Wittgenstein Essay, Research Paper

Why did Wittgenstein come to name the propositions of his Tractatus & # 8220 ; senseless & # 8221 ; ( 6.54 ) ?

The decisions and concluding philosophical place of Wittgenstein & # 8217 ; s Tractatus undermine and deny the possibility of his methods and aims. Namely he concludes that metaphysical speculation and the effort to reply unanswerable inquiries is mindless. Since the Tractatus throughout postulates solutions to the inquiries of world, the meaningfulness of linguistic communication and the possibility of human cognition it has to all purposes contradicted itself and rendered itself a mindless philosophical aberrance. This is non to state nevertheless that it has become useless or invalid as a philosophical probe. The purpose of the Tractatus is to demo & # 8220 ; the merely purely right method & # 8221 ; of doctrine, which conversely destroys the Orthodox remit of doctrine. As many of his coevalss believed, Wittgenstein saw doctrine as been cluttered by a clutter of baseless metaphysical concepts, entities proposed to be merely to supply a foundation for assorted theories. The logical rationalists, the Vienna Circle and an mixture of schools of philosophical idea saw these as the chief stumbling block to obtaining the advancement of doctrine. Wittgenstein uses the Tractatus to extinguish these entities from doctrine by demoing that their creative activity is illicit and senseless. This is implicit in purpose and ground why he comes to do this claim ( 6.54 ) . We must besides understand the strategic ground why he does this, how this claim is used to develop an informative image of his method. Finally as we shall see although this decision is reached to sabotage metaphysical philosophical probe it is critical to the coherency and the credibleness of the concluding measure ( denying the cogency of this type of metaphysical method ) that the logical procedures of the Tractatus are valid. Why within the context of the Tractatus & # 8217 ; s probe is Wittgenstein led to this denial and how does it technically fit into what he has said?

Wittgenstein compares the Tractatus to a ladder that must be climbed, merely to be thrown off once it is used. The Tractatus is supposed to demo us the mistake of traditional signifiers of philosophical question and supply an illustration of how if philosophical jobs are addressed in the correct, strict mode they are non solved but dissolved. This is the motive and the object of such a statement. It is critical to understand what Wittgenstein is seeking to accomplish and to understand the larger vision of what is being shown. Once this apprehension is reached such a absurd claim as 6.54 can do perfect sense. Of class whether this undertaking was a success or non or whether it is even comprehendible is unfastened to debate, but we must understand how Wittgenstein comes to this decision in such a manner as to turn out what he claims to be unprovable.

There is a symmetricalness and signifier to the Tractatus which is non happenstance. Each elucidation relates to others in such a manner that the work is best viewed as an organic whole, non a progressive statement that uses certain premises to reason from a footing towards a decision. Wittgenstein is non a foundationalist philosopher set uping statements and averments on which to build a system or theory. Wittgenstein & # 8217 ; s aims are inexplicit in every elucidation ( or at least aggregation of elucidations ) . Wittgenstein does non try to develop a concrete statement to demark the bounds of doctrine, cognition and what we may talk of. Alternatively he demonstrates through the description of logical theory of representation how these boundaries are overstepped and therefore where they lie. This competently mirrors the kernel one of Wittgenstein & # 8217 ; s cardinal thoughts, that the signifier of representation ( the manner logical signifier is shared between representation and what is represented ) can non be described or said but merely shown. Wittgenstein is seeking to demo that we can non speak of what we can non cognize and that to make so is mindless. Gaining that it is paradoxical to try to turn out this he alternatively shows it. Wittgenstein does non as such semen to the position that all the propositions of the Tractatus are mindless but instead leads us there increasingly ; the thought that the propositions are senseless is nevertheless there throughout, an built-in portion of the work. It is stated explicitly at the terminal to clear up what has been inbuilt all along and to bind the undertaking together. The disk shape of the Tractatus is wholly calculated, Wittgenstein begins by saying that & # 8221 ; The universe is everything that is the instance & # 8221 ; and his penultimate proposition is the 1 that is at manus claiming the inanity of all that has been written. He starts by saying what can be said and after 70 pages or so of elucidation returns to this by saying what can non sanely be said- viz. anything that is non the universe and hence non the instance, i.e. the contents of the Tractatus. Was the Tractatus to contemplate any other inquiry of doctrine it would neglect to state anything with any warrant or certainty. To be wholly accurate it does neglect to state anything with any warrant and in making so proves it & # 8217 ; s initial premiss. To disregard his ain work as senseless may first look unusual but when seen in this visible radiation, as an built-in portion of a presentation in a work that consists of interconnected and mutualist facts, it becomes coherent.

I would venture though that his last comment, matrix 7, the lone matrix to stand entirely, is a different instance. The ground it has no elucidation is exactly because it is an apparent fact ( in the position of Wittgenstein ) that we can non talk of what we can non cognize. To clarify further would be to research into the kingdom of metaphysics, to in vain try to detect something of which we can non talk and to happen the unfathomable grounds for this. To make so would be to step into the kingdom of what Kant describes ( and dismisses ) as & # 8220 ; nonnatural world & # 8221 ; the impossible place of sing the universe from without in an overview that is distinguishable from 1s ain point of perceptual experience. As it was to Kant ( albeit for different rhenium

asons ) , to Wittgenstein this is a self-contradictory thought and the effort to make so is the really folly which leads us to many of the errors of metaphysics. Hence this is simply a statement of what can be known, unsullied by probe, which is the lone manner it can retain its cogency. Of class, as with the remainder of the Tractatus, this phrase echoes with the idea of the all the other matrices in the work. The point has already been demonstrated but demonstrated though negation, taging the boundries of human cognition Wittgenstein has over stepped them. This degage phrase is the positive avowal of what has been proved, the valid decision to all that has been said before but unencumbered by the impossible and deceptive load of cogent evidence.

