The Anonymity Of Juries Essay, Research Paper
Abstraction
The American condemnable justness system has traditionally made
the individualities and references of jurymans known to the justice, the
prosecution, and the defence. That tradition began to gnaw with the
unprecedented sua sponte test tribunal determination to utilize an anon. jury
in the instance of United States v. Barnes, a extremely publicized felon
test of ill-famed organized offense figures in New York City. Since
& # 8220 ; Barnes, & # 8221 ; Federal prosecuting officers in New York have requested and been
granted anon. juries in a figure of similar instances, a development
which has generated unfavorable judgment. This paper foremost addresses the issue of
whether juryman namelessness violates a suspect & # 8217 ; s 6th amendment right
to a jury test by adversely impacting the suspect & # 8217 ; s ability to
exercising efficaciously autocratic challenges during voir dire. It besides
discusses the consequence an anon. jury may hold on the given
that a suspect is guiltless until proved guilty. Besides considered are
efforts by test Judgess, through peculiar jury instructions, to
minimize or extinguish bias to suspects ensuing from the usage
of an anon. jury. And eventually the paper examines the demand for
anon. juries and concludes that in certain instances jurymans may either
fear revenge or really be exposed to bullying unless the
tribunal employs steps to hide their individualities.
Introduction
Juror namelessness is an invention that was unknown to the
common jurisprudence and to American law in its first two centuries.
Anonymity was first employed in federal prosecutions of organized
offense in New York in the 1980 & # 8217 ; s. Although anon. juries are unusual
since they are typically merely empanelled in organized-crime instances, its
usage has spread more late to widely publicized instances such as the
federal prosecution of constabulary officers accused of crushing Rodney King ;
and the test of those accused of the World Trade Center bombardment.
In these instances, lawyers selected a jury from a panel of
prospective jurymans whose names, references, cultural backgrounds and
religous associations remain unknown to either side. This unusual
process, designed to protect jurymans from outside influence and the
fright of revenge, has on occasion been used in New York federal
tribunals since the test of drug kingpin Leroy & # 8220 ; Nicky & # 8221 ; Barnes.1 Despite
evident benefits, critics assail anon. juries both as an
infringment of the 6th amendment warrant of an impartial jury 2
and as a serious and unneeded eroding of the given of
innocence.3
Since many lawyers believe tests are often won or lost
during jury selection,4 any process decreasing the function of advocate
invites near scrutiny and unfavorable judgment. Oppositions of anon. juries
argue that the process restricts meaningful voir dire and thereby
undermines the suspect & # 8217 ; s 6th amendment right to an impartial
jury.5 Critics besides claim that jurymans interpret their namelessness as
cogent evidence of the suspect & # 8217 ; s condemnable propensity, thereby overthrowing the
given of innocence.6 Nevertheless, this paper argues that
anon. juries neither undermine the 6th amendment nor
meaningfully thin the given of artlessness. Limited Voir Dire
and the Peremptory Challenge
Consistent with due procedure and the 6th amendment,7 the
test justice may decline to inquire prospective jurymans any inquiries non
moderately calculated to expose prejudices or biass relevant to the
case.8 Although references and group affilations may bespeak
important potency for prejudice, lawyers do non hold an unchained
right to this information in every case.9 Denying entree to these
facts may restrain an lawyer & # 8217 ; s ability to piece an ideal jury,
but it violates no constitutional right.
Although the Barnes tribunal may hold been on steadfast constitutional
land in rejecting the suspects & # 8217 ; petition for the cultural and
religous backgrounds and references of prospective jurors,10 it
unnecessarily downplayed the relevancy of this information to
intelligent peremptory challenges.11 Indeed, racial, cultural and
socio-economic undertones are present in every instance affecting an
anon. jury. Trial Judgess should admit this fact and license
some enquiry into group associations and approximative community in stead
of names and references. Because such revelation does non sabotage the
intent of juryman namelessness and more than adequately substitutes for
the information usually inferable from names and references, it should
be permitted in every instance utilizing the process.
