Descartes 2 Essay, Research Paper
DESCARTES & # 8217 ; MEDITATIONS
FROM: Descartes, Philosophy of Rene Descartes: Meditations on First Philosophy, Monarch Notes, 1 Jan 1963.
Introduction.
The Meditations were written in Latin and foremost published in Paris in
1641. Descartes dedicated this book to the Dean and Faculty of Theology at the
University of Paris. He believed that the approbation of those theologists
would represent a public testimony of blessing and support of the truth in
the content of his work.
The Meditations are the most of import of all of Descartes & # 8217 ; plants. They
incorporate his full metaphysical and epistemic place. He considers the
jobs of the beginnings and nature of cognition ; the cogency of truth ; the
nature and fate of adult male ; the being of God, and the creative activity of the
existence. This work is elaborate far more than the Discourse.
Outline.
In the first speculation Descartes explains the grounds for his
methodological uncertainties. The 2nd speculation describes the nature of the human
head. The 3rd speculation nowadayss Descartes & # 8217 ; main statement for the
being of God. The 4th speculation shows the nature of mistake and points
out the demands for conforming truths. The 5th speculation illustrates
the kernel of material nature and presents another presentation of the
being of God. The 6th and concluding speculation differentiates the psyche from
the organic structure.
Foreword.
In a foreword to the reader, Descartes answers to some of the
philosophical unfavorable judgments of his earlier book, the Discourse. He continues in
the foreword to depict his attempt to chew over earnestly upon the of import
inquiries of God and the human psyche. His readers are advised to detach their
heads from sense chases. When they are enabled to take all biass from
their characters, it becomes possible to recognize the maximal benefit of these
speculations.
Meditation I
Summary.
Descartes declares that it was critical for him to wait until he was a
mature adult male prior to set abouting the great undertaking embodied in the intent of this
book. Initially he felt that all of his earlier beliefs must be removed.
Attacking the implicit in premises of his former beliefs, he asserts that
everything he knew in the yesteryear was based upon sense perceptual experience. The senses,
nevertheless, may be delusory in that the minute objects are apprehended they may
appear otherwise from assorted points of position. It is extremely likely that
other things which appear certain through esthesis may in world be the
merchandises of semblances.
Yet there are some objects of esthesiss which must be accepted as true.
For case, Descartes affirms that he is seated by the fire clothed in a
winter dressing gown. It would be insane to deny his cognition of his ain
organic structure. We must acknowledge certain features of objects. For case,
extension, figure, measure, figure, topographic point, clip, may be imputed to objects.
In add-on, there are mathematical truths relative to objects. We know a
square has four sides and non five.
The scientific disciplines which are concerned with composite or complex objects, are
less dependable in the truth of their propositions than the scientific disciplines which are
concerned with simple and general objects like arithmetic and geometry. Yet,
Descartes asks, how can I be certain that the cognition I possess is in
world true? In order to construct a valid construction of cognition he affirms that
he will see all external world as semblance. Even the perfect God will
be questioned in this cosmopolitan uncertainty. He will presume the possibility that God
is a malignant devil who intentionally attempts to lead on him. In consequence,
Descartes intends to suspend all judgement.
Descartes concludes this speculation with the observation that it is
highly backbreaking to carry through this dubious province of head. There is a
inclination for the human head to return to former beliefs as a secure means of
deciding its jobs. In the event that adult male permits this arrested development, he may
happen it impossible to of all time chase away the rational darkness.
Remark:
The Cartesian uncertainty reflects a disdain for an eruditeness based upon the
literature of the yesteryear. Descartes is non concerned with the statements from the
great governments of the yesteryear. He bases cognition upon single
intelligence. While Descartes attacks doctrine from an a priori place
independent of sense experience, his place sing the attitude of uncertainty
necessary for the head to get at truth is the alone part which he
makes to science and modern doctrine.
This initial speculation summarizes the earlier place of Descartes
found in the Discourse. In this first speculation, the foundation of Descartes & # 8217 ;
doctrine has been restated in the elaborate account of the principle
behind his cosmopolitan uncertainty. The existent beginning of this book is the 2nd
speculation.
Meditation II
Summary.
Descartes declares that the credence of his cosmopolitan uncertainty likens him
to a swimmer plunged all of a sudden into deep H2O. He is unable to touch underside
and unable to see the surface. In this floundering manner he must accomplish
the security of one certain fixed place by which he will cognize from whence
to continue. In ancient times, Archimedes thought that it would be possible
for him to travel the full Earth if merely he could set up one fixed
absolute point. The hunt for a certain point of going is critical if one
is to get at true cognition from a place of cosmopolitan uncertainty.
