Redress Essay, Research Paper

Introduction

In December 1982, the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians ( CWIRC ) concluded that the emptying and captivity of 120,000 Americans of Nipponese lineage during World War II were the consequence of racism, war craze, and a failure of the state s leading. Six months subsequently, the committee recommended that the U.S. authorities offer a national apology and payments of $ 20,000 to the lasting internees as a signifier of damages. On August 10, 1988, those recommendations became jurisprudence when President Ronald Reagan signed the Civil Liberties Act of 1988. This paper will try to analyze how and why damages passed, the most important factors involved every bit good the statements for and against the measures.

Wartime

On December 7, 1941, Japan s military dropped bombs on the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor. The following twenty-four hours the United Stated declared war on Japan. The first month of the war was comparatively unagitated. There were few instances of public terror or craze occurring, and Nipponese Americans were treated no otherwise than they had been before war began. There have been newspaper accounts demoing that there was a huge bulk of American citizens that were sympathetic to the Nipponese s predicament of looking like the enemy but being loyal citizens. There were besides some authorities functionaries that were reding the populace non to fault the Japanese in America for the war. The understanding was non relentless and it didn t last long. There was a bulk of people that had ever harbored a feeling of bitterness and abomination towards the Japanese. With the coming of the war, they plunged into an full-scale hatred run. In some countries, a few instances of force against the Nipponese, including shots and violent deaths, occurred. These onslaughts on the Japanese were used as a justification for restricting and relocating them: it was for their ain good, to protect them against racialist force.

As the exclusion motion began to derive more force, Congressman John H. Tolan from California called for the creative activity of the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration of the House of Representatives. The intent of the commission was to do an attempt to find the facts and the statements for and against the proposed exclusion. On February 11, 10 yearss before their first meeting, President Roosevelt had given Secretary of War Stimson his blessing to get down explicating programs for a mass emptying of all individuals of Nipponese lineage from the West Coast.

Executive Order 9066 and its Repercussions

On February 12, 1942, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 that set the phase for the forced emptying of over 120,000 foreigners and citizens from California, Oregon, Arizona, and Washington. The order declared, The successful prosecution of the war requires every possible protection against espionage and against sabotage to national-defense stuff, national-defense premises and national-defense public-service corporations. The measure was signed amongst strong resistance from many high named functionaries such as FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover. He went on record stating that the demand for the remotion of all Nipponese Americans on the West Coast was non justified on national security evidences. He said the program was non based on factual grounds, but on public and political force per unit area.

With the backup of Congress and the President, General John L. DeWitt issued a series of civilian exclusion orders and public announcements that extended to go limitations, curfews, and contraband ordinances to all Nipponese Americans, irrespective of citizenship. Finally, his orders called for all individuals of Nipponese lineage in California and parts of Arizona, Washington, and Oregon to turn themselves in at impermanent detainment centres near their places. The emptying took a sum of eight months, from March 24 to November 3.

Constitutionality

Most of the Nipponese Americans obeyed the military orders as a manner of showing their trueness to the United States, but there were some persons who challenged the constitutionality of the emptying and internment orders. Fred Korematsu was charged with declining emptying, Minoru Yasui with go againsting curfew, and Gordon Hirabayashi with go againsting curfew and neglecting to describe for detainment. All three were convicted in the federal tribunals for disobeying military orders and appealed their instances to the U. S. Supreme Court. These three instances are considered to be condemnable instances because they were direct misdemeanors of jurisprudence. A 4th instance by Mitsuye Endo was filed against the United States in 1942. As that she broke no Torahs and complied with the military orders, her instance was considered a civil suit. She challenged the authorities s right to incarcerate an American citizen without charge or test. A twelvemonth subsequently the determination denying her release was announced, and she appealed to the Supreme Court.

In landmark determinations in the instances of Hirabayashi v. United States, Yasui v. United States, and Korematsu v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld the Executive Order 9066 and the ground forces s emptying process saying that a group defined wholly by lineage could constitutionally be placed under curfew and expelled from their places, because Congress had declared war and the military had decided that it was impossible to divide the loyal from the disloyal. In late 1944, in the instance of Ex Parte Endo, the tribunal unconditionally released Endo from detention, governing nem con that the War Relocation Authority ( WRA ) could neither confine loyal citizens nor prevent them from traveling to the West Coast. The Court ruled that her exclusion from the West Coast and detainment for three old ages without charges had been constitutional, but since Endo had proven herself to be a loyal citizen, she had to be given her freedom.

On December 17th, one twenty-four hours before the Supreme Court announced their determination ; the War Department rescinded the exclusion and detainment orders. On the twenty-four hours of the determination, the WRA announced that all concentration cantonments would be closed within a twelvemonth and that the WRA plan would end its committee by the beginning of July 1946.

