Cuban Missile Crisis Essay, Research Paper

Introduction

On the forenoon of Tuesday October 16, 1962, President John F. Kennedy was reading the Tuesday forenoon newspapers in his bed at the Whitehouse. Not 20 4s hours before, McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy & # 8217 ; s national security advisor, received the consequences of Major Richard S. Heyser & # 8217 ; s U-2 mission over San Cristobal Cuba. In visible radiation of recent cryptic Soviet and Cuban activities developing in the Caribbean Sea and Atlantic Ocean, the president & # 8217 ; s disposal had given the order to carry on reconnaissance missions over the island of Cuba. In peculiar a fifty-mile trapezoidal swath of district in western Cuba was to be looked upon under intense examination. A CIA agent reported in the 2nd hebdomad of September that this stretch of land was being guarded closely by Peruvian, Colombian, and existent Soviet soldiers. There was a existent ground to be leery of the activity in western Cuba. The first of this U-2 reconnaissance mission would uncover a shocking find. ( Chang & A ; William p.33-47 )

The U-2 reconnaissance studies that Bundy received in full item two 70-foot-long MRBMs at San Cristobal. The intelligence that Bundy would finally hold to expose to President Kennedy would sound alarms non merely in his disposal or in the United States of America, but throughout the full universe. Bundy did non state the president that dark. He opted to let him a good dark & # 8217 ; s remainder, the last he would hold for some clip, as it turned out. Bundy felt there was nil the president could make about the missiles that dark anyhow, and he would necessitate to be crisp the following forenoon. ( Brugioni p.68 ) Besides Bundy and the leading of the U.S. intelligence community, Dean Rusk and his squad at State, every bit good as McNamara and the deputy secretary of defence, Roswell Gilpatric, received word of the U-2 & # 8217 ; s find before traveling to bed on October 15. Kennedy & # 8217 ; s find of the missiles could wait till the following forenoon. ( May & A ; Zelikow p.24 )

Therefore on the forenoon of October 16, while Kennedy was lying in bed, Bundy informed that the U-2 mission that flew over Cuba had spotted two atomic missiles and six missile conveyances sou’-west of Havana. Before the summer of that same twelvemonth had ended, Khrushchev had made the duplicate promise that & # 8220 ; nil will be undertaken before the American Congressional elections that could perplex the international state of affairs or worsen the tenseness in the dealingss between our two states, & # 8221 ; and ensured the president through his ain brother Robert F. Kennedy, the lawyer general of the United States and the president & # 8217 ; s closet adviser by agencies of a back channel, that merely defensive arms were to be placed in Cuba. ( Brugioni p56 ) This last and concluding statement left the immature lawyer general and the full disposal to believe that no violative atomic missiles, and surely no arms that were capable of hitting any mark in the Continental United States were being placed in Cuba at this clip. ( Chang & A ; William p67 )

The intelligence brought to the Kennedy disposal in the signifier of the U-2 & # 8217 ; s revealing exposure made bunk of both of Khrushchev & # 8217 ; s pledges. But most significantly the Soviet Union had equipped Cuba with an armory of Soviet atomic missiles despite a presidential statement merely a month early that the United States would non digest such a state of affairs in the Western Hemisphere. Kennedy felt personally insulted by the deployment of these missiles. ( Fursenko & A ; Naftali p.193 ) He thought that he had done everything possible to defuse and smooth over tense dealingss with the Soviet Union even before he took office in 1960. This lay waste toing intelligence from Cuba would ensue in the tense period in Cold War history to day of the month and possibly its tensest period in the full history of the war.

Kennedy decided limit the information sing the lay waste toing intelligence from Cuba to as little a group as possible. This group would come to be known as the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, or as it would subsequently be known and shortened to merely Ex Comm. ( Brugioni p.45 ) This would be the group of Washington & # 8217 ; s sharpest and most influential heads that would more or less decide the destiny of the state and the universe. A heavy duty would be carried on their shoulders. If they failed they we would take the full state with them.

The group would come to include Charles Bohlen, the old Kremlin manus who was late named U.S. embassador to France. Beside Bohlen it would include Secretary of State Dean Rusk, every bit good as Undersecretary of State George Ball and Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America Edwin M. Martin, every bit good as Ambassador at Large Llewellyn Thompson. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and his deputies Roswell Gilpatric and Paul Nitze represented the Defense Department. John McCone, caput of the CIA, off on an pressing household affair, was replaced by his deputy Marshall & # 8220 ; Pat & # 8221 ; Carter, and the CIA was besides represented by the caput of the NPIC, Arthur Lundahl, whose analysts had found the missile sites on the U-2 exposure. General Maxwell Taylor came as president of the JCS. Rounding out the group were McGeorge Bundy and the Kennedy speechwriter Theodore Sorensen, every bit good as Treasury Secretary C. Douglas Dillon. Last but non least this group of Washington & # 8217 ; s sharpest heads was joined and extremely influenced by the President & # 8217 ; s brother and closest adviser, the Attorney General of the United States, Robert F. Kennedy. ( May & A ; Zelikow p.8-12 )

Robert F. Kennedy would turn out to be one of the most, if non the most of import individual responsible in make up one’s minding the destiny of the two universe world powers and basically the full universe next to Nikita S. Khrushchev, the Premier of the Soviet Union, and his ain brother, John F. Kennedy, the President of the United States. Even before the crisis reached a caput when the American authorities eventually discovered the atomic missiles in western Cuba, Bobby Kennedy played a cardinal function in trying to vouch America & # 8217 ; s worst incubus would ne’er come to being.

Through his ain personal back channel to the Kremlin, a Soviet intelligence officer and member of the KGB, Georgi Bolshakov, Kennedy attempted to determine and relay messages and dialogues between the two world powers in inquiry. ( Brugioni p.157 ) When Kennedy was deceived through these private and frequently personal channels, there was no inquiry that Robert F. Kennedy felt a grade of personal abuse and harm to his ain pride.

