Median Voter Theorem Essay, Research Paper

Median Voter Theorem:

A Ineluctable Reality Leaving No One Truly Satisfied

On the spectrum of political relations ( or any other ideologically-based affair ) , personal sentiments will necessarily change from one extreme on the left to the antonym on the right. In a regulating system such as that of the United States, where the population straight elects representatives to regulate, the place a campaigner holds on the spectrum refering to certain issues in relation to other campaigners becomes progressively of import. Theoretically, two people coming from different backgrounds and different political parties should supply contrasting sentiments on major issues, leting an single elector to clearly and easy see the difference between his options and take which option would be best for himself and his state. Harmonizing to the Median Value Theorem, nevertheless, in most instances, the campaigner & # 8217 ; s personal positions and precedences can non be considered if a winning election is the ultimate end, taking to about indistinguishable campaigners at the clip of election. Although this theory contains defects, both theoretically in the existent workings and ideologically in the consequences, it is still valid and of import to today & # 8217 ; s political schemes.

The average elector is the elector closest to the centre on an issue. If determined decently, half of the population holds a place to the left of this determined average elector and half to the right. Harmonizing to the Median Voter Theorem, the average elector in a majority-rule election will be decisive so long as electors have single-peaked penchants. The theorem implicates that campaigners who are successful in winning elections are those who are able to capture the ballot of the average elector. If two campaigners run against each other, they are each forced to take the political place of the average elector of the spectrum or hazard losing the election, irrespective of their personal beliefs. If one campaigner were to set up an thought even one per centum to one side or the other of the average elector, his opposition would theoretically capture more than half of the popular ballot, taking to a triumph.

However, this theorem, like most theories, contains defects doing the construct progressive. One such defect is the consideration that non all elections are decided by the popular ballot, the footing for the Median Voter Theorem. In the United States, for illustration, the president is elected non by popular ballot, but by the Electoral College, go forthing the campaigner to believe non merely of the average elector in the population, but how that may associate to the existent election and the average elector of the Electoral College. By adding this excess party to the election procedure, the Median Voter Theorem, although still relevant, is non needfully as critical in such state of affairss. Furthermore, if more than two campaigners run against each other, the full system is thrown away, go forthing a wholly different game strategically. With three or more campaigners, each person must endeavor to distinguish himself in the eyes of the electors, coercing fluctuation from the average elector.

Political parties and the support thereof besides play an of import function in the political system. Parties are established and maintained around certain political positions and positions and the grade to which these ideals are held. By taking a place excessively far from this cardinal place of the party, a campaigner hazards estranging those

within the party who hold more utmost positions, go forthing them experiencing abandoned by their ain campaigner. While these people likely would non vote for the opposition, this alteration in platform may do them to abstain from voting at all, therefore altering the average elector and doing the Median Voter Theorem irrelevant.

One manner a party may work to better upon this quandary is by the usage if the frailty presidential campaigner. Although if the presidential campaigner is elected, the frailty president will hold power to a certain grade, many electors do non take this thought into consideration, looking merely at the qualities and thoughts of that presidential campaigner when doing a determination. Such blind activity by the bulk of electors allows the party to choose a frailty presidential campaigner that may keep ( and go on to keep ) the more controversial and traditional positions of the party without looking excessively bold. Therefore with the combination of a presidential campaigner following the Median Voter Theorem in order to obtain about half the voting population and a presidential campaigner standing for the thoughts of the party, no 1 feels alienated.

Ideologically, the theorem still holds defects. The whole point of campaigners and an election between people of different parties with different beliefs is to so hold an election between two campaigners of different beliefs. Unfortunately with the Median Voter Theorem, this state of affairs is non and can non be the instance. Because of the elector tendencies and consequences of canvassing anterior to the election itself, campaigners are forced to change their beliefs to the point of non even holding beliefs of their ain. In their desire non to estrange anyone or hazard losing the election, the campaigners, although they may get down with wholly different positions on issues, finally morph into virtually the same individual with the same prepared replies for argument inquiries, go forthing the elector with no other pick than to vote, in kernel, for the campaigner whose hair manner they like the best, instead than establishing a determination on the issues. Neither campaigner is willing to take a base that may ( although be delighting to some ) turn others against him. As a consequence, when they winner of the election is finally determined, virtually no 1 is wholly satisfied. The campaigner will hold mutated his positions to the extent that they may non come near to resembling those of his party or initial platform. The mean elector, nevertheless, will be able to happen at least parts of his ain positions within those of the campaigner as the campaigner will hold taken on those positions determined to be most popular.

The privation for credence and the demand to be liked are natural desires within human nature, particularly within political context. Politicians are frequently criticized for flexing their beliefs and doing different promises to different groups, frequently even contrasting in their ultimate end, but is at that place truly another option? In order to win an election and maintain power, one must win the support of the bulk of the component. In order to make so, he must give some of his ain ends and ideas to go what the people want, what the average elector wants ; he must go who they want to stand for them, who they want in office, and, most instantly, for whom they want to vote. Merely by taking on this average elector attack on some graduated table, can a candidate even hope to go more than a campaigner.

Plants Cited

Sened, Itai. Lecture # 4.

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