Us Term Limits Essay, Research Paper

When the Constitution of the United States was adopted in 1789, it was without way sing term bounds for legislators. At the clip, professional politicians were unheard of, and the thought of person functioning for more than one or two footings was improbable. So the Constitution did non officially turn to the issue of term bounds, although it was understood that officers would restrict themselves to one or two footings and so return to private life ( 1 ) . With the coming of the modern province, nevertheless, came the devising of Congress as a calling, and therefore the voluntary remotion of oneself from office, as envisioned by the laminitiss, is no longer on a regular basis undertaken in the United States Congress. The construction of the Congress supports members who have held office for several footings thereby sabotaging the thought of the citizen-legislator put Forth by the laminitiss. Alternatively of citizens who will shortly return to the community that elected them, professional Congress-people spend more clip in Washington than in their place provinces, and normally do Congress their calling. What has developed in recent old ages, in response to congressional careerism, is the thrust to enforce bounds on the length of clip person may function in Congress. Presently, advocators of term bounds are naming for two footings in the Senate, and three in the House. It is possible, so, for a member to function six old ages in the House, twelve old ages in the Senate, eight old ages as Vice President, and eight old ages as President, a sum of 36 old ages. It is non improbable, hence, that there will go on to be career politicians. The issue is non about entire clip that one may take part in authorities, instead it is about how long one may function in a peculiar capacity. Term limits bask popular, but non political, support, thereby polarising the electorate and the elected. This paper will discourse the popular support for term bounds, the statements on both sides, and draw decisions about the demand for Congressional term bounds in the United States

Support for term bounds encompasses close to three-fourthss of the American population ( 2 ) . The inquiry is why. The simple reply is that the American people no longer swear a system they view as corrupt and biased towards the few. But the issue is truly non this simple, nor is its footing of support. While on the surface it is corruptness and prejudice that feed the resoluteness for bounds, underneath it is excessively complex an issue to depict so compactly. Rather the issue includes Congressional dirts, allegations of graft and sexual torment, questionable run parts, and Congressional fringe benefits such as no-interest loans and free, reserved parking at the airdrome ( 3 ) . & # 8220 ; To many, it seem [ s ] that one ground Congress hour angle [ s ] lost touch with ordinary people [ is ] because so many members [ are ] in Congress excessively long. & # 8221 ; ( 4 ) Harmonizing to Ed Crane of the Cato Institute,

& # 8220 ; Americans want to open up the political procedure. They want their fellow citizens who live and work in the existent universe & # 8212 ; the private sector & # 8212 ; to stand for them. Not career legislators It would let good people from across the political spectrum to take part in the political procedure as campaigners, even if they happen to hold spent most of their life outside the spotlight in the private sector like the remainder of us. & # 8221 ; ( 5 )

Clearly electors support term bounds for a assortment of grounds, yet these grounds all portion a common characteristic: the desire for a more competitory electoral procedure, and the hope that term bounds will besides restrict corruptness.

The strength of public support for term bounds can be seen in the fact that several provinces voted to restrict the length of clip their representatives can function in Congress. By the center of 1995, about half of the provinces had limited the figure of footings for their representatives. This success of the term bound motion at the grass roots degree faced a serious reverse when the Supreme Court ruled in a 5-4 bulk that such limitations were unconstitutional. They argued that & # 8220 ; leting single States to craft their ain makings for Congress would therefore gnaw the construction envisioned by the Framers, a construction that was designed to organize a more perfect brotherhood. & # 8221 ; ( 6 ) The citizens and the province are at the clemency, hence, of Congress in footings of implementing bounds.

Congress must make up one’s mind to amend the Constitution. Since members of Congress face a struggle of involvement on the issue of term bounds, protagonists of this enterprise are traveling to hold to go more originative in their lobbying. An illustration of how provinces may be able to acquire around this determination is the thought that province representatives be asked to subscribe a statement sing their support of term bounds for Congress. Those representatives who do non subscribe or hold to work towards term bounds will hold a notation beside their name in the following election rhythm that indicates their neglect for public sentiment.

Term bounds is a policy that has a base of indorsement in two of import ways. First, it already has the support of the American people, and 2nd, it is an unofficial policy that has its roots in the Articles of Confederation, if non the Constitution. Unfortunately, nevertheless these statements entirely are non plenty to oblige calling legislators to follow term bounds. There are several other cardinal statements in favour of term bounds that may turn out persuasive in the long tally.