Some facets of juryman namelessness may even work to a suspect & # 8217 ; s
advantage. Assuming lawyers are able to spot elusive biass
from a prospective juryman & # 8217 ; s group associations, namelessness every bit
restrains both sides from extinguishing members of the jury pool with
unwanted demographic characteristics.12 Although defence lawyers
may be unable to weed out jurymans with group features that are
purportedly damaging to condemnable suspects, pro-secutors will
likewise be unable to observe jurymans from purportedly sympathetic
jurors.13 This equality of ignorance may prefer suspects. Because
strong belief requires a consentaneous finding of fact, namelessness increases the
possibility of a hung jury by increasing the liklihood that jurymans
associated with religous, cultural or socio-economic groups prefering
peculiar suspects will steal through the voir dire.
One author has argued that equal entree to information about
the jury panel is important to a just voir dire.14 He noted that, in the
yesteryear, prosecuting officers have had one-sided entree to governmental bureau
informations on prospective jurors.15 Thus, the prosecution enjoys a possible
systemic advantage in every case.16 He concludes that a comparatively
wide voir dire is necessary to rectify this institutional disparity.17
One might more readily conclude, nevertheless, that anon. juries remedy
this systemic inequality. Without names and references, prosecuting officers
could non take advantage of the superior informational and
fact-finding resources of the authorities. Anonymity therefore ensures that
both sides are on equal terms with respect to information about
prospective jurymans.
Although the limited voir dire is constitutional, it prevents
entree to information on which lawyers rely well in
exerting their peremptory challenges. Consequently, lawyers should
have alternate entree to jurymans & # 8217 ; cultural backgrounds and approximate
community if the revelation would non endanger jurymans & # 8217 ; security.
The Presumption of Innocence
Unlike security steps that unambiguously point to the
suspect, juryman namelessness could be perceived to turn to possible
perturbations entirely unrelated to the suspect. Yet, critics of the
anon. jury contend that prospective jurymans could merely read the
namelessness direction to be a judicial decision of the suspect & # 8217 ; s
guilt.18 Therefore, they can non obey the contradictory direction to
assume the suspect inexperienced person until the governnment meets its load
of proof.19 Although plausible, this decision needfully depends on
certain unsupported assump tions about juryman perceptual experience and cognition.
The possible load of jury namelessness on the suspect & # 8217 ; s
given of artlessness was conceded in United States v. Thomas.20
It was even recognized that the damaging impact on the suspect
could non be eliminated wholly. In rejecting a per Se regulation against
namelessness, the Thomas Court underlined two indispensable requirements for
usage of an anon. jury. First, there should be & # 8220 ; strong ground to
believe the jury needs protection, & # 8221 ; and 2nd, sensible safeguard
must be taken to minimise the negative consequence of usage of the anon.
jury & # 8220 ; on the juryman & # 8217 ; s sentiments of the defendants. & # 8221 ; 21
Unfortunately, the tribunal besides endorsed hiding from the
jury the existent ground for namelessness. The chief justfication offered
for namelessness was to forestall jury meddling, but the tribunal approved an
direction that intentionally made no reference of that, merely of the
necessity to protect jurymans from & # 8220 ; unwanted and unwanted promotion
and embarrassment and ill fame and any entree to you which would
interfere with continuing your pledged responsibility to reasonably, impartially and
independently serve as jurors.22
In about every instance, the test justice explains to jurymans that,
due to the test & # 8217 ; s ill fame, namelessness is necessary to forestall the
media and the populace from occupying their privateness and impairing their
impartiality.23 Critics claim that jurymans read through this facially
impersonal direction because no juryman would believe he was being
insulated from anyone other than the suspects or their
sympathizers.24 This premise would therefore necessitate Judgess to forbear
from doing any suggestion refering the jurymans & # 8217 ; extra-judicial
contacts, lest suspects be cast in a negative visible radiation. Indeed, many
convicted suspects successfully argue on entreaty that the jury was
either non adequately cautioned to avoid outside influence or that
juryman contact with 3rd parties prejudiced the suspect & # 8217 ; s instance.
Cases that inspire important media attending and public
passion raise particular concerns about juryman insularity. The consequence of
explosive media studies and hostile public sentiment on a suspect & # 8217 ; s
just test rights has long perplexed judges.2
5 When ill-famed
felons are tried, a juryman could easy experience force per unit area to move as a
public retaliator and therefore could believe that his namelessness is aimed at
insulating the jury from forces and sentiments hostile to the suspects.