Kennedy would play a cardinal function throughout all of the Ex Comm meetings, and while his brother was off, there was no inquiry that was in charge of these meetings. Throughout these meetings, Bobby & # 8217 ; s ain positions on how to cover with this dramatic state of affairs evolved from a instead militant and incensed place ; a want to acquire even, to a much more moderate and reasonable, even pacifist place on how to cover with the state of affairs in inquiry. Kennedy would play an of import function in determining the concluding class of action in managing the play at manus.

Finally Kennedy would play the function of courier and negotiant with the Soviet embassador to Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin, in negociating the concluding trade and trade off to defuse the struggle and stop it one time and for all. Involved in this secret negotiating, the cognition of which was possessed by less so ten work forces in both the United States and the Soviet Union at this clip is besides loaded with contention, affecting classified paperss and different histories of the true narrative revealed on both the American and Soviet side of the struggle, including the memoirs of Nikita S. Khrushchev himself. ( Chang & A ; Kornbluh p.237 )

Kennedy was one of the most of import makers of the full struggle. Without his presence it is unknown which way this struggle would hold taken. It would be Robert F. Kennedy whom the president would trust on and swear the most in this state of affairs. He was one of the most vocal in covering with the struggle and surely one of the most rational. He helped maintain control of the state of affairs and staved off the continued assaults of the war hawks in Congress who genuinely looked to achieve the upper manus in the method of covering with this struggle. His great and of import function in this struggle that will be discussed, from his secret back channels to the Kremlin in the months before the crisis, to the trades he would finally present and do to the Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin.

Back Channels to the Kremlin

Robert F. Kennedy foremost met Georgi Bolshakov through Frank Holeman, an American journalist for the New York Daily News. Bolshakov was a Soviet intelligence agent. He had been working for the Soviet intelligence bureau GRU. The GRU, who began his grueling preparation procedure in 1943, while the war with Hitler, was still really much in full swing. Despite the war traveling on around him, Bolshakov was trained in a vigorous apprenticeship for seven old ages to go a Soviet intelligence officer, and so attended a three-year class at the High Intelligence School of the General Staff. In all his preparation lasted until 1950 during which clip he acquired some impressive English linguistic communication accomplishments. As a consequence of his impressive English accomplishments, Bolshakov was assigned to the TASS Soviet intelligence bureau in Washington where he would be an editor whose chief function in the office would be to cultivate beginnings. ( Brugioni p.157 )

After giving four old ages to this assignment aboard in Washington, Bolshakov was recalled back to Moscow where he was to work under Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Georgi Zhukov. When Zhukov was dismissed in 1957, a impermanent arrest was brought to Bolshakov & # 8217 ; s calling. However his calling would see a rival by the terminal of the 1950 & # 8217 ; s through his friendly relationship with the new son-in-law of Soviet Premier Khrushchev, Aleksei Adzhubei, the hubby of Rada Khrushchev. By 1960 Bolshakov was back in Washington working one time once more for GRU. ( Brugioni p. 157-9 )

Frank Holeman had first met Bolshakov in 1951 at a Soviet held lunch-in in Holeman & # 8217 ; s award. The two hit it off instead good and met infrequently and exchanged information. Soviets shortly began to value Holeman as a utile source and encouraged this budding relationship until Bolshakov was transferred back to Moscow in 1955. ( Brugioni p.159 ) Upon Bolshakov & # 8217 ; s return to Washington in 1960, Holeman was speedy to restore ties with his former familiarity from Moscow. Soon after Holeman and Bolshakov began there correspondence once more, Holeman dropped the chance to Bolshakov of possible meeting in individual to discourse national involvements with the lawyer general of the United States, the brother of the President himself, Robert F. Kennedy. Bolshakov was taken off guard by the suggestion, but was rather tempted and excited about possible taking face to face with person in such a place of American power as Kennedy. Despite his hidden enthusiasm, Bolshakov replied to the journalist that he needed blessing from his & # 8220 ; embassy before such a meeting could be proposed. ( Brugioni p.160-4 ) What Bolshakov truly needed was permission for his foreman in the GRU, whose individuality is still unknown, who ab initio upon hearing the proposal was instead surprised that one of his aid would of involvement to the Attorney General of the United States and rejected the proposition. Why would some one of such importance want to talk to one of his helpers?

Despite the rejection by his superior and despite relaying the message back to Holeman that he would be unable to run into with the lawyer general, Bolshakov decided to put on the line it anyhow and run into up with Holeman on May 9th of 1961, merely ten yearss after Holeman made his initial proposal. Bolshakov chose the day of the month of May 9th for the meeting with Bobby Kennedy because it was a Soviet vacation in jubilation of the licking of fascism in 1945, and his office with the GRU would be understaffed as most of his co-workers would be place basking the vacation. Thus Bolshakov would be able to travel about much easier. ( Brugioni p.166 )

Holeman met Bolshakov at approximately 4:30 at a nearby eating house in Georgetown. Bolshakov had hardly sat down to eat when Holeman asked him if he would be ready to run into Kennedy at 8:30 in forepart of the Justice Department office in Washington. Bolshakov was one time once more caught off guard by the brusqueness of the programming of the meeting, but agreed non-the less to run into with Kennedy at this clip. At 8:30 crisp Kennedy was waiting with one of his Plutos on the stairss of the Justice Department edifice. Holeman introduced the Soviet intelligence officer to the Attorney General of the United States. With that Both Holeman and the Kennedy adjutant left the two gentlemen to themselves to speak. ( Brugioni p.167-8 ) The basis was on the side laid. From so on Robert F. Kennedy had his ain personal connexion to the Kremlin, via a Soviet intelligence officer.

Khrushchev did non wholly condone Georgi Bolshakov & # 8217 ; s meetings with Bobby Kennedy. He even wrote to President Kennedy himself that his embassador Anatoly Dobrynin in Washington enjoyed his & # 8220 ; complete trust, & # 8221 ; to promote the usage of regular diplomatic communications. ( Blight & A ; Welch p.189 ) But the personal resonance between the president & # 8217 ; s brother and the Soviet military intelligence officer was excessively great for the Kremlin or the White House to wish to shut down the Kennedy-Bolshakov back channel.

