Zen Action, Zen Person And Nagarjuna: The Logic Of Emptiness Essay, Research Paper

The sire of Madhyamika Buddhism was Nagarjuna. T.P. Kasulis writes in his book, Zen Action, Zen Person that Nagarjuna was a predecessor to the development of Zen Buddhism. Nagarjuna is regarded though as a patriarch of the Zen tradition. He was the impacting rule to show logically the & # 8220 ; emptiness & # 8221 ; , or instead sunyata of philosophical differentiations. Kasulis besides explores Nagarjuna & # 8217 ; s & # 8220 ; Logic of Emptiness. & # 8221 ;

The Buddhist claimed that & # 8220 ; to be concerned with bad inquiries is like being concerned with the beginning of a poisoned pointer while it is still in one & # 8217 ; s flesh, polluting the bloodstream. & # 8221 ; Kasulis writes that a conflicting group supposed that nil at all continued from the cause into the consequence, that the two where wholly distinguishable. The Abhidharma Buddhist scrutinized the rules behind the Buddhist instructions. Zen Action, Zen Person states that these became about every bit of import as practising the instructions ; that is the scrutnization of the rules. With all this haggle over the rules and the argument on them, Nagarjuna came up with his & # 8220 ; Logic of the Middle. & # 8221 ; The beginning of this came from the philosophy of sunyata or instead emptiness, which Kasulis provinces is the & # 8220 ; Logic of Emptiness. & # 8221 ;

Nagarjuna showed what was incorrect the Abhidharma statement. He stated that the multiple philosophical divisions of Buddhism were created on & # 8220 ; differentiations that must be seen as probationary instead than absolute. & # 8221 ; Kasulis writes that Nagarjuna came up with a declaration to this statement. This solution was pure and simple. Nagarjuna wrote down all the cardinal differentiations that the diverse philosophical & # 8220 ; groups & # 8221 ; assumed. He so took these differentiations and went through them one by one and showed that they had to be considered absolute. He went on to province that these differentiations lead the manner to & # 8220 ; inescapable absurdities. & # 8221 ; Ineluctable agencies, & # 8220 ; being incapable of being evaded & # 8221 ; or

something that is ineluctable ( Webster & # 8217 ; s 1996 ) . So what Nagarjuna was stating was that these differentiations that the Abhidharma Buddhist believed in finally lead to absurdnesss that can non be escaped from.

Kasulis focuses on two of Nagarjuna & # 8217 ; s points or instead reviews against the Abhidharma ; clip and causality. Nagarjuna & # 8217 ; s critique on clip can be seen as a good debut to his & # 8220 ; methodology. & # 8221 ; Nagarjuna argues four points against clip.

The first review is that & # 8220 ; if the being of the present and future depends upon the yesteryear, so present and future should be in the past & # 8221 ; ( Kasulis ) . An illustration from my life to assist exemplify this point would be driving. The yesteryear is when I was 16 old ages old and I got my driver & # 8217 ; s licence. The present is me presently driving and the hereafter is that I will hold a wreck. If the present ( driving ) and the hereafter ( my wreck ) depends on the yesteryear ( my obtaining my drivers license ) , so my being able to drive ( present ) , and my holding a wreck ( future ) should be in the yesteryear.

Nagarjuna & # 8217 ; s 2nd review against clip is that if present and hereafter was non in the yesteryear, how could show and hereafter is dependent upon the yesteryear? It can be illustrated this manner. If my drive ( present ) and my holding a wreck ( hereafter ) are non in the past so how could my drive ( present ) and my holding a wreck ( hereafter ) are dependent upon my obtaining my licence?

Nagarjuna goes on to state that if we don & # 8217 ; t depend on the yesteryear, so the present and hereafter will non happen. If this is the instance so present and future times besides do non happen. We can besides state that if I am non dependent on acquiring my driver & # 8217 ; s licence so my drive and my holding a wreck will non happen.

