Injanuary 1912. Frederick W. Taylor. the centre of a extremely publicized contention over the effects of “scientific manage­ ment. ” testified before a House of Representatives commission look intoing his handicraft. His first aim. he explained. was to “sweep away a good trade of trash. ” Scientific direction was “not any efficiency device. . . . It is non a new system of calculating costs ; it is non a new system of paying work forces. . . it is non keeping a stop ticker on a adult male. . . it is non clip survey ; it is non gesture survey. . . . ” I n fact. it was “not any of the devices which the norm adult male calls to mind when scientific direction is spoken of. ” On the contrary. it was “a complete mental revolution on the portion of the workingman” and an “equally complete mental revolution on the portion of those on management’s side. . . . And without this complete mental revolution on both sides scientific direction does non be. “* Taylor’s designation of scientific direction with a “mental revolution” had several intents. It was the culminating measure in a long run to sell his attack to industrial direction as a system instead than a series of alleviants for specific jobs. It was besides a defence against unfavorable judgments that had arisen from piece­ repast installings and the association of scientific direction with ill will to brotherhoods.

Finally. it emphasized a point that Taylor The writer appreciatively acknowledges the remarks and suggestions of K. Austin Kerr. Patrick Fridenson. Heidrun Homburg. Barbara Clements. Eisuke Daito. and the writers of the other essays in this volume himself had merely late begun to joint: that successful direction depended on thoughts that were applicable to many different sorts of organisations. Taylor’s imagination evoked an enthusiastic response from applied scientists and mill directors and from a larger group whose involvements extended to virtually every establishment. 2 From this point scientific direction was both a elaborate program for bettering the operations of a works or office and a set of prescriptions for bettering any activity. Its popularity underlined the significance of Taylor’s metaphor. Taylor and the Origins of Scientific Management The journey that finally led Taylor to specify his work as “a complete mental revolution” was long and backbreaking. It included experiences in a assortment of industrial endeavors. engagement in the emerging technology profession and in the bing manage­ ment motion. and associations with a corps of associates who disseminated the Taylor system. The events of Taylor’s early old ages played a big and controver­ sial portion in these activities. 3 Born in 1856 into an blue Philadelphia household. Taylor had the benefit of coachs and sole schools. extended travel. and associations with the Philadelphia elite. After go toing Phillips Exeter Academy. he rejected a university instruction in favour of a traditional apprenticeship and an industrial calling. which began in the machine store of the Midvale Steel Company in 1878. He rose quickly. thanks to ability and difficult work and to shut personal ties with the Clark household. the chief proprietors of Midvale. In 1885. after having an technology grade via correspondence classs from the Stevens Institute of Technol­ ogy. he became the company’s head applied scientist. His chances of lifting still farther received a terrible jar the undermentioned twelvemonth when the Clarks sold Midvale to a local industrialist who had a boy of similar age and experience. As a consequence. Taylor resigned in 1889 to head a company that a group of New York moneymans had orga­ nized to work a fresh paper-making procedure. This experience proved to be every bit frustrating. The new engineering was defec­ tive. the company lost money. and Taylor and his married woman were unhappy in the Maine frontier town where they had to populate. With considerable resentment. Taylor left in 1893 to go a selfemployed adviser.

By that clip he had taken of import stairss toward a new function. He had a significant repute as an discoverer of industrial ma­ chinery and wide experience as an industrial director. He had besides undertaken several experiments that forced him to believe more explicitly about organisations and people. One of these. an attempt to calculate operating times for machine tools with a stop watch. would envolve into clip and gesture survey. his signature contri­ bution to industrial direction. Most of all. Taylor had become associated with two endeavors that were reshaping the industrial environment. The first was the quickly maturating technology profession. whose advocators sought an individuality based on strict formal instruction. frequent contact. reciprocally recognized criterions of behaviour. and societal duty. In mills. mines. and railway paces. they rejected the empiri­ cism of the practician for scientific experimentation and analy­ sis. They acknowledged the primacy of the net income motivation. but they insisted that ground and truth were indispensable to go on fiscal success. 4 The 2nd. closely related development was the sys­ tematic direction motion. an attempt among applied scientists and sympathisers to replace administrative systems for the infor­ mal methods of industrial direction that had evolved with the mill system. Systematic direction was a rebellion against tradition. empiricist philosophy. and the premise that common sense. personal relationships. and trade cognition were sufficient to run a little mill. In the big. capital intensive. technologically advanced operations of the late 19th century. “rule-of­ thumb” methods resulted in confusion and waste. The revision­ ists’ reply was to replace traditional directors with applied scientists and to replace managerial systems for guessing and ad hoc ratings. 5 By the clip Taylor began his calling as an applied scientist and director. cost accounting systems. methods for planning and scheduling production and forming stuffs. and incentive pay programs were basics of technology publications and tradejournals. Their aim was an unimpeded flow of stuffs and information. In human footings. advocates of systematic direction sought to reassign power from the first-line supervisor to the works director and to coerce all employees to pay greater attending to the manager’s ends. Most baleful. possibly. they advocated determinations based on public presentation instead than on personal qualities
and associations. 6

In the 1890s. Taylor became the most ambitious and vigorous advocate of systematic direction. As a adviser he intro­ duced accounting systems that permitted directors to utilize operat­ ing records to steer their actions. production control systems that allowed directors to cognize more exactly what was go oning on the store floor. piece rate systems that encouraged workers to follow orders and instructions. and related steps. In 1895 he employed a co-worker. Sanford E. Thompson. to go on his clip survey research with the end of ciphering criterions for assorted businesss that would be published and sold to employers. Between 1898 and 1901. as a adviser to the Bethlehem Iron Company. Taylor introduced all of his systems and smartly pursued his research. This experience. punctuated by contention and intensifying struggle with the company’s directors. was the finishing touch of his originative calling. Two developments were of particular importance. Taylor’s find of “high velocity steel. ” which im­ proved the public presentation of metal film editing tools. assured his celebrity as an discoverer. In add-on. his attempt to present systematic meth­ Doctor of Optometries in many countries of the company’s operations forced him to develop an incorporate position of managerial invention and a broader construct of the manager’s function. By 1901 Taylor had fashioned scientific direction from systematic direction. 7 As the events of Taylor’s calling make clear. the two attacks were closely related. Systematic and scientific direction had common roots. attracted the same sorts of people. and had the same concern aims. Yet in retrospect the differences stand out. Systematic direction was diffuse and useful. a series of stray steps that did non add up to a larger whole or have recognizable deductions beyond daily industrial opera­ tions. Scientific direction added important item and a larger position. In 1901. when he left Bethlehem. Taylor resolved to give his clip and ample luck to advancing both. His first study on his work. “Shop Management” ( 1903 ) . portrayed an integrated composite of systematic direction methods.
supplemented by polishs and add-ons like clip survey. 8 At first Taylor was disappointed with the response to his work. He could speak about a larger. integrated construct of manage­ ment but most makers wanted solutions to specific prob­ lunar excursion modules. Furthermore. their preoccupation with the specifics. notably clip survey and inducement pay programs. threatened more

