A System Of Beliefs Essay, Research Paper

By D.C. Burch

4Nov1996

Before I can travel on to put out the foundations of my belief system, I think it would be helpful to cast some visible radiation on the playing field in which these thoughts are to be considered. This playing field is constructed of words and statements, of class, but the precise significance of & # 8220 ; words & # 8221 ; and & # 8220 ; statements & # 8221 ; is frequently left ill-defined. I will get down by specifying these things as I intend to utilize them. I will besides do a cursury effort to explicate the different types of statements we will meet, the importance of falsifiablity and the function of religion, in add-on to a handful of other definitions that will go of import as we proceed.

Statements

The ultimate edifice blocks of any philosophical system are statements. A statement is an effort to pass on that which is true ( or perceived to be true ) through the symbolic codification ( words ) of a linguistic communication.

All symbols are, of class, inherently limited. There exist assorted belongingss in a symbol & # 8217 ; s object of mention which can non be contained within the symbol itself. An obvious illustration of this is the belongings of existent being. We may discourse in item the assorted belongingss of a Equus caballus and of a unicorn. Considered merely from a lingual point of view, a Equus caballus and unicorn can be assumed to be virtually synonymous. However, the object of the symbol Equus caballus possesses the belongings of existent being while the object of the symbol unicorn does non. The word/symbol Equus caballus, though, can non convey this belongings because it can non be contained by the symbol. True cognition of this belongings can merely be obtained by happening a existent Equus caballus and touching it, siting it, acquiring to cognize it.

The effect of this is the apprehension that there exist incommunicable belongingss of all existent objects. These incommunicable belongingss are no less existent than their catching opposite numbers. They merely can non be conveyed by symbols. Knowledge of these belongingss can merely be obtained by direct experience with the object itself. These belongingss will hereinafter be referred to as experiential belongingss.

Please note, nevertheless, that recognition of such experiential belongingss does non contradict the world or existent importance of those belongingss which can be contained and conveyed by the object & # 8217 ; s symbol. All existent objects contain both catching and experiential belongingss and to belittle consideration of either class is to restrict the grade to which we can understand the nature of such objects.

Literal and Analogical Symbolism

Statements will ever be either a signifier of actual symbolism or analogical symbolism. The former occurs when the statement is mentioning straight to a existent object encountered in nature. The latter occurs chiefly in spiritual statements in which the object of mention is a thing outside of nature ( supernatural ) . In such statements we understand that the symbol is pulling a helpful analogy between a natural object and a supernatural object which is neither entirely like, nor entirely unlike the natural object. We understand that, while the two objects are non indistinguishable, there are echt points of similarity. For illustration, when we say that God is a Father, we do non intend that he is biologically responsible for our being nor that he is precisely like our ain male parents. What we mean is that he is correspondent to our male parents in that he is responsible for our being and that he loves and provides for us in a manner that is similar to the bulk of human male parents.

A Priori V. Reasonable Statements

Any given statement may be either a priori or sensible. a anterior statements are those statements whose truth value is non dependent on the cogency of a logical tax write-off from other statements. We do non ground to a priori statements. We ground from them. There are no premises which give rise to them. Rather, they are the premises upon which all other tax write-offs are finally dependent. Since such statements are non the merchandise of deductive logical thinking, their truth value can non be logically determined. The lone method by which we may set up ( though ne’er once and for all ) the truth value of an a priori statement is by measuring the grade to which world seems to match with valid tax write-offs from such statements.

Reasonable statements, on the other manus, are those statements which are the consequence of a logical tax write-off from two or more other statements. These premise statements may be a priori and/or sensible. The truth value of a sensible statement is dependent on the cogency of the logical tax write-off and upon the truth value of the premiss statements.

At first glimpse, the unassailability of a priori statements might look to be a signifier of rational escape. A closer expression, nevertheless, will uncover the absolute necessity of acknowledging such statements. There is no system of idea nor method of enquiry, which does non finally happen itself confronted by at least one statement that has no more basic premiss. If we disallow these statements, so we bereft ourselves of the right to see any of our decisions as valid.

However, we should be highly cautious in situating statements which are a priori. There exist merely two classs of a priori statements: mathematical and epistemic ( how we know ) . All other statements are sensible statements by virtuousness of the fact that they are finally dependent on the premises of our epistemology.

Disproof and Meaningfulness

Any statement which is non a priori must let for the evidences on which the statement may be proven false, even if such evidences are merely theoretical. If the statement is formalized in such a manner that no possible evidences for its disproof are imaginable or, if it is formalized in such a manner as to forbid consideration of the lone imaginable evidences, so the statement is meaningless. This statement about disproof and significance is a priori and hence can non be proven. However, it can be assessed by its correspondence to world.