Khruschev besides had no job utilizing this back channel as the agency for an enterprise. The channel had already been used in dialogues affecting a atomic trial prohibition pact and the go oning deadlock in Berlin. Khruschev besides saw a manner in which he could take advantage of the channel in an effort to maintain the Cuban Missile operation, codenamed Anadyr a covert operation. ( Brugioni p.175 ) Khrushchev new he couldn & # 8217 ; t possible prevent American U-2 pilots from winging over the island of Cuba, but possibly he could forestall them from winging over Soviet ships presenting missiles and supplies necessary to do missile sites operational whose finish was Castro & # 8217 ; s Caribbean Communist Eden.

Khrushchev instructions for Bolshakov were to convey to Bobby Kennedy that the Soviets and Premier Khrushchev felt that reconnaissance missions via U-2 undercover agent planes over the unfastened ocean were Acts of the Apostless of torment on the portion of the United States and the ceasing of these activities might take to more friendly US-Soviet dealingss and a brighter chance for peaceable coexistence. Bolshakov relayed his instructions and the Kennedy & # 8217 ; s agreed merely under the status that the Berlin issue be iced. Khrushchev was loath to hold on such a volatile issue as Berlin, but did promise non to make anything until after the American elections in November and the Americans did discontinue to direct spy planes over the Atlantic. ( Blight & A ; Welch p.188-9 )

However Bolshakov was left in the dark about the full missile state of affairs. On perennial occasions Kennedy questioned Bolshakov on the arms and stuffs being sent to Cuba by the Soviet Union and Bolshakov repeatedly assured RFK that these arms and stuffs were strictly of a defensive nature. The arms were simply a agency for Cuba to support itself against any possible collections. ( Brugioni p. 175-6 )

Equally late as two hebdomads before the Kennedy disposal became cognizant of the existent missile state of affairs in Cuba, Bolshakov came to Bobby with an of import message. Kennedy & # 8217 ; s at this point knew that the Cubans had already received province of the art SA-2 missiles from the Soviets, which were designed as high-tech flak defensive missiles. ( Cook p.92 ) Robert Kennedy made clip to see Bolshakov on October 5 because Bolshakov said he had received and of import message from Khrushchev. Kennedy normally affected a insouciant, unfastened expression with his Russian friend, but Bolshakov noticed that this twenty-four hours the lawyer general & # 8217 ; s shirt was meticulously buttoned. There was no little talk about Bolshakov & # 8217 ; s holiday, which months before the work forces had considered taking together. Kennedy listened and took notes as Bolshakov conveyed a pledge from Khrushchev that the Soviet Union was directing merely defensive arms to Cuba. ( Blight and Welch p.193 ) To be certain he had non missed any nicety, Kennedy asked him to reiterate the cardinal phrase in the message. & # 8220 ; The arms that the USSR is directing to Cuba will merely be of a defensive character, & # 8221 ; said Bolshakov. ( Brugioni p.178 )

& # 8220 ; In a short piece, & # 8221 ; Kennedy explained, & # 8220 ; I will hold to describe this to the president. & # 8221 ; Indeed, from what Bolshakov new of Soviet purposes, what he was instructed to state Robert F. Kennedy was the truth? Bolshakov truly believed that the Soviets had know purpose of puting violative atomic missiles capable of aiming any part in the Continental United States, at least without first informing the United States and the Kennedy disposal. Bolshakov was left in the dark. Bolshakov lived to see the terminal of the Cold War ; but he ne’er got over his resentment towards the Soviet Premier at holding been used to lead on the Kennedy & # 8217 ; s. Bolshakov was non informed about operation Anadyr. ( Blight & A ; Welch p.197 )

The misrepresentation that the Soviets employed through Bolshakov insulted the pride of both Kennedy & # 8217 ; s but in peculiar that of Bobby, who was Bolshakov & # 8217 ; s friend. Possibly that & # 8217 ; s why Bolshakov was non informed of the operation. When it was brought to the attending that the American authorities was good cognizant of the Soviet missiles in Cuban district, Bolshakov was dumbfounded and even a small baffled. Bolshakov was non cognizant of the missiles in Cuba until John F. Kennedy & # 8217 ; s disposal itself had informed him that the missiles were there and even showed him exposure. When he did see the exposure he denied any expertness in rocketry. & # 8220 ; I have ne’er seen anything like these exposures, & # 8221 ; complained Bolshakov, & # 8220 ; and can non understand what is on them. & # 8221 ; He even suggested that they merely might be baseball diamonds. The Americans nevertheless were non pleased with these consequences. ( Blight & A ; Welch p.197 )

Bolshakov nevertheless did non turn out to be wholly useless to the Kennedy disposal in deciding the missile crisis. On October 23, Frank Holeman revealed to Bolshakov, that the United States was willing to do a barter, Soviet atomic ballistic missiles on the island of Cuba, in exchange for American ballistic atomic missiles in the NATO State of Turkey on the boundary lines of the Soviet Union. Kennedy was looking to take the missiles in Turkey anyhow for they had become disused upon the development of a larger measure of higher quality missiles. ( Cheney p.94 ) However GRU office in Washington chose to sit on the information and non uncover it to Khrushchev and the Soviet praesidium merely yet. Through Kennedy & # 8217 ; s Bolshakov connexion, it was foremost revealed that the Kennedy disposal was willing to do a barter of missile installing in several Soviet and American allied provinces. ( Brugioni p.224 )

Bolshakov proved valuable in the months before the missile crisis to both the White House and the Kremlin. Both used him as a beginning of intelligence sing the other world power & # 8217 ; s programs. Bolshakov was Bobby Kennedy & # 8217 ; s initative in covering with the Soviet Union.

