Abortion: One Moral Issue Essay, Research Paper

Some have argued abortion is morally incorrect because a foetus has a right to life.

Yet, some of these people would do an exclusion in the instance of colza. This stance is contradictory if there is a rigorous deontological place on & # 8220 ; right to life & # 8221 ; if it assumes that a foetus is a populating individual. It is unreasonable to alter this standard in instances of colza if we are to populate by a rigorous reading of right to life, presuming the foetus is populating.

But why does colza do some to alter their place on right to life? It is because they have possibly now excused abortion with powerful eventful statements as a consequence of holding a babe who was born out of colza. There are besides concerns of the rights of a adult female. It may non be in the best involvement of society, or the persons involved to hold a babe who was born out of colza. Although it may look more good to society to abort a foetus because of colza, it is contradictory to abort a gestation if we are to populate by a right to life mantra. Therefore, one must reason from one moral place. If it is argued from society? s point of position, or the effects of an abortion, the act could be excused for colza and perchance many other grounds. If the statement is a affair of rule, nevertheless, and clearly provinces that abortion is incorrect because of the rights given to life, eventful or useful statements should be moot, if there is an premise that the foetus is populating.

First the position of the foetus should be examined. If the foetus has a right to life, there is a tactic premise that it is in fact life. Some, such a philosopher Mary Anne Warren believe that because the foetus has non reached personhood hence non guaranteed the right to life. Warren and others would reason that a individual must hold the capacity for rational idea to be considered a individual. Clearly a foetus is non a rational mind. However, this definition of personhood may non be clear. For illustration, persons that are mentally handicap or in a comma may non hold the capacity for rational idea, nevertheless, they are still considered a individual with legal rights that are guaranteed. They may non be able to believe rationally, give proper consent or depend on others for their being ; they are still given the same legal right regardless. They may non be given personhood in some philosophic grounds, but their being as worlds is unquestionable.

Viability is an another statement against the personhood of a foetus, and therefore its right to life. The foetus is non feasible, that is, it can non be removed from the female parent? s uterus and unrecorded apart from her. To that extent, the life of the foetus is perfectly dependent on the life of the female parent. This dependance is made the footing of denying the acknowledgment to it s humanity and its & # 8220 ; right to life & # 8221 ; . However, how could one do this analysis? Although it is true that a foetus is perfectly dependent on person? s attention in order to go on being, one could reason that a kid of one or three or even five old ages of age is perfectly dependent on another? s attention for being. Therefore, the viability statement is a differentiation that makes no difference, unless we are to take off right to life for little kids. The line between independency and dependance does non make personhood as a immature kid who is a individual is wholly dependent on another and guaranteed the right to life. How can a foetus be argued different in this state of affairs. Therefore, a foetus? s moral position, by extension, can non be characterized by its position as a rational individual but certaintly can be considered a human, with the same rights as other worlds.

Noonan, for illustration argues that since human parents conceive a foetus, so it must be human, as an single familial codification is apparent by fact. A foetus may non be a individual, but is a human with the potency of personhood ( see Noonan ) . It is noted that all human existences are and should be guaranteed to the right to life. Assuming that we accept the statement that because the foetus has its ain familial carbon monoxide

de, it is a human offprint from the female parent, and therefore it must have the same warrants to compensate of life. Some deontologists have accepted this as fact and believe the foetus must be protected as other worlds are with the “right to life” mantra. Curiously, some believe there is no contradiction if these same deontologists make an exclusion is instances of colza. Upon farther scrutiny below, this merely can non be considered consistent.

Assuming a foetus is a human that has the right to life, why are particular fortunes considered in the instance or colza to pardon abortion? This is because of grounds that are largely eventful but some deotological. These statements include the concerns for the female parent and society. A female parent would hold to populate with the horrid memory of a kid who was brought on by colza if there was no entree to abortion in her instance. The kid would besides turn up, with this load, possibly working as a aberrant individual because of the deficiency of love and regard without caring parents. For women’s rightists like Christine Overall, the life that a foetus may hold does non hold the right to conflict on the right of the female parent. Obviously, this gestation was unwanted and forced on the adult female, and as a effect must populate with the subjugation of the adult male who raped her by enduring from the physical hurting of the gestation, and the emotional hurting of raising a kid who is unwanted. Clearly, this gestation was forced because of a misdemeanor of a adult female? s right non to be raped.

Although the adult female? s right was clearly violated in the instance of colza, does that give her the right to take away the foetus? s right to life, presuming it is populating? The foetus is every bit guiltless as the despoiled adult female, forced into a state of affairs it did non inquire for. If it is so living, it must be protected from being aborted if we are to populate by the & # 8220 ; right to life & # 8221 ; mantra. If there is resistance to abortion because it takes off the life of the foetus, colza instances can non be exempted on eventful evidences. By making this, we are opening the door to many other statements besides colza that would pardon abortion. For illustration, if the rights of the adult females override the foetus on eventful evidences a pregnant female parent may reason that she is unable to afford to care for a kid and therefore conflicting non merely her opportunism but besides society? s every bit good. This would finally turn our moral logical thinking from the rights of the foetus, to the useful philosophy of the greatest good for the greatest figure. The rights of the foetus become irrelevant compared to the involvements of society. This may be tolerable moral logical thinking, but is inconsistent with deontological statements. Therefore, colza can non be excused if abortion is opposed originally on deontological evidences of the right to life.

In decision, one must reason a place from one moral point of view and non be inconsistent with moral concluding. In the instance of abortion due to the circumstance of colza, one can non reason so that a foetus as has a & # 8220 ; right to life & # 8221 ; but let it in fortunes such as colza or as this is undoubtedly inconsistent. A deontologist may non utilize consquentialist statements to back up the claim of this state of affairs, nevertheless one can non back up a foetus as human or guaranteed the right to life. It is evidently contradictory for one to state that abortion is morally incorrect but may be permissable as in such instances as colza, therefore, giving and incosistant statement for the & # 8220 ; right to life & # 8221 ; .

Plants Cited

Marquis, Don, & # 8220 ; Why Abortion is Immoral & # 8221 ; in Applied Ethics 2nd Edition pg: 549-556. Simon and Shuster, New Jersey, 1998.

Noonan, John T, & # 8220 ; An Almost Absolute Value in History & # 8221 ; in Applied Ethics 2nd Edition pg: 535-548. Simon and Shuster, New Jersey, 1998.

Overall, Christine & # 8220 ; Selective Termination of Pregnancy and Women? s Reproductive Autonomy & # 8221 ; in Applied Ethics 2nd Edition pg: 557-556 Simon and Shuster, New Jersey, 1998.

Warren, Mary Anne, & # 8220 ; On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion & # 8221 ; & # 8221 ; in Applied Ethics 2nd Edition pg: 541-548. Simon and Shuster, New Jersey, 1998.

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