& # 8220 ; An illustrated book about birds & # 8221 ; makes no claim of fact. There is no manner to turn out it false and it is non meaningful. & # 8220 ; I have an illustrated book about birds, & # 8221 ; nevertheless, provides the evidences on which the statement may be falsified. I might non really possess such a book. Since the evidences for disproof is carried by the statement itself, the statement has significance. Meaning is merely another manner of stating that the statement has an existent value of truth or falsity whether that be complete truth, complete falsity, or some grade of both. & # 8220 ; I have an illustrated book about birds that has no visibleness or mass & # 8221 ; disallows the lone evidences by which the statement might be falsified and hence is non a meaningful statement. All of these illustrations, of class, do non & # 8220 ; turn out & # 8221 ; the original premiss about falsifiability and meaningfulness. They simply show that our experience with world corresponds to the logical tax write-offs of that premiss.

Since mathematical statements do non assure to calculate significantly in this small excursion of mine, I will non give much clip to them. I will state, nevertheless, that my determination to accept them as a prior is non without reserve. It seems plausible that all mathematical statements are really sensible by virtuousness of the fact that they are dependent on the truth value of our epistemic statements. At the same clip, nevertheless, mathematical statements are non merchandises of a concatenation of logical tax write-offs and on these evidences I admit them as being a priori.

Of much greater involvement to me are the a priori statements which compose an epistemology. We are ever faced with the instead thorny job of how to explicate such statements. We must travel about the procedure with an oculus towards guaranting that our epistemic statements correspond to discernible world. But to which elements of world must our statements correspond? For that affair, which elements are really existent and non merely fanciful merchandises of our perceptual experience? There are no easy replies to such inquiries, but it is clear that we must hold some method of restricting and determining the a priori statements which serve as the basiss of our epistemology.

Restricting A Priori Statements

Descartes pioneered a method of restricting a priori statements which is known as Cartesian Doubt. Descartes, following the regulation of Cartesian Doubt, rejected all statements which he did non cognize to be true beyond any and all uncertainty. He posited that the ensuing few statements would so function as the foundations for an all-encompasing epistemology. This attack led him to admit that the lone thing of which he could be perfectly certain was the being of the uncertainty itself. From this he inferred that there must besides be an self-importance, a ego, which could entertain such uncertainties. This, in bend, gave rise to what is likely the most well-known philosophical statement of all clip: & # 8220 ; I think, therefore I am. & # 8221 ;

The cardinal trouble with this attack is that we can easy oppugn ( or uncertainty ) the cogency of Descartes & # 8217 ; illation of a ego. If Cartesian Doubt is our litmus trial, so we must reject the illation of self-importance, merely because we can doubt the cogency of the illation. So, Cartesian Doubt merely allo

ws us to accept the being of uncertainty itself. Nothing more. Cartesian Doubt merely does non supply us with an equal foundation on which to set up an epistemology.

Having turned a critical oculus on Cartesian Doubt, I now backtrack a small and say that I think Descartes was headed in the right way. Descartes & # 8217 ; error was merely in take a firm standing on excessively rigorous a criterion by which to let for the cogency of a priori statements. If nil is allowed which can be doubted by some repetitive skeptic, so we are left with no footing for farther advancement. Therefore, I advocate a sort of Optimistic Skepticism in which we allow merely those things which are perfectly necessary for rational advancement.

The attack is disbelieving in that it allows as a priori about nil about which any uncertainty exists. It is optimistic in that it recognizes and accepts a few BASIC a priori statements as valid merely because, for privation of a better phrase, they must be true if we are to continue any farther. True, this is non a awfully hearty rational for accepting such statements. I do so, nevertheless, out of an optimism that we tend to comprehend these statements as being & # 8220 ; reasonable & # 8221 ; because our experience with them has given us an consciousness of their truth.

These are statements with merely one belongings, i.e. that of existent being, which is incommunicable. ( In the instance of & # 8220 ; things, & # 8221 ; existent being refers to physical world whereas, in the instance of & # 8220 ; thoughts, & # 8221 ; existent being means metaphysical truth. ) The existent being, or truth, of such statements can non be communicated by statements, but merely attained by direct interaction with the statement itself. In this instance, such interaction takes the signifier of accepting and edifice upon the a priori statements and thereby coming to cognize their truth value.

This optimism, which allows us to take the measure of get downing an interaction with these statements before their truth value is known perfectly, will be recognized as a sort of religion, a being confident in that which we hope for, but can non needfully see our manner to logically. If it will be agreed that all a priori statements are finally accepted on the footing of this optimism, so it will go clear that religion is an built-in portion of epistemology.

The Importance of Faith

Faith, contrary to popular sentiment, is non rational self-destruction. It is an built-in portion of the procedure of cognizing. Without the optimism which leads us to get down direct interaction with an object, be it a thing or an thought, we can non come to cognize whether this object possesses the belongings of existent being. I must hold with Anselm who says, & # 8220 ; I believe that I may know. & # 8221 ; Faith is an act of committedness to an thought and provides the foundation for reflecting on the nature of the thought. If this direct experience shows the thought to be false, so it may be abandoned without farther concern. If direct experience, on the other manus, shows the thought to be true, so one can continue forth with assurance. The map of ground in all this is to hold on and reflect on the nature of the direct experience and, in so making, find the truth value of the thought in inquiry. All such definitions of religion and ground are most important when concerned with metaphysical statements, but they remain basically true in respects to all statements, and, moreover, in respects to all objects.