Ultimately, nevertheless, Khrushchev and the Soviet Union used the Kennedy-Bolshakov channel in a fallacious mode, lead oning the intelligence agent himself. Bolshakov was used to cover Soviet-Cuban covert operations in the Atlantic Ocean and to reassure the Kennedy disposal that the Soviets had no programs to put in violative atomic arms capable of pass overing out the full continental United States on the island of Cuba.

To the contrary, the Soviets had planned for months to turn the little island state of Cuba and its six million people into a Soviet Island fortress merely 90 stat mis off the seashore of Florida. This fortress would be to the full equipped with non merely medium scope, but intercontinental atomic missiles, every bit good as a undersea base capable of back uping atomic pigboats. In add-on an full Soviet fort of 50,000 military personnels would be stationed on the island equipped with the arms and the defence systems required to maintain this fortress operational and finally inviolable. ( Cheney p.102 ) Bolshakov was left wholly in the dark about this state of affairs, and intern so was the Kennedy disposal.

The state of affairs infuriated both Kennedy & # 8217 ; s and as the missile crisis progressed, the brothers relied less on the channel as a agencies to make Moscow. It appeared obvious that Bolshakov had no thought what kinds of arms were being installed in Cuba. The Soviet misrepresentation through Bolshakov helped to put the tone for Bobby Kennedy at the first Ex Comm meetings in make up one’s minding precisely what to make about this lay waste toing state of affairs in Cuba. Bolshakov was Bobby Kennedy & # 8217 ; s personal channel to Moscow and his friend. Moscow & # 8217 ; s usage of Bolshakov as a agency of fraudulence and misrepresentation genuinely infuriated the younger Kennedy.

Kennedy was looking to acquire even. It was no surprise that when Kennedy entered the really first Ex Comm meeting on October 16, 1962 Kennedy sat in his chair ready to move as a hawk. ( Fursenko & A ; Naftali p.234 ) He was prepared to make what of all time was necessary to take those missiles from Cuba. If it meant an air work stoppage followed by an invasion, so be it.

Bobby Kennedy and the Ex Comm Meetings

The beginning of the Ex Comm negotiations for Robert F. Kennedy were marked by humiliation. The humiliation that he was straight lied to by the Soviet Union through one of his closest contacts and the humiliation that Castro had one time once more made the United States look like a clump of saps. He struggled in the early portion of these Ex Comm meetings with that humiliation on his shoulders.

Robert Kennedy believed that the missiles in Cuba represented an highly valuable bargaining bit for both the Soviets and the Cubans. His sentiment was besides shared by his brother the president of the United States.

Kennedy wondered whether Castro might non do new menaces against Cuba & # 8217 ; s neighbours, stating, & # 8220 ; You move troops down into that portion of Venezuela, we & # 8217 ; re traveling to fire these missiles. & # 8221 ; ( Fursenko & A ; Naftali p.235 ) The lawyer general in the first meeting of Ex Comm was by far the strongest advocator for invasion. He understood his brother & # 8217 ; s sensitiveness toward the political impact of a U.S. reaction that was non considered commensurate to the offense. But Robert Kennedy besides expected Khrushchev merely to recharge his missiles if he lost his first group of missiles to an American air work stoppage. The odds of destructing every missile flawlessly and expeditiously with merely one simple air work stoppage were following to impossible. ( Fursenko & A ; Naftali p.247 )

Possibly as a manner of demoing how an invasion could be made internationally acceptable, Robert Kennedy brought up the speedy hole that he had been recommending away and on since the Bay of Pigs catastrophe. & # 8220 ; We should besides believe of. . . whether there is some other manner we can acquire involved in this through. . . Guantanamo Bay, or something, . . . or whether there & # 8217 ; s some ship that, you know, sink the Maine once more or something. & # 8221 ; ( Hinckle & A ; William p. 278 ) Kennedy was so hold oning for straws proposing such implausible and bizarre alibis for occupying Cuba, under stalking-horse of questionable morality. However Kennedy was confused and highly frustrated by the current state of affairs. Much of what Kennedy suggests early on in the Ex Comm meetings were the discharge of great defeat over the crisis. None the less his brother, the president of the United States took Bobby Kennedy & # 8217 ; s Lamentationss really earnestly. Bobby was still his closest adviser and John F. Kennedy felt the same defeat and confusion that his brother felt.

Initially most of the other members of Ex Comm excluding the members of the really military who were present, supported a much more peaceable manner of covering with the state of affairs. Diplomacy was seen as an alternate agencies of covering with such an explosive state of affairs. Llewellyn Thompson advocated a naval encirclement of Cuba. ( Dolan & A ; Scariano p.105 ) Believing it & # 8220 ; really extremely dubious the Russians would defy a encirclement against military arms. . . & # 8221 ; ( Dolan & A ; Scariano p.105 ) Thompson argued that the best manner to avoid peace or at least legalize an invasion of Cuba was a combined austere coercion of encirclement with a public demand that Moscow level its missile sites in Cuba. Thompson realized that odds were this would non be plenty to take the missiles already bing in Cuba and would non forestall them from going operational in the close hereafter. He suggested endangering to utilize force if Khrushchev ignored the U.S. demand. & # 8220 ; I think we should be under no semblances that this would likely in the terminal lead to the same thing, & # 8221 ; he said with some surrender. & # 8220 ; But we would make it under an wholly different position and background, and much less danger of acquiring into the large war. & # 8221 ; ( Fursenko & A ; Naftali p.253 )

In the beginning Robert Kennedy, still really much a hawk disagreed in wholly with Thompson. He saw the encirclement as a & # 8220 ; really decelerate death. & # 8221 ; ( Thompson p.123 ) Robert Kennedy envisioned that a encirclement would last for months. He saw a great trade of struggle involved in a naval encirclement anyhow. The fillet of Russian ships by the American navy would do pandemonium and perchance even revenge by Russian ships. Russian ships would make bold the American naval forces to halt them, and no uncertainty about it there would be ships that would try to run and interrupt through any sort of naval encirclement put into affect by the United States Navy. Russian planes that attempted to wing over the American encirclement would hold to me hit down which would take to nil more than an escalated muss. ( Fursenko & A ; Naftali p. 256-9 ) These at least were Kennedy & # 8217 ; s statements.

