The Existence Of External Forces Essay, Research Paper

The Existence of External Forces

To find whether a peculiar action was decided upon by an

single or whether the action was predetermined one must analyze its cause. In

analyzing cause one finds that there are two types of causes those that are

typified by natural Torahs, such as a dropped book falling to the land, and

those typified by the moral considerations of work forces. This differentiation is

of import because it shows both that no adult male can command his environment reverse

to the Torahs of natural or scientific Torahs, but neither are his actions

wholly out of his control.

The first type of cause we can see as recognized facts, these would

be the natural and scientific Torahs that all objects must obey. It is evidently

false to presume that a adult male may walk through a tree or fly like a bird, but these

things can be factors in the set of causes taking to an action.

The 2nd type of cause is more hard to specify. It is made up of

the past experience and perceptual experiences of work forces, but more significantly it is the manner

in which work forces use these things. This type of cause is arrived at otherwise in

everyone, and it can non be measured, predicted, or understood every bit good as the

other type. In fact it is frequently unable to be seen at all, but it must be

merely because the full universe or even the simple workings of one adult male & # 8217 ; s encephalon

can non be described wholly utilizing merely the Torahs of nature. A complex lesson

determination is created in the head of work forces by more that merely a random or predictable

set of electrical urges, but by the non wholly understood religious and

psychological makeup of work forces. This type is the? true? cause of an action.

When one sees this combination of causes he must accept the thought of

dualism. Dualism is the thought that there are two hemispheres of the existence,

the physical, ordered and understood by scientific discipline, and the religious, abstract and

non understood. The religious hemisphere is the force that guides actions that

can non be explained entirely by physical causes. While the moralistic cause may

hold more weight in the type of action, it can non of all time withstand natural Torahs. For

this ground both extremist determinism and free will look impossible. With this

description given, to find the sum of free will that a thing has, it is

merely necessary to see how that thing uses or is affected by the two types of

causes.

Let us first see adult male. Man is evidently the animal for which this

statement is designed

chiefly. Man is affected by his physical milieus

and uses a complex cognitive system and a complicated set of ethical motives to see

his actions. Man might foremost, upon seeing a image, be stimulated

neurologically by and utilize past experience to do a recognized form from the

forms seen. This would be the strictly physical and determine reaction to the

image, but this would likely non be the entire reaction. Man might utilize his

cognition to make sentiments about the image, he might see an emotion

in response to it. He might finally do judgements based on the sentiments and

emotions that in a manner that is non scientifically ordered, understood, or

predictable. Man so, must hold free will within the bounds of natural jurisprudence.

The differentiation is more hard in the instance of a Canis familiaris. A Canis familiaris rather

evidently is affected by his physical milieus, but can he utilize cognitive

procedures to do determinations beyond his instinctual thrusts? The reply to this

inquiry is yes, and no. A Canis familiaris can trust on past experience and in the really

simplistic thoughts of wagess and penalties can find right from incorrect.

This alone does non give a Canis familiaris free will, he could still be bounded by his yesteryear

experience and have small scruples consequence on his determinations. However, as many

Canis familiaris proprietors know, Canis familiariss frequently do strictly? human? things which show their ability to

exercise some degree of control over their actions beyond the instinctual degree.

For illustration, a Canis familiaris likely, on seeing his proprietor after being left entirely for the

twenty-four hours, would hold the physical reaction of observing the presence of and acknowledging

the proprietor. The Canis familiaris might link the return of the proprietor with a filling of his

nutrient dish and expect it with hungriness. These would be determined reactions

set both by the inherent aptitudes of the animate being and his past experiences, nevertheless, the

Canis familiaris might besides experience the emotion of choler towards the proprietor for holding left him

entirely for the twenty-four hours, and move out against him to demo his displeasure. This would

be an illustration of the Canis familiaris working exterior of or even against his inherent aptitudes and

exercising some degree of control over his actions. This leads one to believe that

a Canis familiaris does hold a minimum sum of free will, once more within the restraints of

his physical environment.

Last it is less hard to make up one’s mind the sum of the of free will

that a stone has. A stone is affected by its physical environment, but has no

agencies of determination devising in order to move on its ain. It hence is affected

entirely by its environment and has no free will.