Scientific Management in Retrospect • 9

serious troubles. Many machine store proprietors. for illustration. introduced clip survey and an inducement pay to raise end product and wean employees from the International Association of Machinists ( IAM ) and other trade brotherhoods. Taylor and his followings. who had small sympathy for brotherhoods. were slow to recognize the dangers of this class. By 1910 the IAM and the American Federation of Labor ( AFL ) had become implacable enemies of scientific direction and Taylor was embroiled in a public contention that would stalk him for the remainder of his life. 9 Taylor responded to these jobs with two tactical adjust­ ments. First. he began to trust more to a great extent on anecdotes from his calling —”object lessons” —to convey his message to audiences that had small involvement in proficient item. Taylor liberally interpreted his experiences to do his point. Thus the narrative of “Schmidt. ” the oxlike Bethlehem labourer whose stupidity Taylor had purportedly overcome with an inducement pay. was mostly apocryphal. 10 Second. apart from the object lessons. Taylor spoke less about mill operations and more about the significance and general pertinence of his thoughts. Between 1907 and 1909. with the assistance of one of his shrewdest associates. Morris L. Cooke. he wrote a subsequence to “Shop Management” that finally became The Princi­ ples of Scientific Management ( 1911 ) . Rather than discourse the specific methods he introduced in mills and stores. Taylor used colourful narratives and linguistic communication to light “principles” of direction. To propose the incorporate character and wide pertinence of scientific direction. he equated it with a “complete mental revolution. ”11 Taylor’s reformulation of scientific direction as a series of rules and as a mental revolution made him a famous person. “Shop Management” had reached an audience of applied scientists and industri­ alists ; the Principles potentially appealed to everyone. Building on the impulse of other efficiency motions devoted to natural resource preservation.
improved authorities service. more effec­ tive instruction. and similar ends. Taylor invited readers to extrap­ olate. 12 How did scientific direction apply to their circum­ stances? Could they duplicate Taylor’s successes? What were the possibilities of rational organisation. clip survey. and material inducements? What costs could they expect? Taylor’s book be­ came an inspiration to those on both sides of the Atlantic who equated industrial or societal advancement with increased efficiency.

As Taylor’s name became a family word. his function in the direction motion paradoxically declined. The popularity of the Principles created more demands for visual aspects and state­ ments than any person could fulfill. and Taylor had small pick but to turn to others to help him. Initially. he had no scruple about this measure. For old ages he had attracted devoted fol­ lowers. At first they were employees like Thompson. who per­ formed specific undertakings. After Taylor’s retirement in 1901 they became more independent. presenting the techniques he had developed and refined at Bethlehem. In add-on. Taylor attracted other persons who were intrigued both by his methods and by the larger deductions of his activities. They shortly began to play originative functions in their ain right. In 1910 Louis Brandeis. the distinguished attorney and reformist. skilfully used their testimony in the famed Eastern Rate Case before the Interstate Com­ merce Commission to publicise scientific direction. By the clip the Principles appeared and Taylor testified before the Con­ gressional investigation commission. Taylor’s followings were good prepared to use scientific direction in industry and to ex­ kick its significance to an eager populace. Their competency and fidelity became a major concern of Taylor’s subsequently old ages ; the ten­ Zions that arose from his concerns have in bend been a characteristic of most histories of scientific direction. 13 The most influential adherents were Henry L. Gantt and Morris L. Cooke. whom Taylor trusted and by and large endorsed ; Frank B. Gilbreth and Harrington Emerson. whom he grew to dislike and mistrust ; and Harlow S. Person. who became a major figure in the
scientific direction motion after his decease. Gantt was Taylor’s first of import follower. the Godhead of valuable refine­ ments such as the undertaking and fillip pay program and the charts that became his hallmark. He was besides the first of the Taylor group to acknowledge the common land between scientific direction and forces work. 14 Cooke was the most political of Taylor’s followings. the chief nexus between scientific direction and progressive reform. He became known for his applications of scientific direction to public disposal and for his over­ tures to brotherhood leaders. 15 Gilbreth’s colourful activities frequently ob­ scured his substantial parts to the analysis of work. Emerson was a originative publicizer who grasped the potency of scientific direction as a concern. and Person was the foremost

Scientific Management in Retrospect • 11

theoretician of scientific direction after Taylor’s decease. As caput of the Taylor Society. the association of Taylor’s professional and rational adherents. in the 1920s and 1930s. he identified scien­ tific direction with the broad concern community of that epoch. Among other of import persons with ties to the Taylor circle. Richard A. Feiss and Mary Van Kleeck symbolized the diverse potency of scientific direction. Scientific Management in Industry During Taylor’s life-time. scientific direction was foremost and foremost a program for enhanced concern public presentation that Taylor’s followings and other advisers installed for fees. Taylor and his Alliess argued that their work increased net incomes. enhanced produc­ tivity. and eliminated category divisions and labour agitation. Critics charged that it encouraged inordinate specialisation. debauched work. and encouraged personal competition. ill will. and a sense of disaffection. The conflicting charges were so sweeping that it was ( and is ) impossible to accommodate them. 16 However. historical re­ hunt has addressed several pertinent issues. including the extent to which scientific direction was adopted in industry. the character of the alterations that occurred in those workss. and the impact of such activities on the work and wellbeing of employees. Between 1901 and 1915 Taylor’s associates introduced scientific direction in about 200 American concerns. 181 or eighty per­ cent of which were mills. 17 Some
of the workss were big and modern. like the Pullman and Remington Typewriter companies ; others were little and technologically crude. Approximately one-third of the sum were big volume manufacturers for mass mar­ kets. but scientific direction ab initio had limited entreaty among the directors of mass production workss. 18 A bulk of the 181 houses fell into one of two wide classs. First were those whose activities required the motion of big measures of stuffs between legion work Stationss ( such as fabric Millss. railway fix stores. and car workss ) . Their directors sought to cut down holds and constrictions and increase throughput. the vol­ ume of production per unit of clip. The 2nd group consisted of advanced houses. largely little. that were already committed to managerial reform.

