Willard Van Orman Quine Essay, Research Paper

Willard Van Orman Quine

& # 8220 ; If pressed to supplement Tweedledee & # 8217 ; s ostensive definition of logic with a dianoetic definition of the same topic, I would state that logic is the systematic survey of the logical truths. Pressed farther, I would state that a sentence is logically true if all sentences with its grammatical construction are true ( & # 8221 ; Citations from the Writings of Willard Van Orman Quine. & # 8221 ; ) . & # 8221 ; Often described as the first American philosopher of the 20th century, Willard Van Orman Quine is a important presence in affairs of symbolic logic, every bit good as other philosophical facets ( Kemerling ) . Born June 25, 1908 in Akron, Ohio, Quine underwent extended preparation in mathematics and doctrine at Oberlin College and Harvard University. He continued developing at Prague, under the direction of Rudolf Carnap. Some of his more widely known publications include: Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Word and Object, From a Logical Point of View, and Philosophy of Logic ( & # 8221 ; Quine, Willard Van Orman & # 8221 ; Britannica CD ) . Throughout all of Quine & # 8217 ; s theories and publications, the cardinal construct is that of Logical Empiricism, and the rejection of Logical Positivism.

In order to understand the footing of Logical Empiricism, it is necessary that one understand the comparative difference between the constructs of analytical logic and man-made logic. An analytic statement is one of expressed logical truth. For illustration, the statements, & # 8220 ; President Johnson is President Johnson & # 8221 ; and & # 8220 ; Either it is raining out or it is non raining out & # 8221 ; are those of expressed logical truths. The first implies the construct of rigorous individuality, & # 8220 ; a = a & # 8221 ; . The 2nd reflects the tautology of the signifier & # 8220 ; p or non p & # 8221 ; . In his & # 8220 ; Two Dogmas of Empiricism & # 8221 ; , Quine does non challenge this fact. However, upon scrutiny of the sentence & # 8220 ; All unmarried mans are single work forces & # 8221 ; , Quine finds strife. This sentence is customarily referred to as analytic, because it is tacitly of the signifier of & # 8220 ; a = a & # 8221 ; , translated to & # 8220 ; All single work forces are unmarried work forces & # 8221 ; . In this illustration, a impression of synonymity between the definitions of the looks & # 8220 ; unmarried man & # 8221 ; and & # 8220 ; unmarried adult male & # 8221 ; is presupposed. Continuing, the statements & # 8220 ; All crows are black & # 8221 ; and & # 8220 ; Johnny is shouting & # 8221 ; are deemed man-made, for the ground that it & # 8217 ; s significance does non depend on the truthfulness of the separate footings, but that is it is an averment about a group of objects in the empirical universe. The sentence, & # 8220 ; Johnny is shouting & # 8221 ; does non try to determine that every individual by the name of Johnny is shouting, but merely that this peculiar Johnny is ( & # 8221 ; Quine & # 8217 ; s Two Dogmas of Empiricism & # 8221 ; ) . Therefore, & # 8220 ; a judgement is analytic if the construct of it & # 8217 ; s predicate is already contained in that of it & # 8217 ; s capable & # 8221 ; , nevertheless it is man-made & # 8220 ; if the constructs of its topic and predicate are independent & # 8221 ; . & # 8220 ; Alternatively, a proposition is analytic if it is true simply by virtuousness of the significance of its footings or tautologous ; otherwise, it is man-made ( Kemerling ) . & # 8221 ; This apprehension is the footing for Quine & # 8217 ; s Logical Empiricism.

& # 8220 ; Quine believes the really n

otion of analyticity to be spurious.” Quine’s position can be expressed through a statement by Olshewsky: “If analytic statements are true by virtuousness of being capable of decrease to logical truths, by virtuousness of what are these logical truths true? If by virtuousness of conventions, so are they arbitrary? If by virtuousness of some kind of rational penetration, so are they non synthetic instead than analytic? If by virtuousness of the significance of the logical conjunctions, do such significance finally necessitate some kind of practical justification.” Quine disapproves of the term analytic, because in order for such a thing to be, it must be assumed that “things” have “meanings” , in such a mode that these significances can be equated with each other in a non-subjective mode. Quine is of the belief decrease, “the belief that each meaningful statement is tantamount to some logical concept upon footings which refer to immediate experience” , and analyticity are dependent upon one another if logical empiricist philosophy is to stay consistent ( ”Quine’s Two Dogmas of Empiricism” ) .

Last, W.V.O. Quine besides rejects the thought of Logical Positivism. The footing of logical positivism is that a & # 8220 ; differentiation between those statements in which their truth or falseness depends upon the significance of the footings involved and those in which their truth or falseness is a affair of empirical and discernible fact & # 8221 ; can be drawn. This differentiation is thought by most empiricists to be the foundation for a recreation between the deductive and empirical scientific disciplines. Quine, in & # 8220 ; Two Dogmas of Empiricism & # 8221 ; and other publications, argues that this differentiation is impossible to pull, and hence argue against logical positivism itself ( & # 8221 ; Western Philosophical Schools and Doctrines & # 8221 ; ) .

Overall, Willard Van Orman Quine supports the position that logical positivism is based on analyticity, and because analyticity is impossible, logical positivism is, in bend, an unsupported thought. He rejects the belief in analyticity of Immanuel Kant, Hume, and Rudolf Carnap, alternatively for the belief of Olshewsky, that all statements are man-made, because an analytic statement would presuppose the being of cosmopolitan significances. His parts to the development of modern-day doctrine involve these alterations of the empiricist traditions of pragmatism and logical positivism ( Kemerling ) . These parts combined with Quine & # 8217 ; s publications distinguish him as the most of import analytic philosopher of the 20th century ( & # 8221 ; W.V.O. Quine & # 8221 ; ) .

Bibliography

Kemerling, Garth. & # 8220 ; Philosophy Pages. & # 8221 ; Online WWW. Http: //www.philosophypages.com ( 2000 )

& # 8220 ; Quine, Willard Van Orman. & # 8221 ; Britannica CD. CDROM. ( 1997 )

& # 8220 ; Quine & # 8217 ; s & # 8216 ; Two Dogmas of Empiricism & # 8217 ; . & # 8221 ; Online WWW. Hypertext transfer protocol: //www.the-spa.com/thirteen/quine2.htm.

& # 8220 ; Citations from the Writings of Willard Van Orman Quine. & # 8221 ; Online WWW. Http: //www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/history/wqq001.htm. ( May 26, 1997 )

& # 8220 ; Western Philosophical Schools and Doctrines. & # 8221 ; Britannica CD. CDROM. ( 1997 )

& # 8220 ; W.V.O. Quine. & # 8221 ; Online WWW. Http: //www.gis.net/~d13/quine.htm