Descartes asserts that he assumes at this phase that everything is
faithlessly. He assumes there is no memory, senses, organic structure, or any world. It is
hence possible that he is being deceived by the semblance of world.
However, if he is being deceived, it follows that he must be as a deceived
individual. In this province of being I ask, what am I?
Descartes asserts that in the yesteryear he believed that he was a adult male and
that a adult male was a rational animate being. At present he can non accept this. It would
be necessary for him to turn out what an animate being was and so find the nature
of reason. This is excessively complicated a job at this minute of universal
uncertainty. In similar manner all the properties of the organic structure, including his face,
custodies, and weaponries, his senses and feeling that he occupies infinite as a unique
organic structure separate from all others, must be held in uncertainty. The lone proposition
that he can do at this occasion is that he is a intelligent thing. He knows
that he exists merely when he is believing.
I am witting that I exist. I who know, says Descartes, that I exist
inquire the inquiry, & # 8220 ; what am I? & # 8221 ; Having established that he is a thought
thing, he proceeds to the job of what a believing thing really is. He
concludes that he is the same being who performs the rational activities
of doubting, apprehension, confirming, denying, willing, refusing, conceive ofing
and perceiving.
He so proceeds to the more hard undertaking of turn outing the being of
a stuff organic structure beyond his mental province. He asserts that the organic structure appears more
certain to work forces because they are able to touch and see a peculiar organic structure. Yet
when we consider a piece of wax fresh from the beehive, we assume that this
wax possesses the definite features that its colour, figure, and size
nowadays to our senses. It seems to hold the olfactory property of flowers and is cool and
hard to the touch. But when we place this wax in the fire, all that seems
existent to the senses sing the nature of wax disappears. All that can be
asserted about it is that it is extended, movable, and flexible. The
perceptual experience of this wax is non an act of sight, touch or imaginativeness. It is an
intuition of the human head. All material objects are understood by the head
entirely.
It is really hard to extinguish one & # 8217 ; s trust upon sense cognition.
Yet we must suit ourselves to a trust upon our heads. Descartes
wonders at the beginning of mistake in the head which occurs from the usage of
linguistic communication. For case, the same word & # 8220 ; wax & # 8221 ; is used to depict the same
substance before and after its subjugation to the fire. The significance of words
may make ambiguity and mistake in idea. In adult male & # 8217 ; s attempt to construct
cognition, he must introspectively look within his head, wipe outing all sense
images.
Remark:
Descartes admits intuition as a beginning of cognition. While tax write-off is
admitted as a dependable beginning of truth, this is considered more complex.
Tax write-off requires illation and relationships. Tax write-off, hence, can non
be the beginning by which Descartes asserts his first rule. Being is
something that is intuited. That is, it is apprehended instantly by an
attentive mind as true. There exists no possible uncertainty sing its
truth. Since this confidence does non continue from a esthesis of external
world, this rational cognition is independent of sense experience.
Descartes makes a clear differentiation between religion and ground. He can non
asseverate his belief in world on religion at all. Faith to Descartes pertains to
the will entirely. It is non an rational affair. Faith is something that is
accepted upon trust because we choose to believe it.
Meditation III
Summary.
Descartes affirms that he is a believing being who uncertainties and affirms,
denies and knows. He is certain that he thinks because his cognition is both
clear and distinguishable. Although he knows himself, he must set up the
being of God in order to continue farther into a clear and distinguishable
cognition of world. While no grounds exists to back up the guess
that God deceives his head into believing in an extra-mental world,
Descartes provinces that he must foremost show the being of God prior
to doing any enquiry into the possibility of misrepresentation.
Descartes returns in his presentation of the being of God by
analysing the nature of idea. An thought may be an image, a signifier, or a
judgement. The image or the appreciated signifier is ne’er false. The beginning of
mistake lies in our judgement. It is necessary to explicate a judgement that this
given thought conforms ith the object it represents. Here resides the most
common beginning of mistake in judgement.
Some thoughts may be innate. Some thoughts are adventitious in that they come
involuntarily into the head from outside. Other thoughts are factitious in that
they are manufactured by myself by uniting innate and adventitious thoughts.