Their executives were attracted to Taylor’s promise of societal harmoniousness and improved on the job conditions. A important minority of the sum fell in both classs. Many of the fabric Millss. for illustration. were leaders in public assistance work. 19 The history of scientific direction in these workss provides small support for the contention. common to many ulterior histories. that Taylor’s cardinal concern was the work of the single employee. Advisers devoted most of their clip and energies to machine operations. tools and stuffs. production agendas. routing forms. and cost and other record systems. In tierce of the mills these activities generated such contention that clip and gesture surveies were ne’er undertaken. In others. such as the Franklin Automobile Co. and several fabric Millss. the installa­ tion consisted about entirely of betterments in agendas and routing. As a consequence at least one-half of the employees of the 181 houses were basically looker-ons. They may hold experienced fewer holds. used different tools. or found that their supervisor’s authorization had diminished. but their ain activities were un­ affected. 20 What about the other employees? Taylor promised that they would have higher rewards and have more chances for publicity and less ground for struggle with their supervisors. Most appraisals of these
claims have concluded that Taylor promised more than his associates could or would present. By the same item. the brotherhood leaders and other critics exaggerated the dangers of scientific direction. They argued that skilled work­ Ers would give up their accomplishments and creativeness. that scientific manage­ ment would advance accelerations. weariness. and rate cuts. and that mean workers would lose their occupations. 21 Taylor’s followings mocked the deskilling statement ; Gilbreth compared it to the impression that sawboness or tooth doctors were deskilled general practicians. 22 In recent old ages. nevertheless. it has reappeared in societal scientific discipline texts and in extremist reviews of the economic system. notably in the influential work of Harry Braverman. The modern critics extrapolated from the Principles instead than from the experiences of the 181 workss or other historical informations. 23 They reasoned that industrial occupations had become intellectually and psychologically unrewarding since Taylor’s clip ; that Taylor was the designer of modern work ( or so the text authors insisted ) ; and hence. that Taylor had tipped his manus when he referred. in the Principles to “gathering together all of the traditional cognition which in the yesteryear has been possessed by the workingmans. ”

Scientific Management in Retrospect • 13

The most of import consequence of the deskilling statement may hold been to befog the more serious charges that scientific manage­ ment led to speedups. rate cuts. and the discharge of employees whose accomplishments or motive were no better than norm. In ortho­ dox scenes. where employers lived up to the missive of scientific direction. merely inferior performing artists had to worry. And in houses that were besides committed to personnel direction. even that menace was minimum. But many employers were less scrupulous or less patient. In their heads faster work meant faster. more persevering workers. non better planning and coordination. improved com­ munications. and systematic care. They gave lip service to Taylor’s thought of an interconnected whole. but they looked to the employees for immediate additions. Even among the 181 houses there was some inclination to utilize clip survey to cut rates. That was the chance that sparked the celebrated Watertown Arsenal work stoppage of 1912. It was seemingly besides the cause of work stoppages at Joseph & A ; Feiss and at three American Locomotive Company workss where Emer­ boy worked. 24 Outside the
Taylor circle the inclination was far more marked. In early 1913. for illustration. Firestone Tire & A ; Rubber Company directors assigned an employee named Robert Holmes to carry on clip surveies of tyre workers to larn why net incomes were so high. Holmes had had no contact with the Taylor group or experience in clip survey. but he spent a twenty-four hours clocking the workers with a stop watch and concluded. predictably. that piece rates were excessively high. The directors so cut the rates and the workers struck. precipitating the industry’s most serious labour struggle before the 1930s. 25 Sing the experiences of houses that have left records ( including those like Firestone ) several decisions about the impact of scientific direction on mill work seem war­ ranted: ( 1 ) First-line supervisors lost much of their authorization to higher-level directors and their staffs. ( 2 ) The proportion of the work twenty-four hours devoted to production increased due to the riddance of holds. ( 3 ) Fewer determinations depended on personal judgements. prejudices. and subjective ratings. ( 4 ) The single worker exercised less discretion. peculiarly in workss where clip surveies were used to schedule production and/or set piece rates ; in the little minority of workss where single direction cards were besides used. the country of discretion was reduced even more. ( 5 ) In most instances net incomes rose. but there were adequate exclusions to film over the consequence.

( 6 ) The degree of accomplishment required in production did non alter as a consequence of scientific direction though the most extremely skilled employees. like the chiefs. lost some of their de facto managerial maps. ( 7 ) Some unskilled occupations disappeared as improved programming and routing reduced the demand for packs of labourers and encouraged the debut of stuffs managing machinery. ( 8 ) The “great fear” of accomplishment and occupation losingss that David Montgomery has documented among craft workers in the early 1910s rapidly waned and scientific direction ceased to be associated with labour convulsion until the spread of the Bedaux system in the 1920s. 26 Merely in recent old ages has it go evident that the traditional preoccupation of modern-day analysts with factory conditions was far excessively
narrow. Scientific direction was besides applicable to the operations of shops and offices. as a smattering of lighting surveies have emphasized. 27 There were analogues with manufactur­ ing workss: big constitutions were most likely to present scientific direction techniques and the managers’ overruling motive was a desire to increase the velocity of operations. But there were besides differences. Because clerical work was labour intensive and dependent on little. non-automatic machines. reor­ ganization attempts focused on the single employee to a greater grade and at an earlier phase than in most mills. Indeed. the attack that Taylor and his Orthodox followings scorned became the criterion in white-collar scenes and evoked small contention. Attempts to better programming and routing. to use clip and gesture survey to cut down uneconomical attempt. and to present economic inducements were most effectual where big volume. insistent operations were the regulation. In other scenes. employers paid less attending to industrial technology techniques reminiscent of fac­ Tories. and concentrated on bettering employees’ accomplishments and mo­ rattle. In either instance. scientific direction was associated with the mechanisation of clerical operations and the growing of a mostly female labour force. The impact on the single worker is harder to estimate. Judging from the experiences of mill workers. it varied well and defies easy drumhead. 28 In the interim the “efficiency craze” that followed the pub­ lication of the Principles overshadowed everything Taylor’s associ­ Ates had accomplished or failed to carry through in American facto­ ries. As a consequence. Taylor. Gilbreth. Emerson and other associates