Damages Menachem begins

A huge bulk of the Nipponese American community to the full believed that the issue of damages should get down in the legislative organic structure of the authorities. It was felt that it was the president s Executive Order 9066 that had authorized the emptying and internment, and Congress s Public Law No. 503 that instituted civil punishments for those go againsting military orders. Therefore, this subdivision of the authorities should be the 1s to do damages. Although this was the most favorite path to take among the Japanese Americans, discord surfaced when the Nipponese American Citizens League ( JACL ) decided that its first measure into the congressional sphere would be to bespeak that a federal survey be conducted to look into and do recommendations to the issue of damages. With the backup of the federal survey s recommendations, Nipponese Americans could so near Congress for the damages measures themselves.

One subdivision of the Nipponese American community split away from the JACL position and opted to force for damages through the tribunals. Led by William Hohri of Chicago, the National Council for Nipponese American Redress ( NCJAR ) was created in May 1979. NCJAR members felt that a committee should merely be a disengagement if attempts to win full pecuniary compensation failed. The attacks of the JACL and NCJAR were non wholly in struggle ; the relationship between both sides was strained, with verbal backbiting on both sides.

Major resistance to the issue of damages erupted during this clip every bit good. One really notable group was the Americans for Historical Accuracy ( AFHA ) , a group led by Lillian Baker. The AFHA characterized itself as a Coalition Against the Falsification of U.S.A. History. The AFHA maintained that the internment was non about as unpleasant of an experience for Nipponese Americans like they claimed. The cantonments were a pleasant oasis at a clip of war. The group goes on to province that for former internees to be inquiring for pecuniary compensation and a national apology when the authorities Federal, clothed, and housed them while the remainder of the state was contending a war was perfectly hideous. Harmonizing to them, the internment had been necessary for national security grounds, and any effort to apologise or do up for that legitimate act was farcical.

Outside Factors Against Redress

There are four really of import factors that were being waged against the issue of damages. The first was the federal budget shortage. In 1980, under the Reagan Administration, our shortage witnessed an alone rise, from $ 59.6 billion to $ 195.4 billion by 1983, when the first damages measures were introduced. The Balanced Budget and Emergency Control Act of 1985 called for a balanced budget by financial twelvemonth 1991. With the passage of this measure, it called for monolithic cutbacks of legion federal progr

Ams. It was possible that electors across the state would non see passing $ 1.25 billion to a little but reasonably comfortable group as being an appropriate and responsible direction of revenue enhancement dollars. Besides, it was argued on legion occasions that the federal, every bit good as some province and local authoritiess, had already paid compensation to the former internees with the passing of the Nipponese American Evacuation Claims Act of 1948. This act allowed Nipponese Americans to register claims against the authorities for the loss of belongings. 26,568 claims numbering $ 148 million were filed under this act. The authorities had distributed $ 37 million. Besides, in 1972 Congress revised the Social Security Act to let Nipponese Americans to claim societal security for clip spent in detainment. In add-on to that, in 1978 the federal civil service retirement commissariats were amended to allow Nipponese Americans over age 18 have recognition for civil service retirement for the clip interned.

The 2nd external factor in resistance to the damages was the province of trade dealingss between the United States and Japan. For a really long clip, the United States has been an economic leader, but late Japan has earnestly challenged the United States, emerging from the war as the second-largest economic system and the taking exporter in the universe today. In more recent old ages, Japan has had a flux of trade instabilities with the United States. Nipponese rivals have driven many American companies out of concern. As a consequence, an anti-Japanese ambiance developed within the American population.

The 3rd external factor that surfaced against damages was the theoretical account minority myth. Statistical grounds has proven that a huge bulk of Nipponese Americans does non endure the same type of societal and economic unfairnesss that plague other minority groups such as African Americans and Latinos. In fact, Nipponese Americans rank non merely above these two minority groups, but besides even above the average household income of most Whites. Congressman Shumway made the contended that:

I believe that this measure may resuscitate some of the prejudice that we saw during our World War II and the old ages shortly thenceforth against good Nipponese Americans citizens. . . . I think that we do non desire to make anything to resuscitate that prejudice. We now count Nipponese Americans citizens as some of the most respectable, hard-working, loyal Americans that we have in our state. To divide them out in manner, to do them the receiver of a stipend which is an attempt to pay them for something I think could resuscitate some prejudice and I think the measure is unsafe for that ground.

The concluding external factor impacting the issue of damages was the state of affairs of other minority groups in the United States and the fright of puting a unsafe case in point for righting wrongs done to those groups. In the instance of African Americans, although bondage was much worse than the Nipponese Americans state of affairs, the slave was run as a free endeavor, non under authorities sponsorship, even though it was sanctioned under the Constitution. For Native Americans, the issue was one of broken pacts between separate states. Neither of these illustrations involved an act of the U.S. authorities against its ain citizens. The internment of Nipponese Americans is the lone instance in the history of the United States in which our authorities took a group of citizens and imprisoned them as a whole without merely cause.

