Essay, Research Paper

The thesis in the article The beginnings of the World War, by Sidney B. Fay, can clearly be stated as the account for World War I. Fay states that no one state is responsible for the creative activity of the war. Furthermore, he goes on to explicate that each of the European state s leaders did, or failed to make certain things to arouse the other states into a war. Fay provinces, One must abandon the pronouncement of the Versailles Treaty that Germany and her Alliess were entirely responsible. It was a pronouncement exacted by masters from vanquished, under the influence of the sightlessness, ignorance, hatred, and the propagandist misconceptions to which war had given rise. ( Fay, The Origins of the World War ) . His chief statements are his accounts of how each state was responsible for the creative activity of the war. His first account is that of how Serbia was partially responsible. Fay explains that Serbia knew that by non co-operating with the Austrian authorities over the deductions of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand blackwash they were indirectly fixing for a war they would contend but did non desire. Fay says that Austria was more responsible for the war than any other power but non in military onslaught, but more in the signifier of self-defense. He makes it clear that Austria was justified in their conflict and that they didn Ts have to, sit back and await the taking apart at the custodies of its neighbours. ( Fay, The beginnings of the World War ) . Fay believes that Berchtold wanted a local war with Serbia but knew and was content with the fact that the remainder of Europe could really easy go involved with the war. Fay s 3rd state s account was that of Germany. He believed that Germany did non desire a war and tried to debar one wholly. It is his belief that since Austria was Germany s merely reliable ally, they were dragged into the war. Furthermore, he explains that Germany s geographical location, being in the center of the struggle between France and Russia, they had small pick in the affair and had to support their district every bit good as Austria-Hungary s. Fay s 4th state and major power discussed, was Russia. He believed that Russia supported Serbia because of the frequent counsel and encouragement given at Belgrade, and if a war were to interrupt out they would more than happy to contend along with the belief of France and Britain assisting out. Furthermore, at the same clip as Russia was transporting on diplomatic dealingss they were in secret fixing military steps which alarmed both Germany and Austria. Fay believed that France s portion in the creative activity of the war was non every bit clear as the remainder of the major powers, although they did assure Soviet union that they would back up them as an ally in forestalling Austria from occupying Serbia. Fay so begins to explicate how Sir Edward Grey was in favour or continuing peace but his efforts failed owing partially to Germany s attitude. He feels that Sir Edward could hold prevented the war if he had foremost, told France and Russia and given a strong warning to Germany that in a European war England would take the side of the France-Russia confederation and organize the Triple Entente. This would hold, led Bethmann to guarantee an earlier and more effectual force per unit area on Austria ; and it would hold possibly thereby have prevented the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia ( Fay, The Origins of the World War ) . Second, Sir Edward Grey could hold listened to Germany, and warned France and Russia that if a war was to travel on, England would stay a impersonal party. This in bend would hold given Russia a vacillation with there deployment of military personnels and at St. Petersburg France may hold been more cautious. Fay farther explains that Sir Edward Grey could non state that England would take the side of Russia and France because he had a Cabinet equally divided, which meant that he was diffident if his people would back up his sentiment in the war attempt. Grey besides wrote in his memoirs that he could hold resigned but that would hold put France in a tough place because they were numbering on British support. Grey so decided to make nil and remain impersonal until of class Germany entered into impersonal evidences, which was Belgium. This act by Germany gave the British Cabinet the determination to come in the war on the Franco-Russian side. His secondary ground for doing the move on siding with the French was the fact that he had a moral duty to help France based entirely on past naval conversations, and his belief that Germany was unjustly supporting Austria. Fay

believed that Italy and Belgium had small influence in the creative activity of the war, but did in fact see the danger they were rapidly acquiring involved in. He so concludes that the finding of fact of Germany and her Alliess being responsible for the war was historically unsound.

The thesis of the article, Germany s Aims in the First World War, can be clearly stated as Germany s nonsubjective and claim to universe power. Fischer can be quoted as stating, Germany found herself, as Moltke put it, in a status of hopeless isolation which was turning of all time more hopeless. ( Fischer, Germany s Aims in the First World War ) . Fischer s first account for this statement is that of Germany s rapid addition in population over the late 1800 s and early 1900 s, while France s population remained approximately the same. He believes that Germany s young person in population gave the national consciousness a feeling, which reinforced the demand for market and industrial enlargement. Furthermore, the life anticipation of the Germans was on an slope, and the babyhood decease rate was on the diminution. Fischer was doing the point that Germany was developing into a extremely industrialised state and the job of happening markets and natural stuffs to back up her population was turning progressively pressing. ( Fischer, Germany s Aims in the First World War ) Fischer was speedy to indicate out that at the clip economic enlargement was the footing of Germany s political universe diplomatic negotiations. This demand and desire for economic enlargement brought away Germany s ultimate aim, which was to claim universe power. Fischer so explains how Germany s assurance was greatly consuming in their military strength as the Gallic and Russians were rapidly bettering theirs. He besides states that although Germany found themselves in a hazardous state of affairs, they were confident they could win. Moltke was quoted as stating, We are ready, and the Oklahoman it comes, the better for us. Fischer was speedy to support the statement that much of the German propaganda after the war had maintained that the war was forced upon them, or at least that they all stumbled into the war. Furthermore, shortly after the war broke out during the crises on the Marne and in Galicia, the Austrian Alliess asked the Germans for aid against the Russian ground forcess and were refused. Fischer defended this statement purchase citing the message by Berchtold. He said, the Austrians originally decided to travel to war chiefly on the fact that they were ensured by the German Emperor, and of the German Imperial Chancellor, that they regarded the state of affairs as suited, and would be glad if Austria showed themselves in earnest. Fischer was able to utilize official paperss to turn out that during the July crises, the Emperor, the German military leaders, and the Foreign Ministry were forcing Austria-Hungary to strike against Serbia without hold. Furthermore, Fischer went on to state that if Austria was non to follow that the Germans would despatch an ultimatum to Serbia demonstrated in footings as to do a war between Austria and Serbia more than likely. Fischer so points out that this alone proves the deliberate hazard taken by the Germans of a Continental war against Russia and France. In retrospect, this deliberate hazard taken by the Germans was seen as a win-win state of affairs so to talk. They believed that they had the military force to win this Continental war, if it was to come to that. They besides in bend had the belief that France may panic, and advise peace. This would hold been a diplomatic win in the German s books. This would hold split Russia from France and insulate both without war. Although this 2nd point was believed to be improbable by the German s it still was a happy, and reassuring possibility. Fischer so went on to state that Hollweg told Bulow that any war that was to happen would last at the most three to four months. Hollweg so went on to explicate the possibilities of a friendly relationship with England, and so through England, a similar friendly relationship with France. He so stated that this would convey forth a ternary confederation with England, France, and Germany all snuff outing the being of Russia, which would easy endanger the civilisation of Europe. Fischer so concludes his essay in Hollweg s reference to the Central Committee of the Reichstag at the beginning of October during the of all time increasing argument on the limitless pigboat warfare. Fischer states that, this outlines Germany s existent guilt, her changeless over-estimation of her ain powers, and her misjudgment of worlds.