Scientific Management in Retrospect • 15

became famous persons ; organisations and publications devoted to efficiency proliferated ; professional societies recognized the im­ portance of direction every bit good as of proficient cognition ; uni­ versities began to learn direction. and virtually every organi­ zation gave lip service to the end of enhanced efficiency. This activity. together with Taylor’s decease in 1915. marked the beginning of a new stage in the history of the direction motion. Though the image is far from complete. a series of dramatic alterations in the character and imagination of scientific man­ agement between 1915
and 1920 suggest the lineations of this new epoch. The best known of these alterations was the rapprochement of Taylor’s followings and brotherhood leaders that followed the engineers’ formal indorsement of corporate bargaining. 29 The practical im­ portance of this grant is ill-defined but it removed a major beginning of misinterpretation and demonstrated the entreaty of scien­ tific direction among brotherhood leaders one time its anti-union impli­ cations were muted. About as of import was the gradual amalgamation of the scientific direction and forces direction move­ ments. Thankss to labour market conditions during the war period. scientific direction by 1920 embraced the full panoply of person­ nel reforms. including forces sections that performed the foreman’s traditional maps of engaging. fire. and preparation every bit good as new activities associated with industrial psychological science. 30 A 3rd unforeseen development was the turning function of scientific direction in the federal authorities. Taylor had had highly hapless dealingss with the Taft disposal and his followings had small contact with Wilson and his advisers. Though virtually every member of the Taylor Society was a authorities employee during 1917-1918. they had no incontrovertible consequence on mobilisation policy. 31 The war experience however had im­ portant indirect effects. non the least of which was the rise of Herbert Hoover to the head of American political relations. Hoover rapidly developed close and affable dealingss with the scientific direction motion and superseded Taylor as the nation’s foremost apostle of efficiency. His influence was evident in Waste In Industry. a study that shortly rivaled the Principles as the most widely read pronunciamento of the scientific direction motion. In subsequent old ages Hoover would take an American rationaliza­ tion attempt that depended. even more than comparable attempts in Europe. on the thoughts and techniques of scientific direction. 32 Scientific Management in Europe and Japan
Before the 1970s most histories of scientific direction gave the feeling that it was an American phenomenon that had its greatest impact on American
establishments. Writers either disre­ garded Paul Devinat’s Scientific Management in Europe ( 1927 ) or

relegated it to a footer. In recent old ages. nevertheless. a new empha­ sis on scientific direction has accompanied the survey of twen­ tieth-century political and economic establishments in European history. Taylor’s popularity. for illustration. was “one of the first touchable marks of the Americanization of Gallic society. ”33 After World War I. scientific direction became a powerful force for economic and political reclamation. 34 Above all. possibly. it was a gage of the growing of big organisations and bureaucratic civilizations. a development that transcended national boundaries. Before World War I. the diffusion of scientific direction in most European states and in Japan resembled the American experience. It depended on applied scientists and industrialists who had some exposure to systematic direction and who were eager to recognize the potency of the big and complex organisations they worked for or consulted. In most states magnetic individu­ ALSs within this group provided the rational and organisational drift that converted the technicians’ involvement into a more loosely based motion. Initially. their focal point was factory reform. which proved to be as hard and combative as it was in the United States. The most common struggles pitted company executives. sensitive to costs and short-run consequences. like their American opposite numbers. against applied scientists and technicians who adopted the broader position of Taylor and his followings. About as impor­ tant before the war was the division between these groups and the labour brotherhoods. which strongly opposed any alteration in the industrial position quo. Systematic direction began to do inroads in Europe and Japan after 1900. As in the United States. the rise of the engineer­ ing profession and the enhanced function of the applied scientist in manufac­ Turing were major implicit in forces. The visual aspect of books and articles advancing coordination through direction sys­ tems signaled a new sensitiveness to the bounds of empiricist philosophy and tradition. Yet alteration was gradual and uncoordinated. In Ger­ many. for illustration. systematic direction seemed to turn

Scientific Management in Retrospect • 17

of course out of “bureaucratic traditions. ” 35 As a consequence. German industrialists introduced “various scientific direction tech­ niques before they of all time heard of the American motion. ” 36 On the other manus. Nipponese railway executives decided to present western managerial methods after they purchased American roll­ ing stock. 37 The bulk of European executives fell between these extremes. A rough step of the spread of systematic direction was the popularity of inducement pay programs. In Britain and France about half of all technology employees worked under some signifier of inducement by 1914. 38 In Russia. the largest employers followed the lead of their western opposite numbers. St. Petersburg. with many big metal working mills. became a hotbed of experimentation. In province workss and so in private operations. applied scientists and directors debated ways to increase throughput and productiveness. They installed cost accounting and inducement pay programs and. in some instances. made clip surveies. By 1908. at least 16 of the largest workss in the St. Petersburg country had introduced “American” fillip programs. 39 Union leaders viewed the pay plans as another attempt to undersell the powers of skilled workers and cut down rewards. but were unable to forestall their debut or extension. Taylor first became known to European industrialists and engi­ neers for his innovation of high-velocity tool steel. At the Paris Exposition of 1900. where high-speed steel attracted much atten­ tion. he had contacts with prima German and Gallic techni­ cians. including Henri Le Chatelier. who would shortly emerge as his best-known European follower. Le Chatelier published Tay­ lor’s “The Art of Cutting Metals” in his esteemed Revue de Metallurgie in 1907 and “Shop Management” a few months subsequently. In the interim. Zeitschrift des Vereins Deutscher Ingenieure. the jour­ nal of the Association of German Engineers. print a long study on Taylor’s work in 1901. exciting widespread experi­ thinking by German technology houses.