Redress Achieved

In 1984, shortly before his monolithic win over former Vice President Walter Mondale, Nipponese Americans and their protagonists in Congress faced President Reagan with an intense lobbying attempt. The issues were with the moral, legal, and economic damages of the forced emptying, resettlement, and internment of Nipponese Americans during World War II. For about five old ages, Reagan opposed redress statute law, change by reversaling his place merely after the political force per unit area reached a fierce pitch during the last yearss of his 2nd term. At the start of the 1988 election run, Jack Kemp, a republican from NY and a close confidante of Reagan s warned that the 1988 general election posed a certain sum of danger to the Republicans if they stood against damages. The support for damages might extinguish a considerable cultural vote-related menace to the 1988 Republican ticket. For a clip, Reagan contemplated a via media with Congress whereby a lower redress compensation budget would be acceptable to his disposal. This had failed with a ballot of 237-162.

Given the political world of the state of affairs, the president informed his cabinet and Senate Alliess that he was taking the veto menace. On August 10, 1988, Reagan wrote the Congress s full damages statute law into jurisprudence. In a particular sign language ceremonial, Reagan made the undermentioned statements:

No payment can do up for those three lost old ages. So what is most of import in this measure has less to make with belongings than with award. For here we admit a incorrect. Here we reaffirm our committedness as a state to equal justness under the jurisprudence.

On October 9, 1990, presented by the U.S. lawyer general, the oldest life subsister of internment, Mamoru Eto, 107 old ages old, received a missive of apology and a cheque for 20 thousand dollars. The missive of apology, signed by George Bush said, A pecuniary amount and words entirely can non reconstruct lost old ages or wipe out painful memories. But we can take a clear base for justness and acknowledge that serious unfairnesss were done to Nipponese Americans during World War II.

Decision

On February 19, 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066, which led to the emptying and internment of 120,000 West Coast Nipponese Americans. On August 10, 1988, forty-six old ages subsequently, President Ronald Reagan signed into jurisprudence the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, presenting pecuniary compensation and a national apology to the lasting Nipponese Americans affected by Roosevelt s wartime order, conveying to a stopping point a black event in the history of the United States.

But does it stop at that place? Personally, I don t believe so. While the incident was highly scandalous and unfortunate, I genuinely believe that given the same type of scenario today, our authorities would intern the Nipponese Americans ( or whichever group happened to be the menace ) once more. The landmark determination of the Reagan to go through the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 has opened the field broad for damages to be awarded to other minority groups that have been repressed or had their constitutional rights violated in any manner, form or signifier.

Although a national apology has been given and damages has been achieved, the Torahs of our state sing wartime process have non changed. I believe that even though our authorities acknowledges that a grave unfairness has been committed, they still feel as if the wartime Torahs are the right processs to follow. If anything, the damages was motivated by more political action than a sense of duty. This is non the last that we will hear of sing the Nipponese Americans having damages. Our state will experience the reverberations of the passing of the Civil Liberties Act for a long clip to come.

Plants Cited

Baker, Lillian. The Concentration Camp Conspiracy: A Second Pearl Harbor. California: AFHA Publications, 1981.

Chuman, Frank E. The Bamboo Peoples: The Law and Nipponese Americans. California: Publisher s, 1976.

Daniels, Roger. Prisoners Without Trial: Nipponese Americans in World War II. New York: Hill and Wang, 1993.

Daniels, Roger, Sandra C. Taylor, and Harry H.L. Kitano, eds. Nipponese Americans: From Resettlement To Redress. Beehive state: University of Utah Press, 1986.

Ichioka, Yuji. The World Of The First Generation Nipponese Immigrants: 1885- 1924. New York: The Free Press, 1988.

Nipponese American Citizens League, National Committee for Redress. The Nipponese American Captivity: A Case for Redress. 4th erectile dysfunction.

Takezawa, Yasuko I. Interrupting The Silence: Damages and Nipponese American Ethnicity. New York: Cornell University Press, 1995.

United. States. Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians. Personal Justice Denied. Washington D.C. : G.P.O. , 1982.

& # 8212 ; , & # 8212 ; , Personal Justice Denied. Part II, Recommendations. Washington D.C. : G.P.O. , 1983.

& # 8212 ; , Congress. House Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the Committee on the Judiciary. Hearings on Legislation to Implement the Recommendations of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, H.R. 442, the Civil Liberties Act of 1987, H.R. 1631, the Aleutian and Pribilof Island Restitution Act. 100th Congress. , 1st Session, 1987.

& # 8212 ; , Senate. House Subcommittee on Federal Services, Post Office, and Civil Service of the Committee on Governmental Affairs. Hearings on S. 1009, to Accept the Findingss and to Implement the Recommendations of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians. 100th Congress. , 1st Session, 1987.