Nagarjuna & # 8217 ; s last review against clip was that & # 8220 ; the staying two periods of clip every bit good as above, below, and in-between, should be characterized. & # 8221 ; What Nagarjuna was stating was that the relationship between yesteryear, present and future is contra

dictory. The relationship between my obtaining my driver’s licence, me out driving on the route and my holding a wreck is contradictory.

Basically what Nagarjuna was stating was that the relationship between yesteryear, present and future all depend upon each other. Let & # 8217 ; s expression at it this manner ; the past depends on the present, the present depends on the yesteryear, the present depends on the hereafter and the hereafter depends on the yesteryear. In other words, my acquiring my driver & # 8217 ; s licence depends on my drive. My driving depends on my acquiring my driver & # 8217 ; s licence. My driving depends on my holding a wreck and my wreck depends on my obtaining my driver & # 8217 ; s licence. One thing can non go on without the other one happening besides. Kasulis so goes on to concentrate upon Nagarjuna & # 8217 ; s review of causality.

Nagarjuna challenged causality by doing apparent that the relationship between cause and consequence was non either absolute or unparadoxical. There are four reproductions to do and consequence. & # 8220 ; Cause and consequence is wholly indistinguishable, cause and consequence are non at all indistinguishable, cause and consequence are both indistinguishable and non indistinguishable at the same clip, and the last response is that cause and consequence is neither indistinguishable nor non indistinguishable & # 8221 ; ( Kasulis ) .

Let & # 8217 ; s utilize the illustration of driving once more to better exemplify this point or review. The cause of my holding a wreck could be because I was rushing. The consequence of my hurrying is holding a wreck. Nagarjuna says that these responses lead to absurdness. Or in layman & # 8217 ; s footings, they are perfectly pathetic.

Nagarjuna argues on point one that if the cause and consequence are precisely the same & # 8220 ; so nil different was caused or brought into existence. & # 8221 ; So if my holding a wreck ( consequence ) and the hurrying ( cause ) are so precisely the same, so nil happened. Nagarjuna says that for the causality to happen that a alteration has to go on. For me to rush and so for me to hold a wreck, a alteration has to go on.

Nagarjuna goes on to reason on the 2nd point that since cause and consequence is non indistinguishable at all, so there can non be any continuity. So if the wreck and the hurrying are at all indistinguishable so they can non go on.

The 3rd statement of Nagarjuna & # 8217 ; s sing cause and consequence is that if cause and consequence is indistinguishable and non indistinguishable so that is a precise contradiction to either of the earlier statements made by Indian logic. If my hurrying and my wreck are wholly indistinguishable so this goes wholly against all the other statements, such as when they say they are non at all indistinguishable ( indicate 2 ) .

The last statement of Nagarjuna & # 8217 ; s sing cause and consequence is that if cause and consequence are neither indistinguishable nor non indistinguishable so this makes it a abuse of linguistic communication. It seems to me that Nagarjuna is stating that this is about a miss-print or a misprint. If my wreck and my hurrying are non indistinguishable nor are they indistinguishable so this makes the statement incorrect. If this error were so true so it would do all the other statements that Indians make about cause and consequence nothing and nothingness.

It seems to me after reading these points on causality that I decidedly have to hold with Nagarjuna on points three and four. It is about as if Indian logic says something about causality and so in the really following sentence they province something about causality that is a direct contradiction to what they antecedently said.

Kasulis writes & # 8220 ; emptiness, which is the logical mutuality of opposing footings, lies at the footing of all philosophical distinction. & # 8221 ; Nagarjuna believed that we could work inside the universe of dichotomy while we identify its relativity. Kasulis says that we should & # 8220 ; see Nagarjuna & # 8217 ; s accent on the nondifferentiating, nonobjectifying penetration or wisdom. & # 8221 ;

Costello, Robert B. erectile dysfunction. Random House. Webster & # 8217 ; s College Dictionary. Random

House, Inc. 1996.

Kasulis, T.P. Zen Action. Zen Person. The University Press of Hawaii: 1981.