One of the participants in this activity. Professor Georg Schlesinger. of the Royal Institute of Physics at Charlottenburg. shortly emerged as an expert on highspeed steel and Taylor’s managerial thoughts. A German interlingual rendition of “Shop Management” appeared in 1904. 40 From this point. Tay­ lor’s international contacts increased and his influence grew. After hearing Taylor’s talk on the potency of scientific direction. Andre Michelin. the Gallic tyre maker. purportedly rushed out to purchase a stop watch. Nipponese technicians were no less enthusi­ astic. Koichi Kanda. writer of the first Nipponese manual on mill direction. published in 1911. included an extended treatment of Taylor’s work. Yoichi Ueno. a university professor and consul­ tant. translated Gilbreth’s Motion Study in 1911 and the Principles in I9I3-41 Still. there were bounds to Taylor’s personal influence. Despite considerable attempt. merely a smattering of European and Nipponese applied scientists and directors spent extended periods in Philadelphia. and his associates worked about entirely in the United States. The noteworthy exclusion was Gilbreth. who spent much of 1913 and 1914 at the Auergesellschaft company. which was allied with Allgemeine Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft ( AEG ) . the largest German technology house. 42 The exact nature of Gilbreth’s work and his dealingss with his client remain a enigma. but Walther Rathenau. the caput of AEG. and Wichard von Moellendorff. one of its cardinal fabrication executives. were among the most influential pro­ moters of scientific direction in Germany during the follow­ ing decennary. Of the European innovators. Le Chatelier was unimpeachably the most of import. After 1904 he became the “driving force” that insured the spread of Taylor’s thoughts “in France and over big parts of Continental Europe. ” 43 As a distinguished chemist and pro­ fessor at the Ecole des mines and the College de France. his prestigiousness insured that Taylor’s thoughts received a respectful hearing in the highest circles of Gallic society. Together with Charles de Freminville. an applied scientist who held a sequence of high places in big industrial houses. Le Chatelier made France the centre of the European scientific direction motion. After Le Chatelier. de Freminville. and Schlesinger. no follower of Taylor had a greater impact than Alexsei Gastev. a Russian revolutionist who helped present scientific direction to the new Soviet province.

Trained as a instructor. Gastev became a metal worker in 1908 and began a womb-to-tomb captivation with western engineering. Exiled in 1910 for political activity.
he went to Paris. worked in several big workss. and became familiar with the modern-day argument over scientific direction. He returned to St. Petersburg in 1913 and was employed at the big Aivaz works when workers at that place struck against managerial inventions. in­ cluding an misguided attempt to present clip surveies. Gastev. however. was intrigued with the potency of scientific man­ agement. Like Lenin. who began to compose positively about Tay­ lor’s thoughts in 1914. he saw scientific direction as a method for accomplishing a “cultural revolution” and “making every adult male a director. ” 44 Merely in Great Britain. among the larger European states. was there no influential advocator or group of advocators before World War I. The major technology publications either disre­ garded Taylor’s work or criticized it. Industrialists such as Edward Cadbury and B. Seebohm Rowntree. closely identified with managerial reform. wrote by and large hostile analyses. Socialistic critics of the position quo were besides unfriendly. The consensus of economic historiographers is that Taylor’s work had no immediate impact in Britain due to the traditionalist conservativism of British executives. 45 Their indictment may be overdrawn. As Judith Merkle has noted. the job in British industry may hold been the absence of a “self-propagating category of merchants. ” non miss of involvement. 46 Michael Rowlinson has late shown that Cadbury introduced many of Taylor’s methods despite his public disclaimers. 47 Extra probes would probably demo that Cadbury and the few industrialists. such as Hans Renold. who publically endorsed scientific direction. were non entirely. An American applied scientist who surveyed European industry in 1920 found in England “the most complete installings of scientific direction I have of all time seen. ” 48 Why were British executives so untalkative? The reply may hold been their preoccupation with industrial dealingss and labour un­ remainder. In Britain. as in other states. the old ages after 1900 saw a crisp addition in labour combativeness and brotherhood activity. Among craft workers. peculiarly those in technologically backward trades. alterations in fabricating operations were at least every bit baleful as pay cuts or onslaughts on brotherhoods. 49 Union leaders in Britain. France. and Germany carefully monitored the Watertown armory
incident and the resulting struggle between Taylor and the AFL. and were ready to respond whenever a stop watch appeared. If European workers had any uncertainties about the malign inten­ tions of Taylor and his European Alliess. Louis Renault shortly eliminated them. A superb tyrant who created Europe’s larg­ est car house. Renault was typical of the Gallic manufac­ turers who were attracted to scientific direction.

In 1907. one of his subsidiaries. Georges de Ram. introduced a planning section. clip survey. direction cards. and other steps in two stores. Production shortly doubled. Renault was impressed but refused to widen de Ram’s reforms because of their cost. 50 Four old ages subsequently. after sing Taylor in Philadelphia. touring several workss and publically denoting his “conversion. ” he decided to continue with his ain version of scientific direction. and suddenly introduced clip surveies into his mill. His workers. fearful of what would follow. struck. Renault was compromising. He blamed de Ram for the problem. agreed to the election of store stewards. and promised to confer with the workers before revising their rates. The strikers returned to their occupations but remained leery. After reading overdone histories of conditions in American workss and neglecting to derive new grants. they struck once more in February 1913. The 2nd work stoppage lasted six hebdomads and ab initio commanded the support of most Renault workers. Like the Firestone work stoppage in the United States. which occurred at the same clip. and a work stoppage at the Bosch Company in Germany several months subsequently. it collapsed when the strikers exhausted their sav­ ings and became disenchanted with their leaders. 51 The Renault work stoppage was a turning point in the diffusion of scientific direction. From Britain to Russia. workers and brotherhoods became watchful to the dangers of uncontrolled clip survey. 52 Yet they besides became cognizant of the possibilities of scientific man­ agement. Le Chatelier argued that one time workers learned about scientific direction. they
would separate between Taylor’s promises of richness and harmoniousness and the foolish actions of a Renault. He considered the work stoppage a public dealingss putsch. 53 In any event. Taylor’s Hagiographas became more popular after 1913. If the new enthusiasm did non fit the American “efficiency fad. ” it did tag the beginning of a proliferation of nonindustrial applica­ tions of Taylor’s thoughts. And. as in the United States. one step of this broader construct of scientific direction was the rapprochement of many union members and propertyless political lead­ Ers who. like Gastev. were more impressed with the promise of order. planning. and security from freakish rule-of-thumb man­ agement than with the dangers of clip survey. Though there were of import similarities between the Ameri­ can and European experiences in the mid 1910s. there was one important difference—the First World War. Get downing in the autumn of