The power of officeholders in Congress is considered a contemplation of the professionalisation of political relations. It is all but impossible for rivals to win against officeholders in the race for Congressional seats. The professionalisation of political relations has & # 8220 ; enhanced the electoral advantages of careerists & # 8221 ; ( 7 ) , or officeholders. Conversely, & # 8220 ; every sweetening of the power of tenure exacerbates careerism & # 8221 ; ( 8 ) . So a rhythm is created wherein calling politicians are more likely to acquire elected thereby encouraging politicians to go careerists. & # 8220 ; Given the power of tenure, advocates of term bounds argue that election to Congress, in kernel, peers life tenure. & # 8221 ; ( 9 )

When the victory of tenure is coupled with the senior status system that assigns places of power based on length of service it creates an environment where electors are afraid non to re-elect their representative in instance their province loses power. Ironically, the more senior a member becomes, the less representative of his electorate and the more representative of particular involvements he becomes. One demand merely look at Senator Thurmon who has been in office since before Pearl Harbor. He is 93 old ages old and is already the oldest helping Senator of all time. As Chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, his place is of import to his place province of South Carolina & # 8211 ; a province with a big defence industry ( 10 ) . He is systematically re-elected because of his senior position within the Senate. It is all but impossible for a campaigner to establish a serious run against Thurmon, as no 1 is South Carolina wants to lose the power his Chairmanship brings. Advocates argue that term bounds will destruct the system of senior status and replace it with a system of meritocracy ( 11 ) . Since legislators will be functioning a limited clip, it is more likely that they will adhere to the desires of their components since they will shortly be returning to populate among them.

Oppositions argue that bounds already exist in the signifier of the electoral procedure. Peoples who do non experience their representative is making an equal occupation can merely vote for person else. Incumbents are every bit likely as any other campaigner non to acquire elected. The statement continues with the thought that term bounds will intend a loss of experience on the portion of legislators. ( 12 ) Because one serves in Congress for a potentially limitless clip, representatives are more likely to & # 8220 ; cognize about the regulations, modus operandis, and processs that are indispensable to survival in Congress [ and ] may besides cognize a great trade about how to utilize the federal bureaucratism to function their constituents. & # 8221 ; ( 13 ) Incumbents, hence, are necessary for Congress to run swimmingly.

The statement that representatives must be in topographic point for a long clip in order to to the full appreciate how to acquire things done is inherently flawed. The ground longer service in Congress is necessary now is that there are no bounds to footings. Therefore, Congress is controlled by its most powerful ( or longest standing ) members. Term bounds would take the possibility of a senior status system and the advantages of tenure therefore making conditions of equality between member of Congress.

The tenure and senior status systems have created conditions whereby leading places & # 8220 ; are peopled entirely by white males & # 8221 ; ( 14 ) . Women and minorities are underrepresented non merely in existent Numberss in Congress, but besides in footings of leading. Term bounds would make more competitory elections and therefore let more adult females and minorities the chance for election. The system as it presently exists discourages minorities from come ining a race because in a bulk of seats the incumbent wins. Since the fledglings are non given the fiscal support of an incumbent, campaigners must either be independently affluent of stay out of the race ( 15 ) .

Critics argue that there is considerable turnover at each election without the infliction of term bounds, and that gifted people will non seek office unless their political calling possibilities are long-run ( 16 ) . It is hard to counter the thought that adult females and minorities are underrepresented or that these groups would profit from more competitory elections. Rather, the focal point is on the inevitableness of professional politicians and careerism as a logical byproduct of the electoral system ; a merchandise that should merely be accepted by the people with no effort to alter it. This statement avoids the issues of minority representation and tenure advantages and efforts to deviate attending off from the fact that minorities do non play an equal or even p

roportional function in Congress.

Advocates of term bounds argue for a return to citizen-legislators. & # 8220 ; With the professionalisation of American political relations, alternatively of public battle, we end up with public alienation ; alternatively of civic committedness, we foster civic forsaking ; and alternatively of political authorization, we are left with political confinement. & # 8221 ; ( 17 ) A citizen-legislator is person who has a calling in the private sector, spends a comparatively short clip in the public oculus and so returns place to populate among his components once more. Since the senior members of Congress are most likely to be influenced by particular involvements, and are removed from the people they represent, it can be argued that the citizen-legislator will act in the opposite mode. The short-run member will probably go through fewer Torahs, and the Torahs he does back up will be more brooding of his components desires ( 18 ) .