Wittgenstein does non come to this statement at random simply because it happens to accommodate his intent. Within the fact-finding construction of the Tractatus statement 6.54 is a logical if non inevitable consequence. As has been said the Tractatus consists of series of statements or elucidations which clarify Wittgenstein & # 8217 ; s statements. These elucidations are broken into seven subdivisions each one incorporating an built-in statement or place. The farther statements in each subdivision ( other than the 7th ) serve to spread out, refine and repeat these places. In this manner the statement develops whilst ever being interlinked.

& # 8220 ; The universe is everything that is the instance & # 8221 ; ( 1 ) Wittgenstein is here stating what there is that can be pictured. He expands this to explicate that what is the instance are & # 8220 ; facts, non things & # 8221 ; ( 1.1 ) . It is the agreements of things that are facts and the objects of visualizing. These facts are independent and can be non existent or existent.

This brings him to the construct of & # 8220 ; atomic facts & # 8221 ; . These are the edifice blocks of existence- the facts that exist and therefore constitute reality- & # 8220 ; What is the instance, the fact, is the being of atomic facts & # 8221 ; ( 2 ) . These atomic facts are combinations of objects ( 2.01 ) and are objects are linked together within these facts ( 2.03 ) and the signifier of this combination is construction ( 2.033 ) . In comprehending we make ourselves images of facts ( 2.1 ) and these images are a theoretical account of world ( 2.12 ) Here Wittgenstein is stating that our images portion the construction of world, the construction in which objects form facts. This is the signifier of representation. & # 8211 ; & # 8220 ; the possibility that the things are combined with one another as are the elements of the image & # 8221 ; ( 2.51 ) . This is how what we perceive is linked with world. The important statement is that & # 8220 ; the image can non put itself outside of it & # 8217 ; s signifier of representation & # 8221 ; ( 2.174 ) That is to state that the image must portion the signifier of what it represents and can non stand for it & # 8217 ; s signifier of representation.. Regardless of how we look at them we will be unable to see what makes these likewise. The rule that a signifier of representation can non be represented in the sense of described, merely represented in the sense of shown, is really of import as it is this premiss that leads to statement ( 6.53 ) . For a proposition to represent of itself would take to paradox, such as Russell & # 8217 ; s Barber paradox.

It is this image which we have in our heads so & # 8220 ; the logical image of the facts is the idea & # 8221 ; ( 3 ) . When this idea is & # 8220 ; expressed noticeably through the senses & # 8221 ; we have a proposition represented through a & # 8220 ; propositional mark & # 8221 ; . This is elucidated throughout the 3rd subdivision and leads to the statement that & # 8220 ; The idea is the important proposition. & # 8221 ; ( 4 ) . This patterned advance basically describes these images as holding logical signifier which can be is the footing of the sense of ideas and propositions and how they can pass on something new to us. They all portion a logical signifier that can convey intending to us. Logical signifier is the province of personal businesss in logical infinite that is, justly or wrongly, represented by logical images. Wittgenstein besides discusses in item how this affects logic and linguistic communication, what roles names have in linguistic communication and their relation to propositions and the nature of tautology and contradictions. His probes into this country are rather involved. For this ground it will be beyond the range of this essay ( and the range of its writer ) to measure them decently. However it is adequate to acknowledge that Wittgensteinhas found with the bounds of logic that the bounds can merely be dicovered from without as all logic leads to tautology and & # 8220 ; all propositions of logic say the same thing.That is, nothing. & # 8221 ; ( 5.43 ) Furthermore linguistic communication limits the universe to being & # 8220 ; my universe & # 8221 ; , the universe of the I. For this ground it is impossible to asseverate that & # 8220 ; this and this there is in the universe, that there is non. This would necessitate one to step outside the bounds of this personal universe. Hence it is that when we talk of metaphysical issues or doubt the being of the universe that we are turn toing inquiries without answeres and therefore nonmeaningful inquiries. It is besides why the propositions of the Tractatus are mindless. It is exactly because the existent statement can take to this decision in this manner that Wittgenstein is able measure outside his statement whilst retaining it & # 8217 ; s relevancy. This proficient facet is critical to the overall coherency of his work.

Wittgenstein & # 8217 ; s statement & # 8217 ; s are non without mistake. They are idiosyncratic in both content and presentation every bit good as deeply involved and complex. Therefore there are many nuances which have non been to the full investigated or understood ( surely non in this essay but possibly non by anyone ) . Some of the statements appear to be contradictory and many appear to be insufficiently justified. However when read as a whole and the deductions of each claim seems to back up the others and the work seems to go self-evident. None more so than the concluding claim that to talk of countries of & # 8216 ; knowledge & # 8217 ; that we can hold no justification of is invalid. This is proved by the action of logical cogent evidence and the defense of that logical cogent evidence on it & # 8217 ; s ain evidences. The statement shows the & # 8220 ; purely correct method & # 8221 ; of doctrine and the bounds of

Bibliography

Kenny, A-The Wittgenstein Reader, – ( Oxford, Blackwell,1994 )