Scientific Management in Retrospect • 21

1914. European executives and authorities leaders had to get by with climb force per unit areas for industrial enlargement. coordinated activity. category and involvement group cooperation. and efficient usage of scarce resources. force per unit areas that American executives and employ­ EEs would non see until 1918. As authorities expanded it became more dependent on persons with managerial and proficient expertness. As mills grew. their directors became more dependent on direction systems. After 1914 the exigen­ cies of war. more than the work of Taylor. Le Chatelier or others. shaped the scientific direction motion. In three countries this consequence was particularly noticeable. First. the break of the economic system and the labour force created powerful force per unit areas for effectual resource use. Unlike the American houses that produced weaponries and weaponries for the Allies. European makers had to increase production without commensurate additions in stuffs and labour. Their responses necessarily were to cut down waste. reorganise production for volume operations. and recruit adult females. disabled workers. and other heretofore un­ conventional employees. Second. the labour deficit and the de­ mand for uninterrupted production forced makers to in­ troduce labour reforms and to work more closely and hand in glove with brotherhoods. 54 The consequence was an merger of scientific and personnel direction and a new
accent on the compatibility of clip survey. inducement pay programs. and corporate bargaining. Third. the permutation of political controls for market forces in many sectors required an unprecedented grade of production planning and coordination. While there was turning trust on scientific direction in all states. the Gallic experience is peculiarly good docu­ mented. 55 Even before the war. Gallic military officers had recognized the potency of scientific direction for arsenal operations and had introduced Taylor’s methods in at least one works. After 1914. as they struggled to increase production. they progressively relied on scientific direction for the industry of shells. weaponries. explosives. motor vehicles. and aeroplanes. 56 At the Penhoet navy pace at Saint-Nazaire. for illustration. they gave Leon Guillet. Le Chatelier’s close friend and associate. a “free manus. ”

Guillet organized a planning section. introduced clip surveies and a fillip pay. and installed other managerial inventions. When he left in late 1915. de Freminville succeeded him and completed his work. Guillet and de Freminville treated the em­ ployees good and “won” their support. 57 Most private employers were less enthusiastic and less scrupulous. Yet an American expert wrote in 1918 that he found in France “a better appreciation of the necessities. . . than in the United States. ” Interest in scientific direction was “more widespread. ” 58 Aimee Moutet concludes that scientific direction made significant inroads in Gallic industry during the war. that applied scientists substituted a “scientific spirit” for the “ruling empiricist philosophy. ” and that the war experience “integrated the Taylor system in the general organisation of the endeavor. ” 59 No less dramatic was the alteration in brotherhood attitudes. Organized labor’s reaction to the Renault work stoppage had suggested dogged ill will. Yet the reformists who controlled the largest brotherhoods and the largest brotherhood federation were pragmatists who embraced the war attempt and the run to increase production and produc­ tivity. provided they were accompanied by labour reforms. Under Alphonse Merrheim and Leon Jouhaux. the Gallic labour move­
ment shifted from ill will to measure up support for scientific direction. The attitudes of rank-and-file workers are more hard to determine. though there were seemingly no work stoppages against scientific direction during the war period. 60 Most dramatic of all was the transition of high authorities functionaries. notably the persons responsible for directing the war economic system and be aftering the postwar Reconstruction. Neither Albert Thomas. the socialist who directed weaponries production until late 1917. nor Etienne elemental. the Minister of Commerce. had had more than a superficial cognition of Taylor’s Hagiographas. Yet by 1916 they were advocators of scientific direction. boosters of industrial modernisation. and title-holders of labor-management cooperation. Thomas. in peculiar. pushed scientific manage­ ment in concurrence with corporate bargaining and labour reform. His vocal protagonism of scientific direction won him the hostility of conservative industrialists and far-left political col­ conferences. but he persisted.

His challenger and replacement. Louis Locheur. was no less aggressive in advancing scientific direction. Cle”­ mental. who became the cardinal figure in the Reconstruction attempt. proverb in wartime experiences the footing of a new postwar order. which would have larger. more modern. and more so­ phisticated industrial operations. scientific direction. labor­ direction cooperation. and authorities coordination of the economic system. 61 The American function in the war. coupled with the prostration of life criterions in the last months of the war and the first months of peace. created tremendous involvement in scientific direction. In Germany more than one 1000 books and articles on scientific direction or “Taylorismus” appeared in the postwar period. 62 Waste in Industry had a electric consequence in Eastern Europe ; it “contributed really mostly to the publicity of scientific manage­ ment in Czechoslovakia. ”63 Karol Adamiecki. an technology professor who had developed a series of charts and graphs similar to Gantt’s. played a similar function in Poland. 64 Professional groups devoted to facets of scientific direction emerged in Britain. though an attempt to organize an English subdivision of the Taylor Society did non menu every bit good. 65 In industry. scientific direction tech­ niques became widespread. Corporations with at least some
mass production operations. such as Renault. Siemens. and Fiat. were leaders. but smaller houses in the fabric. nutrient processing. and excavation industries were besides active. By the mid 1920s. Bankss. insurance companies. section shops. and a assortment of govern­ ment bureaus were utilizing scientific direction to increase the quality and measure of their services. 66 Three developments of the 1920s illustrated the entreaty of scien­ tific direction. First. the German Rationalization motion embraced a assortment of aims and causes. Yet the plants of Schlesinger. Rathenau. Moellendorff. and other theoreticians. the operations of such houses as AEG and Siemens. and the activity of quasi-public bureaus such as the Reichskuratorium pelt Wirt­ schaftlichkeit did non compartmentalise mill operations. eco­ nomic planning. trust dialogues. and corporatist political ar­ rangements. Rationalization was a seamless web. a step of the larger deductions of Taylor’s thoughts. 67 Second. during the same period. partisans in other states formed a assortment of promo­ tional associations correspondent to the Taylor Society: the Masaryk Labor Academy in Czechoslovakia. E. N. I. O. S. in Italy. the Ox­ Ford Management Conference in Britain. the Gallic Conference on Scientific Management ( which after its 1925 amalgamation with Henry Fayol’s Center for Administrative Studies became the Gallic National Management Council ) . These groups organized international Congresss in Prague ( 1924 ) . Brussels ( 1925 ) . Rome ( 1927 ) . and Paris ( 1929 ) . They besides persuaded the American phi­ lanthropist Edward A. Filene and the International Labor Organi­ zation to set up an International Management Institute in Geneva in 1927. Headed by Albert Thomas and subsequently Lyndall Urwick. the Institute symbolized the credence of scientific direction in postwar. pre-Depression Europe. Third. the rap­ id spread of scientific direction was besides related to a new tolerance among organized workers and brotherhood leaders similar to the place of the Gallic labour motion after 1915.