On October 19, the Ex Comm divided into two groups. There was the air work stoppage squad, which included Treasury Secretary Dillon, Bundy, CIA manager John McCone, and the former secretary of province Dean Acheson who had now joined in on the Ex Comm meetings. Rober

T Kennedy chose to fall in this group. Prefering the encirclement were Secretary of Defense John McNamara, Dean Rusk, Thompson, George Ball. ( Blight & Welch p.235 ) The duty of the two groups was to bring forth by the terminal of the twenty-four hours place documents that made the strongest instance possible for their penchant. Over the following 36 hours, Robert Kennedy played a cardinal function in conveying these two groups together. He considered himself apart of the air work stoppage squad, but his place on so drastic a step was hesitating. While he still saw the naval encirclement as full of concerns and failings, he saw the air work stoppage place as even more unsafe. ( Fursenko & Naftali p.263-4 )

The ground he was hesitating was non that agreed with Thompson or the others, instead he began to to the full acknowledge the effect of the alternate air work stoppage. An air work stoppage left small room for the Soviet Union and communist Cuba to manuver. In a state of affairs such as the 1 placed upon them in an air work stoppage, the two communist states would apparently hold no pick but to contend back and defend themselves. ( Blight & A ; Welch p.229 )

In the forenoon Bobby Kennedy argued that the U.S. air force should merely travel and do the onslaught without warning. Merely after a full air work stoppage was made against the Soviet Cuban places on the island should the United States go to the Organization of American States. This was Kennedy & # 8217 ; s position. By the eventide of the same twenty-four hours, he was steadfastly against striking without warning. Kennedy realized the cowardlyness in such an onslaught. A similar surprise onslaught was made on the twenty-four hours of December 7th, 1945, a twenty-four hours that would populate in opprobrium. There was no manner Kennedy decided, that he would let his brother to be compared with Tojo of Japan, in mention to the Nipponese sneak on the American naval forces stationed in Pearl Harbor that finally lead to American engagement in World War II. The United States was non in the tradition of cowardlyness. ( Blight & A ; Welch p.230 ) While he still was tilting towards an air work stoppage or at least an eventual air work stoppage over a naval encirclement, he realized that the Soviet response to such a work stoppage would be far more prepared if they were warned antecedently. None the less Bobby Kennedy had become dead set against a preemptive without warning work stoppage on the island of Cuba. As a consequence, he had changed his head about fall backing to a encirclement as a first measure. ( Thompson p.145 )

By the clip John F. Kennedy had arrived back at the White House after a scheduled cross state trip across the United States early Saturday forenoon, Bobby Kennedy was steadfastly locked into the encirclement cantonment of Ex Comm. If a ballot were to take topographic point in Ex Comm, the air work stoppage cantonment would lose. Robert F. Kennedy upon weighing the options of an air work stoppage over taking the first measure as an proclaimed military encirclement realized that the effects of the air work stoppage made the encirclement far more appealing. ( Fursenko & A ; Naftali p.267 ) At least the encirclement could purchase clip and let the Soviets to withdraw without a individual shooting being fired. It was President Kennedy who in fact needed convincing of the impracticality of an air work stoppage as opposed to a naval encirclement.

Kennedy would so take some convincing that the encirclement would be a safer option to an straight-out surgical air work stoppage on Soviet missile places in Cuba. However in visible radiation of new CIA intelligence that intelligence bureau understood that the operational position of the missiles and the possibility of hitherto undiscovered missile sites were the issues closest to the president & # 8217 ; s bosom and potentially most relevant to his concluding determination. ( Hinckle & A ; William p.287 )

Therefore with the aid Bobby Kennedy conveying the Ex Comm group together and the polishing of light onto freshly found intelligence, the encirclement cantonment carried the twenty-four hours. On Monday forenoon Kennedy would give a nationally televised reference, followed by the infliction of a limited encirclement a twenty-four hours subsequently. Kennedy realized that the Pentagon excluding McNamara was against the determination, but was affirmed by General Taylor that the U.S. armed services would endorse the president & # 8217 ; s determination wholly. ( Hinckle & A ; William p. 293 )

Robert Kennedy besides argued that the stalking-horse behind a naval encirclement of the island of Cuba should be of a moral stalking-horse. He argued that the stalking-horse of a naval encirclement should affect the misrepresentation of the Soviets in there puting of atomic arms on the island of Cuba despite American warnings of what would be the effects of such an action. President Kennedy nevertheless rejected this moral stalking-horse. Kennedy stated categorically why there was non an acceptable military option at this phase in the crisis. The Soviet Union & # 8217 ; s nomadic MRBM ( medium scope ballistic missile ) bases & # 8220 ; can be set up quite rapidly, & # 8221 ; and for this ground and this ground entirely he was certainly there were more on the island had antecedently been detected. ( Cohen p.175 )

Kennedy no longer believed the Soviets would move providentially in the event of war. After all it was non really prudent of the Soviet Union to earnestly believe it could put atomic missiles right under the olfactory organ of America and easy acquire away with it. Kennedy thought that possibly even the Soviets were rubing for the battle. Right up till Kennedy & # 8217 ; s reference, the Soviets were incognizant that the Americans had thought that the United States knew of the ballistic missiles in Cuba. However there were marks. Therefore when the proclamation of the naval encirclement was made, the Soviets were non take wholly off guard. ( Fursenko & A ; Naftali p.253 )

During this first portion of the Cuban missile crisis, prior to the Soviet cognition of American consciousness, Robert Kennedy played a important function in developing his brother & # 8217 ; s place on how to manage the state of affairs. Early on into the struggle, Kennedy was a clear and vocal hawk. His suggestion of sabotage and false stalking-horse in an effort to trip a legitimate invasion seem over the top. Yet as he cooled down, and sobered up to the realisation that this struggle could really good take to the coming of thermonuclear war, Kennedy began to recognize the unlogical logical thinking behind triping a war with such deadly effects. His place bit by bit developed from that of an invasion to that of a surprise air onslaught to that of a warned air onslaught and eventually to that of a encirclement of Cuba without a individual shooting being fired.