Critics argue that term bounds would do legislators to disregard their components during their concluding footings, and that bounds would simple shift power from the officeholders to the staff members and the lobbyists ( 19 ) . This displacement would take power from those elected and give it a non-partisan bureaucratism. New members would be at the clemency of their staff, and be crippled by their ain rawness.

It is extremely improbable that a member shortly returning to populate once more in the community that elected him would disregard what his components wanted, or go so far removed from them that he was unaware of their demands. In footings of the power displacement & # 8220 ; any Capitol Hill observer knows that it s the most senior members who are most dependent on staff and lobbyists, non the hot-shot immature freshmen. & # 8221 ; ( 20 ) Therefore, Representatives functioning a limited figure of footings are non likely to trust on their staffs to the extent that officeholders do presently, thereby extinguishing the fright that lasting staff members will truly be running the state. Additionally, senior members presently seek to stay in Washington when they are no longer in office by turn uping a place as a lobbyists or administrative official. With term bounds this is besides improbable to go on & # 8220 ; because the turnover on Capitol Hill will rapidly do their contacts obsolete and their influence limited. & # 8221 ; ( 21 )

It can be argued that the term bounds initiative is a solution looking for a job. Yet, it can besides be argued that term bounds is an issue whose clip is now. While term bounds may non work out all that is incorrect with the American system, it surely is a measure in the right way. The system as is presently exists is rife with rank and privilege. In Congress, all members are purportedly equal, yet it is rather obvious that some are more equal than others.

Not merely is the privlege of senior members a job, but it besides the sensed corruptness that goes along with it. As people see their legislators traveling further off from them and closer to particular involvements it is easy to go disillusioned with the system. Because representatives are invariably cognizant or the demand for re-election they will frequently back up measures that specifically help their province and in making so pacify the public plenty to guarantee their re-election command. But is this genuinely regulating? Harmonizing to Ehrenhalt,

& # 8220 ; Politics is, so, more than in the yesteryear, a occupation for people who prefer it to any other line of work. About these people one more of import point should be made: They tend non merely to bask political relations but to believe in authorities as an establishment. The more person is required to give clip and money and private life to run for the metropolis council, for the province legislative assembly, or for Congress, the more of import it is for that individual to believe that authorities is a respectable endeavor with important work to do. & # 8221 ; ( 22 )

With term bounds, political relations will non be about a calling. Rather, it will be about a echt purpose to further alteration. Term bounds will authorities a respectable and accessible establishment for all people.

What term bounds may carry through, so is a grading of the playing field and the invitation for all to come drama. A representative authorities must reflect the people it represents. This is non to state that the Congress must follow a policy of affirmatory action in order to hold equal representation of adult females and minorities, instead Congress must follow term bounds in order to further competition and creativeness in its members and its electoral procedure.

When someplace near 75 per centum of a population supports an enterprise, it would look to be good authorities that would back up it. But when that enterprise infringes on the length of clip a member may function in Congress it becomes a struggle of involvement that is improbable to be passed. The really construction of Congress itself encourages members to seek re-election for several footings by honoring the most senior members with places of power and influence. This makes incumbent politicians really hard to crush in an election, and it ensures that the most powerful people in the state will go on to be white males. But white males do non reflect the cultural and cultural make up of the United States. Nor do they stand for the many and varied involvements of their components. Term bounds would do it really hard for one cultural group to command the authorities. By furthering competition and by making a system where representatives must shortly go the delineated once more, term bounds set up a more representative and just regulating organic structure. In add-on, with the remotion of senior status one gets meritocracy ; with the citizen-legislator one becomes more cognizant of his components demands, as he is ne’er far from returning to them ; with competition the United States Congress can be held up as a genuinely representative arm of authorities that includes adult females, minorities, and white work forces in every bit powerful places. & # 8220 ; Whose authorities is it anyhow? With term bounds, it s [ the people s ] . & # 8221 ; ( 23 )

Endnotes

1 Fund, John H. & # 8220 ; Term Limitations: An Idea Whose Time Has Come & # 8221 ; Policy Analysis No. 141 October 30, 1996

2 Editorial & # 8220 ; Senate Tackles Term Limits & # 8221 ; The Boston Herald April 23, 1996

3 Levine, Herbert M. Point-Counterpoint: Reading in American Government St.Martin s Press, New York: 1995. 208

4 ibid, 208

5 Crane, Ed & # 8220 ; Campaign Reforms V. Term Limits & # 8221 ; The Washington Times June 26, 1996

6 Bandow, Doug & # 8220 ; The Political Revolution That Wasn T: Why Term Limits Are Needed Now More Than Ever & # 8221 ; Policy Analysis No. 259 September 5, 1996