This alteration of attitude reflected greater attention in the usage of clip survey. but besides the new nexus between scientific direction and labour reform. the desire for American life criterions. and the unions’ worsening lucks. 68 The most dramatic illustration of the temptingness of scientific manage­ ment in the 1920s was its popularity in the Soviet Union. Lenin and Gastev found few Alliess until 1920. Then the despairing province of the Soviet economic system. the Bolshevik committedness to industrializa­ tion. and the attractive forces of western engineering led Soviet leaders to encompass scientific direction in much the same manner that their replacements in the 1930s would encompass a similar Panacea. the importing of American and German engineering. At the tallness of his influence. Gastev preached a “Soviet Americanism” and a “new. blooming America” based on scientific direction. 69 Gastev’s first triumph came in 1920 when he obtained official support for an Institute of Labor ( TsIT ) to carry on managerial research and advance scientific direction. In the undermentioned months he outmaneuvered challengers and won extra frequenters in the Soviet authorities. With the coming of the New Economic Policy. Gastev’s cause flourished. In early 1921 there were 20 groups carry oning research under his protections ; by mid 1923 there were 58. Most of them focused on raising industrial productiveness but “rationalizing instruction. battling inordinate lines at shops. bettering the sorting of mail. reorganising the harvest home of murphies and even bring arounding poxs were all topics of experimentation and research. . . . ” 70 Gastev shortly attracted crit­ Intelligence Communities and challengers. His oppositions attacked his preoccupation with clip survey and his technocratic attack. his motto. for illustration. that “mankind learned how to treat things ; the clip has come to thoroughly procedure adult male.

” 71 Gastev’s most serious rival was Pavel Kerzhentsev. a journalist who promoted a popular. non­ proficient attack to scientific direction. Kerzhentsev’s Time League. devoted to cut downing waste in all countries of day-to-day life. enjoyed a brief trend in 1923-1924 and temporarily eclipsed Gastev’s operations. Yet Kerzhentsev was no lucifer for Gastev in the sphere of bureaucratic combat. By 1925 he had lost official favour ; together with the Time League he shortly faded from position. Gastev. nevertheless. had small chance to enjoy his triumph. The decease of his head frequenter. Felix Dzerzhinski. in 1926. made him vulnerable to assail
and the victory of Stalin in the late 1920s suddenly ended the Soviet committedness to scientific direction. Some of Gastev’s followings were purged every bit early as 1929 ; he persisted. with worsening influence until his apprehension and imprison­ ment in 1938. By that clip about all his Alliess and associates had been killed or imprisoned. 72 What did Gastev carry through. if anything? The studies of Amer­ ican applied scientists who visited the Soviet Union supply one step of his impact. Royal R. Keely. a peripheral member of Taylor’s clique who made an drawn-out study in 1920. was disdainful of Soviet industry. 73 Walter Polakov. a outstanding adviser of left-of-center understandings who spent a twelvemonth and half in the Soviet Union a decennary subsequently. reported merely modest advancement. “All of the critical inside informations of scheduling. dispatching. production control. advancement records. etc. are left chiefly to opportunity. ” Time and gesture survey. he added. “is a thing small known in the U. S. S. R. ” 74 While Polakov likely missed elusive alterations of attack and attitude every bit good as applications outside fabrication. his judgement was a commentary on the caustic effects of political infighting and the strength of grassroots resistance. Despite official support for about a decennary. scientific direction had few friends in mines or mills. The direction expert was “the most despised adult male in industry. ” As Gastev himself acknowledged in 1927. “he is op­ posed by the manager ; he is opposed by the main applied scientist ; to a big grade he is opposed by the chief ; he clashes with the resistance of the workers. ” 75 Donald Filtzer’s recent scrutiny of Soviet clip survey informations attests to the outrageousness of the challenge. 76 As Gastev and his Alliess fell out of favour. the opposition grew increas­ ingly violent. The Stakhanovite motion of the mid 1930s was a rebellion against clip and gesture survey and the managerial authorization that it enhanced. 77 By the terminal of the decennary few engi­ neers or directors were sufficiently bold or foolish to keep out.

The singular rise and autumn of scientific direction in the Soviet Union had no western analogue. The Depression of the 1930s diminished the attractive force
of American thoughts and such European alternates as rationalisation. but seemingly did non impact the advancement of scientific direction in industry. The best illustration was the success of the Bedaux house in the 1930s. European affiliates of the American consulting company began to run in Britain. France. Italy. Germany. and other states in the late twentiess. Hard times were good for concern. despite renewed labour resistance. Bedaux’s promise to salvage more than his fee. chiefly through increased labour productiveness. suited the thought of in­ dustrialists in the 1930s. 78 But Bedaux was non the lone consulting house that thrived. Urwick. Orr & A ; Partners. and Wallace Clark & A ; Co. . for illustration. did good despite their fidelity to the Taylor attack. And though the international scientific direction motion ( including the International Management Institute ) fell victim to hard times and lifting political tensenesss. most of the establishments that impressed Paul Devinat in the 1920s continued to continue the heritage of Taylor and his associates in the 1930s. The Nipponese experience was similar. In the late 1920s and 1920s three groups promoted scientific direction in Nipponese indus­ attempt: advisers such as Yoichi Ueno and Araki Toichiro. who had personal contacts with Taylor. Gilbreth. and Emerson ; mechanical applied scientists such as Takuo Godo of the naval armory at Kure and Shigeo Kato of Niigata Iron Works. who wanted to better the operation of their workss ; and technology employees of Nipponese houses allied with General Electric. Westinghouse. and other Ameri­ can multinationals. who borrowed technique every bit good as engineering.

Takeo Kato of Mitsubishi Electric. for illustration. brought back the Westinghouse mill manual and clip survey usher from a 1925 visit and used them to overhaul operating processs in his house. The Nipponese authorities encouraged this activity. making commissions on rationalisation that served as forums for propo­ nents of scientific direction. 79 Though the history of scientific direction in Europe and Japan in the 1930s and 1940s is barely more complete than the history of scientific direction in the United States. it is clear that the post-World War II leaders who argued that American direction techniques would salvage wartorn states from eco­ nomic retardation greatly exaggerated the freshness of their proposals. Like Americans •who saw in Stalin’s Five Year plans the ultimate look of scientific direction planning. they con­ fused superficial visual aspects with world. The mental revolution was non and had ne’er been an American monopoly. Scientific Management in America. 1915 to the 1950s What happened to scientific direction in the United States after 1915? The undermentioned essays examine the destinies of the scientific direction innovators. the diffusion of scientific direction in society and industry. and the unfavorable judgments of a ulterior coevals of analysts who had no firsthand cognition of Taylor or his work. More of import. they show that in the United States. as in Europe. scientific direction continued to be a stimulation to believing about the maps of organisations and a series of techniques for bettering short-term economic public presentation. Be­ cause of this double function. the survey of scientific direction pro­ vides an avenue for understanding the American involvement in eco­ nomic and proficient rationalisation every bit good as the development of production direction and the altering character of industrial work in the in-between decennaries of the century. At the clip of Taylor’s decease. none of the work forces near to him could fit the celebrity or influence of two foreigners. Richard A. Feiss and Frank B. Gilbreth. Feiss was an advanced executive whose Joseph & A ; Feiss Company had late emerged as the most attractive and promising look of the promise of scientific direction. Feiss’s operation was non merely big and successful ; it besides was a compelling illustration of the logical links between Taylor-inspired industrial technology and advanced forces work. Feiss and his influential helper. Mary Barnett Gilson. shortly embraced a signifier of societal technology commensurate with the company’s committedness to industrial efficiency but far ex­ ceeding anything Taylor or his immediate adherents of all time imagined. Scientific direction and a big female labour force proved to be a powerful combination. David Goldberg’s essay ( chapter 2 ) is the most complete description to day of the month of the Feiss operation and the dry destiny of Feiss and his co-workers in the 1920s. Gilbreth’s calling is better known. His exuberant personality. inventions in occupation analysis. struggles with Taylor. and unconven­ tional household life made him a famous person.