My innate thoughts are guaranteed by nature & # 8211 ; a self-generated force that compels
my acquiescence to the resemblance between my thought and the object my thought
represents. In the act by which I believe my thought of the object represents
the world of the object, I am motivated by a unsighted urge as the beginning of
my belief. Therefore, I can non turn out rationally that objects exist outside my
head on this footing.
Descartes asks that our thoughts be viewed as manners of consciousness. The
thought is strictly subjective in that it resides merely in the head. If we consider
those thoughts that are images, we observe a assortment of thoughts all varying in
flawlessness. Since the thought is an consequence, the cause of this consequence must possess
as much world as the consequence. It may be asserted that any cause must hold as
much flawlessness as its consequence. For case, a rock can non be unless it
is produced by a cause at least every bit perfect as the rock. The thought of heat
must be produced in my head by a cause with every bit much flawlessness as the heat.
When this rule is applied to his thought of God, Descartes asserts that the
cause, God, must hold every bit much world and flawlessness as his thought of God which
is in the consequence. It is of the nature of flawlessness that a thing is perfect
merely if it exists. Therefore, a perfect God must be.
Descartes knows that he is non the cause of his ain thought of God. He
thinks that any thought of an space, perfect, omniscient God transcends his
ain mental ability. God, hence, causes the thought of God in his head.
Because God is the cause, and the cause possesses every bit much flawlessness and
world as the consequence ( the thought of God ) , and an object is perfect merely if it
includes the construct of being, Descartes asserts that the perfect cause,
God, genuinely exists.
Descartes demonstrates to boot that God exists by ground of the fact
that he himself exists as a thought being holding a construct of God. He asserts
that if he existed as an independent being possessing every flawlessness, he
would be God. Obviously his deficiency of flawlessness precludes the possibility of
this. However, what precisely is the cause of his being? As a dependant
being, he asks upon whom he depends. If it is stated that he is dependent upon
some other less perfect being than God, so the inquiry will originate as to the
beginning of this being & # 8217 ; s dependance. Finally it is necessary to province that an
all-perfect necessary being, possessing all the properties of God, exists as
the cause of Descartes & # 8217 ; ain contingent being.
Since Descartes believes he has established that God caused the thought of
God in his head, he following inquires into the job of how he received this
thought from God. Descartes concludes that this thought is unconditioned in him. At the
minute of his creative activity, God imposed the thought of himself in the head of
Descartes really much like a worker stomping his name to the merchandise of his
doing. Descartes apprehends this thought in the same intuitive manner that he
understands the fact of his ain thought being. He does non infer God & # 8217 ; s
being. He knows this instantly and intuitively.
Descartes concludes that the contemplation of the thought of God is the
beginning of greatest felicity in life. Although he admits that this is
uncomparably less perfect than the contemplation of God in the life to come as
religion suggests, it is a fact of experience that the contemplation of God
provides great felicity.
Remark:
It is of import to observe that Descartes returns from the thought of the
space to the thought of the finite. This thought of God is the beginning of his
belief in the world of objects that are extra-mental. The unconditioned truth of an
space and perfect God is considered to be in the highest grade true.
However, Descartes does non asseverate that he knows God in the same mode in
which he knows his ain selfhood. Because God is infinite, He is
inexplicable to the finite head. Descartes declares his pleasance in
contemplating this thought of the infinite God but does non propose that he knows
the eternity of flawlessnesss that exist officially in God. There is a existent
differentiation or a existent dualism that exists between the finite and the space
consciousness. Man is non indistinguishable with God. He is separate from God by
ground of his restriction and finite nature.
Meditation IV
Summary.
Descartes asserts that his thought of God and the space is more clear and
distinct than any thought of finite world. This thought of God provides a way for
the find of the hoarded wealths of scientific discipline and wisdom which reside absolutely in
God. His belief in extra-mental world can non be due to any delusory action
of God. God is a perfect being and misrepresentation is imperfect by its nature. Any
mental mistakes that exist in his head find their beginnings in his progressive
nature. Mistakes do non continue from God from the fact that any mistake is missing
in world. It is a defect or want of cognition.
It is imaginable that God might hold created him as a being incapable of
being deceived. However, any enquiry into this country must assume some
apprehension and judgement of the actions of God. God is infinite and
inexplicable in His nature. The concluding cause or the intent for the
creative activity of things as they are transcends the limited and finite apprehension
of adult male. Descartes asserts that his head is wholly incapable of understanding
God & # 8217 ; s actions. Therefore, it is unpointed to inquire why he has been created in
such a manner that he is capable of falling into mistake. However, each person
animal must be viewed non as
an single but as a portion of the existence as
a whole. Somehow, the imperfectnesss of the single contribute to the
creative activity of the perfect existence.