7 ibid

8 Levine, 209

9 O Connor, Karen and Larry J. Sabato American Government: Rootss and Reform Allyn and Bacon, Massachusetts. 1996. 198

10 & # 8220 ; Thurmon-ator Looks Good to Interrupt Senate Records & # 8221 ; Time November 2, 1996

11 Petracca, Mark & # 8220 ; The Poison of Professional Politics & # 8221 ; Policy Analysis No. 151 May 10, 1991

12 Bandow

13 Petracca

14 Ferry, Jonathan & # 8220 ; Women Minorities and Term Limits: America s Path to a Representative Congress & # 8221 ; U.S. Term Limits Foundation Outlook Series Vol 3, No 2. July, 1994

15 ibid

16 Levine, 210

17 Petracca

18 Fund

19 ibid

20 ibid

21 ibid

22 Ehrenhalt, Alan The United States of Ambition: Politicians, Power, and the Pursuit of Office Random House, New York. 1991: 20

23 Jacob, Paul & # 8220 ; Whose Government is it Anyway? & # 8221 ; this article will look in the Journal of the West Los Angeles School of Law.

Bibliography

AllPolitics & # 8211 ; Ballots By States & # 8220 ; Ballot Measures by State & # 8221 ; October 30, 1996 www.allpolitics.ca

AllPolitics & # 8211 ; Term Limits Debate & # 8220 ; Term Limits Stall in Senate & # 8221 ; April 23, 1996 www.allpolitics.ca

AllPolitics & # 8211 ; South Carolina Senate Race & # 8220 ; Thurmon-ator Looks Good to Interrupt Senate Records & # 8221 ; November 2, 1996 Found at www.allpolitics.ca

Bandow, Doug & # 8220 ; Bias for Incumbents & # 8221 ; The Washington Times October 17, 1996 www.washtimes-weekly.com/wash_times

Bandow, Doug & # 8220 ; The Political Revolution that Wasn T: Why Term Limits are Needed Now More Than Ever & # 8221 ; Policy Analysis No. 259 September 5, 1996 www.cato.org/pubs/policyanalysis.html

& # 8220 ; Senate Tackles Term Limits & # 8221 ; The Boston Herald April 23, 1996 www.termlimits.org/index.shtml

Crane, Ed & # 8220 ; Campaign Reforms Vs. Term Limits & # 8221 ; The Washington Times June 26, 1996 www.washtimes_weekly.com

Ehrenhalt, Alan The United States of Ambition: Politicians, Power, and the Pursuit of Office Random House, New York. 1991

Ferry, Jonathan & # 8220 ; Women, Minorities and Term Limits: America s Path to a Representative Congress & # 8221 ; U.S. Term Limits Foundation Outlook Series July, 1994 Vol.3 No.2 www.termlimits.org/index.shtml

Fund, John H & # 8220 ; Term Limitation: An Idea Whose Time Has Come & # 8221 ; Policy Analysis No. 141 October 30, 1990 www.cato.org/pubs/pas/policyanalysis.html

& # 8220 ; Term Limits Excellent New Strategy & # 8221 ; The Florida Times Union October 1, 1996 www.termlimits.org/index.shtml

Jacob, Paul & # 8220 ; Choosing Term Limits & # 8221 ; The Washington Times August 7, 1996 www.termlimits.org

Jacob, Paul & # 8220 ; Whose Government is it Anyway? & # 8221 ; www.termlimits.org/index.shtml

Kolbe, John & # 8220 ; Term Limits Sledgehammer & # 8221 ; Phoenix Gazette June 7, 1996 www.termlimits.org

Levine, Herbert M. Point-Counterpoint: Readings in American Government St. Martin s Press, New York. 1995

Nelson, Lars-Erik & # 8220 ; A Very Particular Class of Federal Employee & # 8221 ; The Washington Post January 5, 1996

www.termlimits.org/index.shtml

O Connor, Karen and Larry J. Sabato American Government: Rootss and Reform Allyn and Bacon, Massachusetts. 1996

Petracca, Mark & # 8220 ; The Poison of Professional Politics & # 8221 ; Policy Analysis No. 151 May 10, 1996

www.cato.org/pubs/pas/policyanalysis..html