Yet. as Brian Price explains in chapter 3. public visibleness did non interpret into professional or material success. Despite his celebrity. Gilbreth made small advancement in set uping the high quality of his inventions to conventional clip survey or in fulfilling his clients. At the clip of his decease in 1924. his calling was at low wane. his repute sullied by perennial failures. He escaped the destiny of Feiss. nevertheless. because of the potency of gesture survey and because of the attempts of his married woman and spouse. Lillian Gilbreth. During the thirtiess. as gesture survey reemerged as an of import characteristic of work analysis and Lillian became a famous person in her ain right. the Gilbreths of the early 1920s gave manner to the more abiding and attractive Gilbreths of Cheaper by the Dozen ( 1948 ) —happy. successful. and respected. In the interim the thoughts or rules of scientific manage­ ment had attracted broad involvement in American rational circles. Some authors and bookmans became critics ; others saw possible benefits for themselves and society. The spectrum of possibilities is apparent in chapters 4 and 5. which examine the reactions of several groups of faculty members and the outstanding societal research worker. Mary Van Kleeck. Professors saw scientific direction chiefly in footings of academic political relations ; yet their attempt to work it for their benefit created a powerful and entirely unforeseen mechanism for the spread of Taylor’s thoughts. It was no happenstance that a big proportion of active participants in the direction motion of the 1920s and 1930s were university module members or that Taylor’s work became an of import characteristic of the instruction of applied scientists and directors. Van Kleeck. on the other manus. began her calling as a outstanding societal worker. non unlike Mary Barnett Gilson. She became interested in industrial issues. saw scientific direction as an reply to the disorganisation and lawless individuality of individualistic capitalist economy. and viewed its success as cogent evidence of the efficaciousness of production planning in society as a whole. As Guy Alchon explains. these positions besides led her to look up to the Soviet experiment and finally to go an vindicator for the Soviet province. Although scientific direction had deductions for all insti­ tutions. it is most closely identified with industrial production. Supporters and critics likewise assumed that its greatest impact was in the
mill. But they have had more problem stipulating the nature of that impact. During Taylor’s life-time. when comparatively little Numberss of houses and workers were involved. it was possible to

Scientific Management in Retrospect • 29

physically inspect most of the of import sites. as C. Bertrand Thompson and Robert Hoxie did. By the late 1910s that type of rating was impossible ; a little group of practicians no longer controlled entree to Taylor’s techniques. and the figure of applications exceeded the fact-finding capablenesss of any individ­ ual. However. several indirect steps are possible. 80 They suggest that by the 1930s scientific direction in the workplace no longer implied radical alteration or had particular entreaty for avant garde executives like Richard A. Feiss. In most instances manag­ Ers viewed it in narrow. useful footings and introduced or extended it to assist accomplish the potency of mass production engineerings and to pull off semiskilled workers. These tendencies likely accelerated in the thirtiess. when economic diminution spurred a renewed hunt for lower costs. Three documents examine the application of scientific direction in industry. Kathy Burgess’s topic in chapter 6 is the Link-Belt Company. which had been one of Taylor’s original presentation houses. She reports a form of activity that was consistent over a long period but which differed markedly from that of Joseph & A ; Feiss and presumptively the mass production and service houses that embraced scientific direction in the 1920s. Link-Belt de­ pended on extremely skilled workers. Scientific direction im­ proved their work and by and large won their hand clapping. but it could non see that they would non fall in brotherhoods or work stoppage. To Link-Belt directors. this was a serious defect. which they addressed through traditional brotherhood turning away steps: labour undercover agents. black lists. and arbitrary discharges. Thus the mental revolution at Link-Belt was ne’er complete ; despite the debut of modern forces work and other polishs of scientific direction in the 1920s. Link-Belt directors continued to trust on Draconian anti-union tactics every bit long as it was lawfully executable to make so. During the same period. the puzzling Charles Bedaux demon­ strated that the techniques of scientific direction could be successfully applied without a broader committedness. or a broad vision like
that of the Taylor Society insiders. In the 1920s and 1930s. Bedaux became the best-known industrial adviser. with a big patronage in the United States and Europe. A latecomer to scientific direction. he prospered while Feiss. Gilbreth. and many of the innovators stumbled. Yet the ingredients of his success are vague because of his intentionally close attack.

The find of the records of his British operations has eventually raised the head covering on Bedaux’s activities. In chapter 7. Steven Kreis discusses Bedaux’s tactics and their effects. Most large concerns. nevertheless. did non use foreigners or use them merely briefly and periodically. John Rumm’s survey of Du Pont ( chapter 8 ) is the first elaborate history of an industrial technology section over a long period. Like Kreis’s survey. it illustrates the narrow. practical focal point of most scientific manage­ ment applications. Du Pont executives had created a sophisticated organisation based on rules of scientific direction long before they established an industrial technology section. Merely when the Depression required extended cost cutting did they widen scientific direction to the store floor. Still. their attempt provides a elaborate position of Taylor’s techniques in action and an illuminating contrast with the experiences of Joseph & A ; Feiss. Link-Belt. and other innovators. During Taylor’s life-time. the focal point of most appraisals of the impact of scientific direction was its consequence on work and workers. In the 1920s and 1930s this accent bit by bit faded. though Bedaux’s work continued to arouse contention. In portion. this alteration was political ; brotherhood policy changed and personalities like Taylor and Gilbreth no longer served as lightning rods for resistance to managerial alteration. In the thirtiess. when labour mili­ tancy revived. forming attempts and economic