Kennedy was really instrumental in hushing the hawks naming for an air work stoppage and finally defending the construct of a naval encirclement. While non wholly accepting the effectivity of the encirclement, he did larn to appreciate the effects of the other possible options. As his place on the crisis evolved to that of a more rational one, so did that of the Ex Comm commission. This demonstrated a great character and leading in the immature lawyer general. In the terminal everybody though non needfully holding with it was willing to accept the thought of a naval encirclement at least as a first measure towards deciding the struggle.

While his brother the president disagreed with him on certain points, such as that of carry oning the encirclement under a moral stalking-horse, at least he was able to assist convince and keep his older brother from a more aggressive action like an air work stoppage that may ensue in a much more serious counter reaction. Even the CIA stated, the missiles found were at this clip believed to be operational, and it was impossible to corroborate that there were no other missile sites that the cardinal intelligence bureau was non cognizant of. These missiles might really good be pointed in the way of Washington D.C.

Robert F. Kennedy and Anatoly Dobrynin

Possibly Robert F. Kennedy & # 8217 ; s most of import function in the Cuban Missile Crisis would be played as the Washington representative in dialogues in an exchange for the remotion of missiles out of Cuba. These dialogues would happen through a new channel, a more official channel of dialogue, through the Soviet Ambassador to Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin. ( Hershbag p.8 ) It would be through these dialogues at the tensest interval of the crisis that a declaration to the full matter would be achieved.

After the encirclement was placed into consequence, on October 23 some of the Soviet ships turned back upon making the encirclement. However Khrushchev specifically ordered certain ships to run the encirclement if necessary. The ships, which attempted to run the encirclement, were able to make so. In the average clip both sides were fixing for war. ( Blight & A ; Welch p.255 )

The United States was accumulating an invasion force of 90,000 Mariness for a possible invasion of Cuba from bases on the eastern seashore of the United States every bit good as extra Mariness from bases on the Pacific seashore. ( Blight & A ; Fursenko p.238 ) However many of these Mariness would hold to sail around Central America through the Panama Canal in order to make the battleground. They may non make the scene of the struggle until at least a hebdomad subsequently. The Pentagon had lowered the U.S. warning system from DEFCOM 5, which was peace to DEFCOM 2. DEFCOM 1 stood for all out war. Pentagon besides warned American infirmaries throughout the state to get down anticipating big Numberss of casualties. At this point in clip U.S. reconnaissance planes were winging at treetop degree over Cuba as a agency of garnering in intelligence for an finally amphibian landing of Mariness on the island. ( Fursenko & A ; Naftali p.238 )

Soviet and Cuban forces on the Communist island besides had begun fixing for war. Khrushchev gave the Oklahoma to his general in charge of military operations on the island, General Issa Pliyev, to fix his military personnels for a possible invasion and to support him in the coming of an American air work stoppage. Cuban forces under Fidel Castro were besides taking stairss toward the possibility of war and a approaching invasion. Castro already assumed an American invasion would come merely yearss after the encirclement was initiated and proved uneffective. Castro sent his brother Raul Castro to fix defences in western Cuba. In eastern Cuba he relied on his most sure adviser outside his ain brother, Che Gueverra to manage military operations at that place. Castro believed the American invasion was inevitable and saw no ground non to fire on any American reconnaissance planes that violated Cuban air infinite. Both provinces were so fixing for all out war. ( Hinckle & A ; William p.278-287 )

At this point in clip, through the tension of the state of affairs, Khrushchev offered a possible trade as a agency to acquire out of this struggle while still salvaging face. Khrushchev & # 8217 ; s trade involved and American pledge non to occupy Cuba. Equally long as the United States was willing to publically plight non to occupy Cuba, the Soviets would be willing to level the arms that the President & # 8217 ; s disposal deemed violative. The trade was foremost mentioned as a possibility by a Soviet intelligence officer named Aleksandr Feklisov. ( Schesinger p.7 ) Feklisov proposal seemed equal plenty to President Kennedy and the Ex Comm commission and did non necessitate the United States to give much land abroad. Few provinces globally favored a U.S. invasion of Cuba any manner and the missiles would be removed under UN review. ( Schesinger p.7 )

However following the heels of this supplication for dialogue, awful intelligence brought the struggle to its tensest point and its flood tide. On Saturday October 27, an American reconnaissance plane was shot down over Cuba by Soviet SA-2 fire. The pilot of the U-2 aeroplane was killed. In add-on to the down of the aircraft, Cuban flak arms had fired upon other American aircraft. These planes were winging at treetop degree and one of these planes was hit but non downed. None of these planes had any agencies of protecting themselves, but now President Kennedy was under great provide these reconnaissance planes with exactly that sort of protection. ( Fursenko & A ; Naftali p.276-9 )

On top of that, Khrushchev cabled a new proposal to the White House merely a twenty-four hours after the first modest proposal was received. This proposal was far more demanding than the first 1. The proposal non merely called for an American pledge non to occupy Cuba now or at any clip in the hereafter, but it besides demanded that U.S. Jupiter missiles be removed from silos in Turkey as a status towards the remotion of Soviet missiles from Cuba. Both operations were to be done under UN review. ( Fursenko & A ; Naftali p.277 )