But because some attempt is ever made to admonish the jury against any
outside influence, it seems unlogical to reason that juryman namelessness
could be perceived merely as presumptive grounds of a suspect & # 8217 ; s
guilt.
Assuming that the namelessness direction signals the jury that
the suspects might & # 8220 ; acquire & # 8221 ; to them, critics of anon. juries ignore
a likely effect of that perception.26 A juryman who anticipates a
suspect & # 8217 ; s revenge would be more likely to return a guilty
finding of fact despite such frights instead than because of them. Therefore, even if
namelessness by the way instills the fright it attempts to rectify, the
consequence arguably benefits the suspect by doing jurymans afraid to
inmate. On the other manus, if namelessness helps to rectify bing
frights, it serves the ideal of cold-eyed opinion. Although a
suspect would intelligibly welcome a test before a jury biased
toward an acquittal, the people, every bit good as the suspect, are
entitled to an impartial jury.
Of class, a juryman may construe namelessness as a step
designed merely to forestall jury meddling, non as a step protecting
him from a violent suspect. The inquiry so becomes whether this
illation pre-judicially alters the juryman & # 8217 ; s perceptual experience of a suspect.
Whether jurymans perceive their namelessness as a step designed to
prevent meddling or force, it does small to change their
perceptual experience of certain suspects, since most qualified jurymans have
some pretrial feelings or sentiments of virtues of of import,
publicized instances. However, the tribunals have systematically held that
jurymans need non be wholly unmindful to the facts underlying a
peculiar case.27 Pretrial feelings or sentiments will non
unfit a juryman if, in the tribunal & # 8217 ; s opinion, he can put aside such
feelings and establish his determination entirely on the grounds admitted at
test. While a juryman & # 8217 ; s ability to disregard permeant media coverage may
be questionable, critics of anon. juries seem presume that jurymans
are unmindful to the nature of these instances until they are directed non
to uncover their identities.28 Merely so, purportedly, are their heads
irrevocaably poisoned against the suspects.
By teaching a jury that namelessness prevents the media and
interested members of the populace from interfering with their
deliberations, a test justice avoids most damaging insinuation. Con-
sequently, an anon. jury does non sabotage the given of
artlessness.
The Use of Anonymous Juries
Although the damaging impact of juryman namelessness may be
overdone, any invasion on a suspect & # 8217 ; s just test rights is
undue if namelessness is unecessary. The demand for anon. juries
remainders on several evidences.
Juror namelessness remainders on the premise that at least some
jurymans will be intimidated by the characterzation of the suspects in
the indictment and the corresponding pretrial media attending. Critics
complain that Judgess have imposed namelessness without an indicant from
jurymans that they were afraid.29 Although juryman fright may be hard
to turn out, aassuming its being is non every bit spurious as this unfavorable judgment
suggests.
First, the impracticality of judicial enquiry into this country
is obvious. If the jurymans are non already discerning, extended
oppugning about such frights would surely be given to bring forth the fright
the inquiries are designed to observe. Second, while no juryman expressed
any fright of force on the record in Barnes and its progency, jurymans
hold voiced such frights in instances affecting less ill-famed suspects.
Most of the current instances utilizing anon. juries involve powerful
organized offense groups whose public reputes for corruptness,
bullying, and pitilessness have become affairs of modern-day
wisdom.
Another premiss underlying the demand for anon. juries is
that certain suspects or their sympathisers are likely to pervert or
intimidate the jury. Critics assert that tribunals accept this premiss
despite a & # 8220 ; entire absence of any grounds of jury meddling, or of a
confederacy to fiddle, injure, or otherwise adversely impact a juror. & # 8221 ;
30
Although the demand for namelessness is non limited to traditional
organized offense instances, and the factors considered in impaneling
anon. juries existed to a lesser grade in instances predating Barnes,
the process is an appropriate safety steps in instances that & # 8220 ; stretch
the traditional dimensions of condemnable law. & # 8221 ; 31
Decision
An impartial jury is merely a condemnable suspect & # 8217 ; s
constitutional right but a trademark of any civilized judicial system.