Sing the beginning of mistake, Descartes declares that he discerns that
he possesses a module of knowledge and one of election or free pick. There
is no possibility of mistake in the apprehension or knowledge by itself. The
understanding simply apprehends the thought. When mistake enters into the
state of affairs, it does this through the action of the will. However, it is non the
power of willing, but the failure of the person to keep his will that
creates mistakes. The will must be restrained or limited to taking merely those
objects which are to the full understood by the mind. Clear and distinguishable thoughts
are needfully true. These thoughts move the will to action when the thoughts
reside in the mind. Descartes asserts that the great lucidity of the
construct of his ain being residing in the mind moved his will to
accept this truth.
Whenever any thought is missing lucidity or differentiation it is necessary to
keep the will from judging the thought as either true or thought until such clip
that the thought may go clear and distinguishable false. The single must asseverate
a province of uncertainty sing the Descartes concludes that the action by which he
abstains from judgement of an ill-defined thought is right. Failure on his portion to
bound his will opens the door to possible mistake.
Descartes concludes this speculation by asseverating that any mistakes that he
accepted in the yesteryear were the consequence of his ain imperfectnesss and restrictions.
He can non kick or fault anyone else for those mistakes which were the consequence
of his ain choosing. He possessed ever the power to keep his will. He
had the advantage of obtaining clear and distinguishable cognition. This cognition
would tend his will to take the right act or object. In add-on, he
possessed the declaration to suspend all judgement whenever a truth was non
clearly known to him.
Meditation V
This speculation examines the nature of affair. Descartes analyzes his
thought of affair and reasserts his ontological cogent evidence for the being of God.
Descartes declares that he will abandon the of import inquiries sing
the nature of God and the nature of the human head for the minute. In this
speculation he undertakes the inquiry of the certainty of his cognition of
material objects.
He proceeds by analyzing his witting thoughts sing material nature
in order to determine which of these thoughts are clear and distinguishable. Because
clear and distinguishable thoughts proceed from God, they may be accepted upon all
occasions as truth.
Descartes affirms that he can conceive of clearly the feature of
measure which is called uninterrupted in the philosophical sense, when he
reflects upon the thought of affair. In add-on, he can conceive of the extension of
the stuff object with its correlative length, comprehensiveness, and deepness.
Furthermore, it is clear to him that he can recite all the many properties
of affair. These properties constitute size, figure, state of affairss, and local
gestures. Each gesture, he asserts, can be assigned certain grades of continuance.
Therefore, Descartes histories for the phenomena of clip.
Continuing his analysis, introspectively sing his thoughts refering
affair, Descartes asserts that all material objects contain a definite nature.
There is a determined signifier or kernel to each object. This kernel is
changeless and ageless. For case, he can explicate a clear and distinguishable
thought of a trigon. The trigon possesses a distinguishable signifier or kernel. My
cognition of this kernel returns from my ground entirely, asserts Descartes.
Obviously he can ne’er feel an kernel. The signifier is abstracted through the
rational procedures of the head. Since the thought in the head is both clear
and distinct, he knows it is a true thought of material world. Material objects
must hence be. The qualities which he imputes to material objects must
likewise exist.
Descartes demonstrates the being of God in the same mode. He has an
thought in his head of a perfect God. This is a clear and distinguishable thought. Because
the clear thoughts are true, he may continue with an analysis of the construct of
flawlessness. A thing can non be perfect if it is simply imagined in his head. A
perfect object is genuinely perfect merely when it includes the property of
being. Therefore, the thought of a perfect God needfully includes
being. Hence, God exists.
Having demonstrated the being of God to his ain satisfaction,
Descartes uses this cognition to beef up his avowal that stuff
objects have a existent being. It is apparent that if material objects had no
existent being and I possessed a clear and distinguishable thought of their being,
God would be guilty of misrepresentation. All clear and distinguishable thoughts proceed from
God. However, God is perfect and can non possess any imperfectness. We would be
forced to presume He was imperfect if he deceived us into believing the clear
and distinguishable thought sing the being of material objects. Therefore, the
being of a perfect God insures our belief that material objects genuinely
exist as our clear and distinguishable thoughts reveal.