Kennedy & # 8217 ; s reaction to this new missive was & # 8220 ; He didn & # 8217 ; Ts say that, did he? & # 8221 ; & # 8220 ; That wasn & # 8217 ; T in the missive we received, was it? & # 8221 ; ( Fursenko & A ; Naftali p.277 ) Khrushchev had upped the anti in this new proposal and had taken a much house stance so merely a twenty-four hours before. Some members of Ex Comm even doubted if Khrushchev was still in control of the state of affairs in the Kremlin. Removing the missiles from Turkey, as portion of a dialogue to take Soviet missiles in Cuba would hold to been done without confer withing NATO whom the missiles were pledged to support. ( Cheney p. 98-9 ) Though the missiles were disused, how would experience about the American pledge to support them against Soviet aggression if they were to be removed? How would NATO respond? Such a drastic remotion could take to serious fracturing of NATO confederation. Negotiations would hold to be conducted fast. In the dialogues that would follow, both sides would hold to be satisfied and both sides would hold to be able to salvage face. The President decides to direct his brother Robert F. Kennedy to negociate with Washington & # 8217 ; s Soviet embassador, Anatoly Dobrynin. ( Hershburg p.3 )

Robert Kennedy history of the meeting between the two functionaries from both world powers reads as follows straight from his ain memoirs.

& # 8220 ; At the petition of Secretary Rusk, I telephoned Ambassador Dobrynin at about 7:15 p.m. on Saturday, October 27th. I asked him if he would come to the Justice Department at a one-fourth of eight.

We met in my office. I told him foremost that we understood that the work was go oning on the Soviet missile bases in Cuba. Further, I explained to him that in the last two hours we had found that our planes winging over Cuba had been fired upon and that one of our U-2 & # 8217 ; s had been shot down and the pilot killed. I said these work forces were winging unarmed planes.

I told him that this was an highly serious bend in events. We would hold to do certain determinations within the following 12 or perchance 24 hours. There was a really small clip left. If the Cubans were hiting at our planes, so we were traveling to hit back. This could non assist but convey on farther incidents and that he had better understand the full deductions of this affair.

He raised the point that the statement the Cubans were doing was that we were go againsting Cuban air infinite. I replied that if we had non been go againsting Cuban air infinite so we would still be believing what he and Khrushchev had said & # 8211 ; that there were no long-range missiles in Cuba. In any instance I said that this affair was far more serious than the air infinite over Cuba and involved peoples all over the universe.

I said that he had better understand the state of affairs and he had better communicate that understanding to Mr. Khrushchev. Mr. Khrushchev and he had misled us. The Soviet Union had in secret established missile bases in Cuba while at the same clip proclaiming, in private and publically, that this would ne’er be done. I said those missile bases had to travel and they had to travel right off. We had to hold a committedness by at least tomorrow that those bases would be removed. This was non an ultimatum, I said, but merely a statement of fact. He should understand that if they did non take those bases so we would take them. His state might take relatiative actions but he should understand that before this was over, while there might be dead Americans there would besides be dead Russians.

He so asked me what offer we were doing. I said a missive had merely been transmitted to the Soviet Embassy, which stated in substance that the missile bases should be dismantled and all violative arms should be removed from Cuba. In return, if Cuba and Castro and the Communists ended their insurgent activities in other Central and Latin-american states, we would hold to maintain peace in the Caribbean and non allow an invasion from American dirt.

He so asked me about Khrushchev & # 8217 ; s other proposal covering with the remotion of the missiles from Turkey. I replied that there could be no quid pro quo & # 8212 ; no trade of this sort could be made. This was a affair that had to be considered by NATO and that it was up to NATO to do the determination. I said it was wholly impossible for NATO to take such a measure under the present baleful place of the Soviet Union. If some clip elapsed & # 8212 ; and per your instructions, I mentioned four or five months & # 8212 ; I said I was certain that these affairs could be resolved satisfactorily. ( This last sentence did non look in Kennedy & # 8217 ; s existent memoirs as a consequence of its sensitive nature in uncovering information that was still considered top secret and classified at the clip of the publication of RFK & # 8217 ; s memoirs on the Cuban Missile Crisis, Thirteen Days in 1967. ) ( Hershburg p.9 )

Per your instructions I repeated that there could be no trade of any sort and that any stairss toward easing tensenesss in other parts of the universe mostly depended on the Soviet Union and Mr. Khrushchev taking action in Cuba and taking it instantly.

I repeated to him that this affair could non wait and that he had better contact Mr. Khrushchev and have a committedness from him by the following twenty-four hours to retreat the missile bases under United Nations supervising for otherwise, I said, there would be drastic consequences. & # 8221 ; ( Kennedy p.254-9 )

The footings of the trade outlined by Dobrynin and Kennedy were as follows ; in exchange for an American pledge that the United States would non occupy Cuba, the Soviet Union, under the supervising of a United Nations review squad, would take all arms from the island of Cuba that the United States deemed as violative. These arms would include all ICBM and MRBM located within the boundary lines of Cuba. Along with the missiles, the presence of Soviet military forces would besides be removed. Secretly, the lawyer general besides assured the Soviet embassador that the American atomic Jupiter missiles in Turkey would besides be removed, under the context of a NATO backdown of the missiles. The backdown of these missiles from Turkey would consequentially look to hold nil to make with the crisis in Cuba. Withdrawal of the missiles under such a stalking-horse as Soviet menaces and aggression would potentially harm American leading in NATO and the religion of American Alliess as to its pledge to protect and help them, peculiarly Turkey.

Therefore the trade was complete and when Khrushchev received the footings the undermentioned twenty-four hours, he rapidly broadcast the footings of the understanding over Moscow wireless as to forestall a surprise event from interrupting the understanding. By the terminal of the twenty-four hours both sides were relieved and the crisis was apparently averted. The worst of the state of affairs was over.