In extraordinary instances, juryman namelessness is necessary to guarantee this
end. Rather than alarming a juryman to a suspect & # 8217 ; s violent character,
namelessness simply allays bing frights and prevents outside forces
from prejudicing either side. Preventing a suspect from utilizing his
repute or resources to deter strong belief conserves, instead
than subverts, the unity of the judicial procedure.
& # 8212 ;
Endnotes
1 United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 140-41 ( 2d Cir. 1979 ) , cert.
denied 446 U.S. 907 ( 1980 ) .
2 William M. Kunstler, & # 8220 ; The Threat of Anonymous Juries, & # 8221 ; The State,
22 October 1983, 360.
3 Ibid. , 360.
4 Seymour Wishman, Anatomy of a Jury: the system on test, ( New York:
Timess Books, 1986 ) , 28.
5 Ephraim Margolin & A ; Gerald F. Uelman, & # 8220 ; The Anonymous Jury, & # 8221 ; Criminal
Justice Journal, Fall 94, 16.
6 Ibid. , 16.
7 United States Constitution amendments V, VI, XIV.
8 Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 189-90 ( 1981 ) .
9 Gold v. United States, 378 F.2d 588, 594 ( 9th Cir. 1967 ) ( no right
to jurymans & # 8217 ; religous backgrounds ) ; Johnson v. United States, 270 F.2d
721, 724 ( 9th Cir. 1959 ) ( no right to jurymans & # 8217 ; references ) , cert denied,
362 U.S. 937 ( 1960 ) ; Wagner v. United States, 264 F.2d 524, 528 ( 9th
Cir. ) ( no right to jurymans & # 8217 ; names ) , cert. denied, 360 U.S. 936 ( 1959 ) .
10 United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 140-41 ( 2d Cir. 1979 ) , cert.
denied 446 U.S. 907 ( 1980 ) .
11 Ibid. , 121, 174.
12 D. P. Lehner, & # 8220 ; Anonymous Juries: Do the Benefits Warrant
Endangering the Rights of the Accused? , & # 8221 ; Criminal Justice Journal,
Fall-Winter 1988, 189-190.
13 Ibid. , 189-190.
14 Seymour Wishman, Anatomy of a Jury: the system on test, ( New York:
Timess Books, 1986 ) , 134-36.
15 Ibid. , 134-135.
16 Ibid. , 136.
17 Ibid. , 136.
18 Ephraim Margolin & A ; Gerald F. Uelman, & # 8220 ; The Anonymous Jury, & # 8221 ; Criminal
Justice Journal, Fall 94, 61.
19 Ibid. , 94, 61.
20 United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1364-65 ( 2d Cir. ) , cert.
denied, 106 S.Ct 66 ( 1985 ) .
21 Ibid. , 1359, 1364-65.
22 Ibid. , 1359, 1364-65.
23 D. P. Lehner, & # 8220 ; Anonymous Juries: Do the Benefits Warrant
Endangering the Rights of the Accused? , & # 8221 ; Criminal Justice Journal,
Fall-Winter 1988, 188.
24 Ibid. , 188.
25 Ibid. , 200-201.
26 William M. Kunstler, & # 8220 ; The Threat of Anonymous Juries, & # 8221 ; The State,
22 October 1983, 360.
27 United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 141 ( 2d Cir. 1979 ) , cert.
denied 446 U.S. 907 ( 1980 ) .
28 D. P. Lehner, & # 8220 ; Anonymous Juries: Do the Benefits Warrant
Endangering the Rights of the Accused? , & # 8221 ; Criminal Justice Journal,
Fall-Winter 1988, 187.
29 William M. Kunstler, & # 8220 ; The Threat of Anonymous Juries, & # 8221 ; The State,
22 October 1983, 360.
30 D. P. Lehner, & # 8220 ; Anonymous Juries: Do the Benefits Warrant
Endangering the Rights of the Accused? , & # 8221 ; Criminal Justice Journal,
Fall-Winter 1988, 200.
31 Ibid. , 199.
& # 8212 ;
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