermentioned edition: Soren Kierkegaard [ Johannes Climacus ] , Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragmemts, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong ( Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985 ) .

M. Jamie Ferreira, Transforming Vision: Imagination and Will in Kierkegaardian Faith ( Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991 ) .