Moscow & # 8217 ; s history of the evildoings between the Soviet Washington embassador and Kennedy has resulted in some contention as to how the dialogues genuinely progressed. Khrushchev & # 8217 ; s history of the meeting between the two negotiants in his memoirs Khrushchev Remember & # 8217 ; s are as follows:

& # 8220 ; The flood tide came after five or six yearss, when our embassador to Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin, reported that the President & # 8217 ; s brother, Robert Kennedy, had come to see him on an unofficial visit. Dobrynin & # 8217 ; s describe went something like this:

Robert Kennedy looked exhausted. One could see from his eyes that he had non slept for yearss. He himself said that he had non been place for six yearss and darks. & # 8216 ; The President is in a sedate state of affairs, & # 8217 ; Robert Kennedy said, & # 8216 ; and does non cognize how to acquire out of it. We are under really terrible emphasis. In fact we are under force per unit area from our military to utilize force against Cuba. Probably at this really minute the President is sitting down to compose a message to Chairman Khrushchev. We want to inquire you, Mr. Dobrynin, to go through President Kennedy & # 8217 ; s message to Chairman Khrushchev through unofficial channels. President Kennedy implores Chairman Khrushchev to accept his offer and to take into consideration the distinctive features of the American system. Even though the President himself is really much against get downing a war over Cuba, an irreversible concatenation of events could happen against his will. That is why the President is appealing straight to Chairman Khrushchev for his aid in neutralizing this struggle. If the state of affairs continues much longer, the President is non certain that the armed forces will non subvert him and prehend power. The American ground forces could acquire out of control. & # 8217 ; & # 8221 ; ( Khurschev & A ; Talbott p.204 )

While it is extremely improbable that the American armed forces was of all time on the brink of taking control of the United States authorities ; all populating members of Ex Comm at the clip of this publication deny any possibility of this occurring, it was true that the United States armed forces was forcing for an aggressive attack in deciding the Cuba crisis. It is rather possible that Dobrynin took Bobby Kennedy out of context or the former Soviet Premier misunderstood Dobrynin himself. Theodore Sorensen himself, the close friend of the Kennedy & # 8217 ; s and the editor of Bobby Kennedy & # 8217 ; s memoirs on the Cuban missile crisis, Thirteen Days admits canceling sentences affecting the exchange of Jupiter missiles in Turkey for ballistic missiles in Cuba due to the secretiveness of this exchange at the clip of the memoirs publication. Dobrynin described the publication as being non every bit expressed as their existent conversation. ( Hershburg p.8 )

In any event the crisis was resolved, with great a trade of gratitude to be given to Robert F. Kennedy in function in take parting in the most of import dialogues of the full struggle. The lone existent also-ran in the crisis were the Cubans, who were non informed of the secret trade judicial admissions of the trade, and understood the state of affairs to be that Moscow had merely agreed to level a atomic fortress in exchange for a onionskin pledge non to occupy Cuba by the imperial American steamroller. Castro and his Cuban companion & # 8217 ; s felt betrayed by the Soviet Union and relation would ne’er be every bit near as they were during the crisis between the two states. ( Schlesinger p.9 )

In Conclusion

In decision, Robert F. Kennedy proved to play a critical function in determining the American response to ballistic atomic missile bases in Cuba. At first Kennedy and his brother & # 8217 ; s full disposal was deceived by Khrushchev through Bobby Kennedy ain personal back channel to the Kremlin. The intelligence officer himself who had become a close friend of Kennedy was besides deceived by his ain authorities. Khrushchev used the agent to take enterprises against the Kennedy disposal and finally to keep the secretiveness of operation Anadyr.

Despite the misrepresentation, Kennedy would besides play a important function in the early phases of the Ex Comm meetings, before the Soviets realized the Americans had discovered at that place missile installings in Cuba, and aid to determine a more rational attack to covering with the crisis the committing to an all out, pre-emptive work stoppage against Cuba. Through these meetings, Kennedy & # 8217 ; s place on a class of action in the crisis evolved from of a hawk to that of a rational place that would non ensue in reciprocally assured devastation of both world powers. While his sentiment evolved, he helped to germinate the sentiment of the full Ex Comm commission. By the clip the president was inquiring for a solution to the state of affairs from the group, a rational response was available. Bobby Kennedy played a important function in developing this response.

Finally Robert F. Kennedy may hold played the most important function of all in the concluding dialogue of the footings to eventually decide the struggle that placed both world powers on the threshold of universe war. Though the precise inside informations of the conversation between Kennedy and Ambassador Dobyrnin remain ill-defined and controversial, the struggle was resolved and the universe moved on. Without Bobby Kennedy & # 8217 ; s function in the struggle, it is ill-defined as to whether this would hold been the instance in October of 1962.

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2. Cook, Fred J. ( 1972 ) . The Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Franklin Watts Inc.

3. Chang, Laurence and Kornbluh, Peter. ( Ed. ) ( 1998 ) . The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962. New York: The New Press.

4. Brugioni, Dino A. ( 1991 ) . Eyeball to Eyeball. New York: Random House.

5. Hinckle, Warren and William, W. Turner. ( 1981 ) . The Fish is Red. New York: Harper & A ; Row, Publishers.

6. May, Ernest R. and Zelikow, Philip D. ( Ed. ) ( 1997 ) . The Kennedy Tapes. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap imperativeness of Harvard University Press.

7. Khrushchev, Nikita S. ( Au. ) , and Talbott, Strobe. ( Ed. ) ( 1974 ) . Khrushcev Remembers. Boston: Brown Little.

8. Thompson, Robert Smith. ( 1992 ) . The Missiles of October. New York: Simon & A ; Schuster.

9. Cheney, Glenn Alan. ( 1999 ) . Nuclear Proliferation. New York: Franklin Watts Inc.

10. Fursenko, Aleksandr and Naftali, Timothy. ( 1997 ) . & # 8220 ; One Hell of a Gamble. & # 8221 ; New York: W. W. Norton & A ; Co.

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Internet Beginnings

14. Hershburg, Jim. More on Bobby and the Cuban Missiles. Crisihttp: //www.hfni.gsehd.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/CWIHP/BULLETINS/b8-9a30.htm.

15. Schlesinger, Jim. More on Bobby and the Cuban Missile Crisis. cwihp.si.edu/cwihplib.nsf/16c6b2fc83775317852564a400054b28/5904d5ef8d1b9bce852564b90069258?