Descartes anticipates several possible expostulations to his place. It
might be argued that there is a existent differentiation between kernel and
being. Hence, my thought of the kernel of a perfect God does non include the
construct of being. Descartes answers that in God kernel is being.
Being is the supreme flawlessness and can ne’er be separated from kernel.
Since kernel and being are one, the statement has no weight.
Another statement might be proposed from the possibility that Descartes
can non be certain that his analysis of material nature does non continue from
a dream province. In fact, what he considers material might be pure semblance.
Descartes answers that it is irrelevant whether he is woolgathering or wake up. He
still has a clear and distinguishable thought in his head. Clear and distinguishable thoughts are
needfully true. Consequently, his thought of material nature must be true.
Remark:
When Descartes reflected upon the nature of intuition, he evolved his
standards of truth. An object is true when the thought of it in the head is
clear and distinguishable. An thought is clear when the construct stimulates the will to
accept it as true. This is a forceful stimulation. An thought is distinguishable when
the construct is so precise and so different from all other thoughts that the will
is moved and the mind is forced to grok it.
Meditation VI
In this, the concluding speculation, Descartes continues his presentation of
the cogency of his thought of the being of stuff world. He eventually
discusses the difference between the psyche and the organic structure in adult male.
Summary.
While his thoughts sing material things must surely be accepted as
true, Descartes admirations if material things have a existent being independently
of his thoughts. Although he is more certain sing the thought of his ain
being and the being of God, Descartes believes that it is certain that
there is a material being. The fact that mathematics describes stuff
objects with clear and distinguishable thoughts supports the fact of the aim
being of stuff world.
Descartes begins his rational presentation of the certainty of
stuff being by separating between the imaginativeness and thinking
or construct. It is possible for him to conceive of the being of a trigon
or even a Pentagon. Through his imaginativeness he is able to gestate a image
of three sides or another image of five sides. However, he asserts it is
impossible for his to conceive of a chiliagon, which is a thousand-sided figure.
Although he can non conceive of a chiliagon, he can gestate it intellectually.
Obviously there is a particular attempt of the human head which adds to the action
of imaginativeness. This suggests to Descartes that imaginativeness indicates the
mere chance of stuff being while thinking may deduce the
necessity of stuff being. It is non possible to do a necessary
illation of corporeal being from imaginativeness because thinking is
necessary to the act of imaginativeness.
Continuing farther, Descartes recalls many of the constructs which he
believed were true in the past upon the footing of sense information entirely. It
is his purpose to analyze the grounds for doubting the being of these
things in order to ask into those thoughts he ought to accept as clearly
and clearly true.
In the past Descartes asserts that he believed that he had no
cognition unless it proceeded through the senses. As a consequence, his thoughts were
missing in lucidity and differentiation. Such a belief leads necessarily to
incredulity and complete uncertainty of everything.
It was natural for him to accept the erroneous belief that cognition
proceeded through the senses. His first perceptual experience indicates that he
possesses a caput, custodies, pess, composing a stuff organic structure. His esthesiss,
farther indicated that he enjoyed pleasance and suffered hurting. He experienced
sultrily the assortment of passions such as joy, unhappiness, and choler. These
esthesiss occur through no deliberation or act of his will. They appear
involuntarily and hence suggest the being of an outside cause. Yet
Descartes asserts that it is non possible to confirm the being of stuff
objects which exist independently of himself with clear and distinguishable truths.
As he grew older and acquired many more experiences, Descartes realized
the failings built-in in believing that stuff world exists as a consequence
of sense cognition entirely. With increasing experiences, Descartes & # 8217 ; faith in the
cogency of sense cognition weakened by grades. It was evident to him that
the same object appeared otherwise upon separate occasions when sensed. For
case, a tower might look unit of ammunition when viewed on one juncture and once more
seem square when inspected from another vantagepoint upon a different
juncture. It is apparent that sense information leads to mistakes in human
judgement.
If he were to depend upon sense cognition entirely, it would be impossible
for him to find whether or non he was asleep or wake up. The same senses
nowadays a world to the dreaming head that is pure semblance, but that
indicate extra-mental world to the awakened head. How so can anyone be
certain as to the being of stuff world? Although my sense feelings
are independent of my will, Descartes states, I can non pull the decision
that what senses reputedly represent has existent being. Descartes believes
that he can non be certain that his esthesis returns from a perceived object.
Nor can he be certain that the object exists in world as the senses study
it.
