Essay, Research Paper

The atomic bombardments of Hiroshima and Nagasaki marked the terminal to the universe & # 8217 ; s largest armed struggle. Many arguments have surfaced over the moralss of such an onslaught. The bomb itself caused monolithic sums of casualties while the unknown effects of radiation caused many more deceases amongst the subsisters of the blast. Despite the grim effects of such a arm, it offered the best pick for a speedy and easy licking of Japan. President Truman, who authorized the usage of the atomic bomb, made a wise determination under the fortunes of the war. The Nipponese refusal to give up, the monolithic sum of allied casualties involved in occupying the Nipponese mainland and the ineffectiveness of a military encirclement in coercing Japan to give up made the bomb a necessary last resort. There were several conventional methods that were suggested to convey Japan to its articulatio genuss. These included a naval encirclement, an extended aerial barrage or an invasion of the island of Japan. Japan posed small or no violative menace to American forces. Despite this fact the Japanese were the most retentive and driven of Americas enemies throughout the war. The conflicts for Okinawa, Wake and Guam all were ample testament to the Nipponese willingness to decease in the face of overpowering odds. The kamikaze was a perfect illustration of the Nipponese conflict attitude. Nipponese pilots would strap themselves into planes loaded with explosives and wing them into American ships. By the war & # 8217 ; s conclusion the Nipponese kamikaze onslaughts had sunk 3 aircraft bearers damaged 285 trade and drop a sum of 34. The Nipponese besides did good in increasing support for the war attempt. & # 8220 ; Both scientist and publicizers were in fact powerful instruments inflaming popular hatred against the democratic states and in regimenting the people into blindly back uping the war of aggrandizement. & # 8221 ; ( p.100 ) This resoluteness would merely hold been strengthened had American and Russian forces tried to occupy Japan. This about self-destructive type of contending would hold resulted in a enormous sum of casualties for both sides. American casualties entirely were projected at 500,000. The sum of deceases caused by an invasion would hold easy dwarfed those of the atomic bombardments. Air power offered American forces a method of staying comparatively unharmed against the overzealous Nipponese military while puting waste to full metropoliss. This was possible because while Nipponese land forces remained strong, air defences had been badly weakened. This gave American bombers free reign over the skies of Japan. American bombardment foraies over Japan were bring downing monolithic sums of casualties and doing enormous harm to Nipponese metropoliss. In fact the atomic bombardment of Hiroshima or Nagasaki was non every bit lay waste toing as conventional bombardment foraies over Tokyo or to old bombardment foraies over European metropoliss, most notably Dresden. & # 8220 ; In March, 1945, our Air Force had launched the first incendiary foray on the Tokyo country. In this foray more harm was done and more casualties were inflicted than was the instance at Hiroshima. & # 8221 ; ( p.99 ) Therefore it is really plausible that had the atomic arms non been dropped over Hiroshima and Nagasaki the figure of conventional bombardments casualties of the continued air foraies would hold been much greater than those of the atomic bombardments. The last believable scheme that would coerce Japan to give up would be a naval encirclement. This would affect the Navy policing the Waterss around Japan and halting any supplies from acquiring through. Japan had sufficient military supplies to contend off an American invasion despite a encirclement. This meant that if the encirclement were to be successful the Japanese would hold to be starved into give uping. The Nipponese mainland could non bring forth adequate nutrient to prolong its monolithic population for really long. Had a encirclement been attempted, any staying nutrient supplies would hold been allocated to the military forces go forthing the civilian population to hunger. This would hold lead to a monolithic sum of deceases due to starvation amongst the civilian population. This scheme would hold lead merely to the decease of civilians and non weakened the Nipponese military or brought Japan closer to give up. The side effects of atomic arms had non been discovered at the clip that Truman gave the order to drop the bomb over Hiroshima. Scientist and military forces who knew about the atomic bomb were non cognizant of its radiation side effects. Therefore President Truman was besides incognizant of these effects when he made the determination to drop the bombs. This is really of import because the atomic bomb was seen merely as a truly, truly large conventional bomb. With the information that Truman had been given, dropping an atomic bomb was much like a conventional bombardment foray. The atomic bomb provided tactical advantages in add-on to its amazing political power. & # 8220 ; But the atomic bomb was more than a arm of awful devastation ; it was a psychological weapon. & # 8221 ; ( p.99 ) Merely one plane needed to be fuelled, crewed and maintained. The hazard of being shot down was drastically lower that of a squadron of planes needed to bring the same sum of mayhem. We now know of the deathly permanent effects of atomic arms, but these side effects were unheard of during the war. To Truman in the military facet the atomic bomb was no different than telling a squadron of bombers to level Hiroshima with incendiary bomb. It must be stressed that to Truman the bomb did non fall into the military tabu of chemical arms or poising Wellss, but alternatively appeared to be a really powerful conventional bomb. Before the bombs had been dropped the Nipponese authorities was at a deadlock over affairs of peace. The approximately equal civilian and military parties were locked in