Having opened that door, I will now venture into even murkier district: one thing which Optimistic Skepticism leads me to dispose of is the belief that I can get down with myself and ground outward until I have built a philosophical system which provides the footing for rationally covering with every facet of being.

The premise that my ain logical thinking can function as the foundation for such an all-encompasing doctrine is non necessary for farther rational advancement. Formalization of this system might good be a procedure of groking something which is existent outside myself instead than a procedure of building.

Furthermore, since Optimistic Skepticism recognizes the demand to accept a priori statements without anterior cogent evidence, so we have already recognized the importance of foundational elements which have nil to make with ourselves. We do non make a priori truths, we simply discover them. Our philosophical system, hence, is founded as much upon these external a priori statements as upon our ain logical thinking and I become a participant in the procedure of find, instead than a Godhead of something new.

If I do non get down entirely with myself to construct a coherent system which provides the footing for understanding and covering with every facet of being, so I am faced with merely three options.

First, that such a system is unachievable which will finally take to philosophic desperation. Second, that the construct of such a system is really nonmeaningful, because all cognition is truly merely a consequence of direct experience with assorted specifics of world. This is an utmost signifier of existential philosophy which ignores the existent being of catching belongingss and therefore bounds itself excessively greatly in my sentiment. The 3rd possibility is that such a system is both meaningful and come-at-able, but merely when something more basic than & # 8220 ; I & # 8221 ; serves as the foundation. Hence, the demand to acknowledge and accept certain a priori truths which owe their being to something which I can non turn out but must accept on faith if any farther advancement is to be made.

If & # 8220 ; I & # 8221 ; were to be the lone foundation for a doctrine, so we would hold the inexplicit premise that everything which I encounter must be derived from myself. I suppose this could be the instance, but, if it is so, so I am distressed to explicate the myriad of experiences which seem to be contrary to the desires of my ego. ( Pain, defeat, immorality, etc & # 8230 ; ) No, a far better account for such things is that they are existent in a manner which is independent of me. They are existent for the same grounds that I am existent. Namely, that the world of these experiences, or at least the beginnings of these experiences, and of I myself are dependent on an ultimate land. This ultimate land, of class, is independent of its consequents. To cut through this mire of incoherence, allow us name myself, and all these other things which affect me, nature. That on which nature is dependent for its belongings of existent being, we will name supernature.

It is merely possible to construct an across-the-board philosophical system when we take this supernature as our get downing point. To make otherwise is an exercising in futility. If all things do non depend on me for their belongings of existent being, so it would be foolish to try to construct any system of idea on myself. Such an effort would be like seeking to construct the Empire State Building on work forces & # 8217 ; s shoulders instead than the land on which the work forces besides must stand.

Of class, we are still faced with the inquiries about what this supernature is truly similar, but we will return to this later. For now, allow us restart treatment of the a priori statements that must organize the footing for an epistemology.

Foundational A Priori Statements

There are four a priori statements which must be true if there is to be any farther advancement.

1. I exist

2. Truth exists and is independent of me

3. My ground has the ability to infer truth

4. The nature of truth is correspondence with an original

The existent being, or positive truth value, of these statements, of class, is finally dependent on the supernature. Beyond that, their common characteristic is that they must be true if we are to continue.

If I do non be, so my ground does non be and can non perchance uncover truth. If all truth were dependent on me, so I could ne’er detect anything but truth and the really construct of truth is negated. If my ground is incapable of infering truth, so all contemplation is nonmeaningful and can non function as the footing for anything, much less a system of cognizing.

The 4th statement warrants a little closer attending. If I say & # 8220 ; I spoke to Shawn today, & # 8221 ; the truth value of the statement is dependent on the existent fact of my holding spoken to Shawn that really twenty-four hours. If I did, so the statement has perfect correspondence to the original object and therefore possesses positive truth value.

There is a profound deduction in this definition of truth. The deduction is this: There be some statements which are true perfectly, for they are independent of clip, topographic point or single penchant. The two statements sing truth itself listed supra are illustrations. If they are true at all ( and they must be if there is to be any farther rational advancement ) so they are ever true, for all times, topographic points and persons. Since the two statements about truth are metaphysical in nature, so we can barely get away the decision that there be metaphysical truths which are true perfectly. The lone quiddity is over which truths are absolute and which truths might alter over the class of clip ( i.e. relation ) . To adhere to a place recommending that all metaphysical truth is comparative is clearly absurd. Not the least so because such a claim is merely meaningful if it is an absolute in the exact sense which it is denying to be possible.