At present, Descartes asserts that he knows clearly that he was produced
by God as a thought being. With the certain cognition of his ain thought
being, he began to cognize himself better and to acknowledge the Writer of his
being.
Descartes declares that he possesses a inactive module by which he is
enabled to have sense feelings. This suggests the presence of an active
module bing independently of his head. The active module produces the
images which are received in my head. Now, this active module must be either
God or some object bing independently of my head. Descartes affirms that
it could ne’er be God. Sense cognition is often erroneous, and
evidently God can non be the beginning of mistake. Therefore, he concludes that
these thoughts arise from the presence of a corporeal object which exists in
world.
There are some material objects which are peculiar in nature. For
illustration, objects such as the Sun are non so clearly understood. Descartes
asserts that the beginning of belief resides in God. God can non lead on because
misrepresentation is an imperfectness. Because of His perfect nature, God nowadayss
thoughts that are clear and distinguishable to the head. Consequently, we ought to
accept these thoughts as true. There exists, hence, a stuff world
composed of stuff and at times material being. Furthermore, God is the
cause of nature and nature Teachs one that stuff world exists. Nature
Teachs Descartes that he possesses a stuff organic structure. The feelings of hungriness,
thirst, and hurting are existent and exist because he has a stuff organic structure. Obviously
the head is non the beginning of hungriness. Therefore we ought to accept the
grounds of stuff being which nature dictates.
Descartes believes that he is lodged in his organic structure as a pilot lives in a
ship. As a consequence, his head and his organic structure compose a certain type of integrity. The
feelings he experiences, such as those that evoke pleasance and hurting, are a
confounding manner of believing which consequences from the interaction of the head with
the organic structure. The demands of the organic structure exist because of the mercenary and
mechanical nature of the organic structure. These are known by the head.
Nature Teachs that other organic structures exist. It is evident that they exist
from the interaction between his organic structure and other stuff organic structures. Some stuff
objects are a beginning of pleasance and other objects represent a beginning of hurting
to the organic structure. Although nature may take adult male to want the incorrect thing, nature is
ne’er the cause of mistake. Error resides in human judgement. For case,
nature may take one to want poisoned nutrient. Nature impels one to want this
nutrient because of the agreeable gustatory sensation of nutrient, non because there is toxicant in
the nutrient. It is human judgement that determines whether or non the nutrient ought
to be taken. Therefore, neither nature nor our organic structures deceive us.
There are tremendous differences between the head and the organic structure. The head of
adult male is non divisible. The organic structure may lose one of its parts, such as a pes, but
will go on to map. However, the head may ne’er be diminished. The head
may have sense feelings from the encephalon, and as a consequence act in its
thought procedures with integrity. It does non have feelings straight from
the separate parts of the organic structure.
Descartes asserts his clear strong belief that he is a believing being and
hence religious in nature. He is hence distinguishable in sort from the
material nature of his organic structure. His head inhabits the organic structure. Because the head
must interact with the organic structure, it is apprehensible that mistakes might be
possible due to the failing and imperfectness of such a brotherhood. Recognizing this
imperfectness places the head on guard against the possibility of mistake. The
importance of keeping the will to travel merely towards those thoughts that are
clear and distinguishable is imperative if we are to avoid mistake.
Remark:
Descartes affirms that the nature or kernel of affair is extension. The
kernel of head is believing. Consequently, the two worlds exist. Both are
different from each other in sort. This place of metaphysical dualism is
cardinal to the inquiry of adult male & # 8217 ; s nature.
Since the head and the organic structure are distinguishable in sort, the job arises
sing the interaction of the two. How is it possible for an immaterial
substance to come into contact with a stuff substance? Descartes affirms
merely that they do.
The statement of Descartes that he inhabits his organic structure like a pilot in a
vas is uncovering in the visible radiation of the above inquiry. The organic structure is
purely a mechanical and machine-like substance. Its maps are wholly
different from those of the spirit. The spirit is synonymous with head. The
intents of this head are alone. The head serves as the manager of the organic structure.
It functions as the rational agent of the organic structure. However, the intent of the spirit or head is non limited to any functional operations of a united
organic structure and spirit. The head is the beginning of one & # 8217 ; s single self-importance or individuality.
This self-importance is distinguishable from the spirit of the space self-importance which is God.
Therefore, another dualism exists in Descartes & # 8217 ; position. This latter dualism
distinguishes Descartes from the metaphysical position of Hegel.
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