a struggle over surrender. The only way in which surrender could be achieved is if a consensus could be achieved amongst the parties. The military leaders refused to back down, unwilling to accept defeat and dishonor. The massive toll that American bombing attacks were taking on Japan had no effect on the military leaders who ready to fight to the end. Had this deadlock remained the Japanese would have fought until they all starved to death because of a blockade or had been bombed into oblivion. Only when the atomic bombs were dropped the deadlock was broken and peace achieved. This act caused the Japanese emperor to end the political deadlock and demand surrender. “He (the Emperor) hardly would have dared to do so until the explosion of the atomic bomb destroyed the argument that Japan could secure a better peace if it continued to refuse to surrender unconditionally.” (p.99) This was a rare event indeed as the emperor traditionally left politics to the politicians. “Even thereafter, the Army heads accepted the decision to surrender only because the Emperor’s openly declared conclusion relieved them of shame and humiliation, and lessened their fear of disobedience by their subordinates.” (p.99) The demand for peace showed the amount of political power that the bomb held. For without a doubt it was the atomic bomb that caused Japan to surrender. It was a forceful enough message to prod the normally withdrawn emperor into action for peace. In the unconditional surrender that the United States presented the Japanese government it was demanded that the Emperor be removed from his god-like state of power. Some historians criticized this clause because they felt it might have prevented the Japanese government from deciding to surrender before the atomic bombs were dropped. The Emperor was so highly revered in Japan that his removal would only occur under the most dire of circumstances. The Japanese military leaders would never have allowed this to happen without direct intervention by the Emperor. Even if the United States had agreed to allow the Emperor to stay in power the Japanese would have not agreed to surrender. It was defeat, not the terms of the defeat that the Japanese military leaders so vehemently opposed. The American public wholeheartedly backed the unconditional surrender of Japan. “A Gallup Poll in June had shown that a mere fraction of Americans, only 7 percent, thought he had should be retained after the war, even as a puppet, while a full third of the people though he should be executed as a war criminal.” (p.112) In respect of the American lives sacrificed, nothing but unconditional surrender would have sufficed. “Unconditional surrender was an objective too long established, too often proclaimed; it had been too great a rallying cry from the time of Pearl Harbor to abandon now, Byrnes insisted. Truman had reaffirmed it as a policy in his first speech to Congress on April 16.” (p.112) In addition to these factors a negotiated peace would be tantamount to political suicide. “Politically it would be disastrous, Byres was also sure.” (p.112) The very idea of negotiation with Japan seemed deplorable the vast majority of Americans. It has also been argued that a demonstration could have been held for Japanese officials on an uninhabited island. This, if it had worked, would have spared Hiroshima and Nagasaki devastation while still revealing the atom bomb’s fantastic power to the Japanese. Assuming that the Japanese would have even agreed to this, there was no guarantee that the fickle atomic bomb would detonate properly. Assuming that the bomb detonated correctly it would still pose several large problems for America. First and most obvious was that one of the three bombs that were left which were difficult to produce and very expensive to procure had just been used to annihilate an area of no military value at all. Secondly the Japanese might have taken this to mean that the United States lacked the resolve to use such a weapon. Thirdly air defense in cities such as Hiroshima and Nagasaki would have been put on high alert diminishing the chances of a successful nuclear raid. If the bomb failed to detonate, this would spell political disaster for America. Besides looking very foolish, America would have caused even greater diehard sentiments among the Japanese. “They (Byrnes and Groves) believed that if it did not come off “as advertised,” the Japanese would take fresh heart and fight harder and longer.” (p.98) Determination to fight to the very end would have grown greatly in the face of that American folly. Had the bomb not detonated properly over Hiroshima its existence would not have been exposed nor would its failure. Falling for several thousand feet the bomb would have reached a terminal velocity of several hundred miles per hour and smashed apart upon impact had the detonator not functioned properly. This was the possibility that the scientist in the Manhattan project could have predict most accurately. President Truman’s decision to use atomic weapons on Japanese cities is best described as the lesser of evils. With the options available to him, the atomic bombings proved to have the potential for the least casualties for both sides while ending the war quickly. This policy of maximum violence led to the quick end of the deadlock in Japanese politics. Had such a policy not been used the war could have dragged on for months or perhaps years more with mounting casualties on both sides. The political power of the atomic bomb was unmatched and proved to be the only force that could get the emperor to intervene in Japanese politics and stop the hostilities. The atom bomb proved to be the ultimate ambassador in a war where conventional politics were futile.