Foreign Drug Policy Essay, Research Paper

Since the debut of narcotics in the United States, American society has felt the effects of drug usage in all facets of day-to-day life. As drug usage heightened to new degrees in the 1980 & # 8217 ; s the Bush Administration chose to declare a & # 8220 ; war & # 8221 ; on drugs. Never before in our history had offense been combated with war. This war led to the mobilization of the United States & # 8217 ; tactics for get the better ofing illegal drug usage in the U.S. Alternatively of taking to battle drug usage by seting greater attempt into cut downing demand the Bush Administration chose to diminish illegal drug supply. This needed cut downing drug supplies from Latin America, an country where most of the illegal drugs are produced and trafficked. The Clinton Administration has chosen to keep the drug & # 8220 ; war & # 8221 ; . The disposal has non changed the distribution of financess that are used for battling the drug job. The drug war has continued to show limited success, yet mobilization has increased along with disbursement. Since the beginning of the drug & # 8220 ; war & # 8221 ; Latin American states have been targeted by the United States. Latin American states are believed to be the among the major illegal drug manufacturers in the universe. Illicit drug cultivation has more than tripled in the last four or five old ages. Today, Colombia is the universe & # 8217 ; s taking beginning of cocaine and the taking agriculturist of coca, the natural stuff for cocaine ( Reuters ) . In 1986 Washington passed the International Narcotics Control Act which required foreign states to collaborate with U.S. attempts in drug-enforcement. The states could non be & # 8220 ; certified & # 8221 ; by the U.S. unless they complied with U.S. demands. The executive order given by the President is passed through Congress, where it is negotiated and so ratified. Certification means a continuance of assistance from the United States and additions U.S. favour in international fiscal state of affairss. Most Latin American states oppose the procedure but agree to the Torahs demanded ( Casteneda ) . Colombia is included in the group of states seeking re-certification every twelvemonth. In 1996 Colombia did non have enfranchisement, but was given a & # 8220 ; critical national involvement release & # 8221 ; . In 1997 Colombia once more failed to be certified by the U.S. because it was believed that the Colombian authorities was non making everything in its power to battle narcotics. The punishments for decertification included the prohibition of more than $ 1.5 billion in U.S. trade funding and investing warrants. & # 8220 ; Decertification & # 8221 ; besides means that the U.S. is obliged to vote against many-sided loans for Colombia in international fiscal establishments. Yet the jurisprudence specifically allows U.S. support for counter-narcotics plans to go on, and has no direct affect on these plans ( OICJ ) . In 1999 the Clinton Administration decided to raise the countenances against Colombia and allow it partial enfranchisement. President Bill Clinton & # 8217 ; s statement read & # 8220 ; By the virtuousness of the authorization vested in me by subdivision 490 ( B ) ( 1 ) ( B ) of the Act, I hereby find that it is in the critical national involvements of the United States to attest the undermentioned major illicit drug bring forthing and/or major illicit drug theodolite states: Cambodia, Colombia, Pakistan and Paraguay & # 8221 ; ( Weekly Copilation of Presidential Documents ) . The Administration felt that Colombia & # 8217 ; s counter-narcotics attempts have made important betterment since 1998 and with the new presidential disposal in Colombia it is felt that betterment will go on. Colombian jurisprudence enforcement has increased ictuss, apprehensions and countered private aircraft in drug trafficking. Eradication of harvests has greatly increased in attempts to battle coca cultivation. Areas of concern for the U.S. have remained the judicial procedure and the extradition of & # 8220 ; drug Godheads & # 8221 ; to the U.S ( CNN ) . The enfranchisement was merely partial nevertheless because the disposal believed that Colombia & # 8217 ; s counter-narcotics attempts still faced serious lacks ( CNN ) . The enfranchisement of Colombia means greater easiness for entree to U.S. assistance to counter-narcotics attempts. In add-on to assistance, Colombia would see fewer economic disadvantages because of enfranchisement. Critics of the enfranchisement procedure claim that it amendss a state & # 8217 ; s self-respect. It is besides seen by many Latin American states to be one-sided, hypocritical and arbitrary. It is felt the enfranchisement is capable to U.S. sentiment towards the state and serves U.S. national involvements. There have been few strong efforts to revoke the 1986 International Narcotics Control Act. Latin American states have non attempted long-run lobbying or diplomatic steps to set an terminal the enfranchisement procedure. Despite resistance to the plan, most Latin American states are content with being certified. Contending for abrogation may take old ages and do many output & # 8220 ; decertification & # 8221 ; by Congress. Latin American states have chosen to accept the benefits of enfranchisement over the possible costs of contending to revoke the procedure ( Casteneda ) . Colombia now receives more U.S. security aid than any other state in the hemisphere. The aid has traditionally been in the signifier of military aid. Much of the assistance received by Colombia has been military hardware and preparation for soldiers. Money has besides been spent on Blackhawk choppers, boats, arms and surveillance systems. It is this mobilization of fiscal assistance to Colombia, which has led to such terrible human rights misdemeanors. Over the past decennary the U.S. has contributed over one billion dollars to battle drugs in Colombia with small success. The U.S. has provided more than $ 600m to the Colombian military and national constabulary in the past seven old ages ( WOLA ) . Illicit drug production and trafficking continues to lift yearly and Colombia continues to be the universe & # 8217 ; s taking coca manufacturer ( WOLA ) . Colombian president Pastrana visited the U.S. in October of 1998. Part of the intent of his visit was to bespeak more aid from the U.S. for counter-narcotics operations. With the election of Andres Pastrana to the Colombian presidential term U.S. foreign policy has been even more aggressive in the battle against narcotics. At the White House reaching ceremonial Pastrana remarked: & # 8220 ; We seek both to negociate and to beef up our armed forces. We need an ground forces to continue the peace and an ground forces to protect democracy and an ground forces that defends human rights and the regulation of the jurisprudence. We believe that in the terminal there is no such things as democracy without regard for human rights ( CNN ) . & # 8221 ; Colombian President Pastrana has requested a program for $ 3.5 billion in assistance to back up counter-narcotics attempts to be distributed over the following three old ages. Cardinal to this petition is an addition in military assistance, to $ 500m yearly for the following three old ages, up from $ 289m in FY1998 and $ 70m in FY 1997 ( INL ) . President Pastrana petitions for increasing support for the drug war have merely farther backed the Clinton & # 8217 ; s Administrations attempts to make so. In FY98, the U.S. Government, provided Colombia with $ 43 million in support of counter-narcotics operations, an extra $ 14 million for chopper ascents, and about $ 21 million in air power support and $ 41 million in equipment and services drawn from U.S. reserves ( INL ) . The 1998 assistance bundle included the arming of the Colombian chopper fleet with 20mm cannons, to be used in harvest obliteration. In the past assistance has been listed in the U.S. authorities & # 8217 ; s & # 8220 ; class 4 & # 8243 ; , for non-hostile operations. The 1998 bundle was classified as & # 8220 ; class 2 & # 8243 ; , for military operations short of war ( Economist ) . In FY99, it is expected that U.S. support will make $ 203 million ( including $ 96 million for six Black Hawk choppers ) doing Colombia the 3rd largest receiver of U.S. aid after Israel and Egypt ( INL ) . The Colombian National Police have been provided with preparation for anti-narcotics aeronauts, mechanics, and logicians. It has besides been furnished with parts and fuel for the CNP & # 8217 ; s anti-narcotics air division dwelling of 42 choppers and 17 fixed wing aircraft, some of which are U.S. , owned ( INL ) . The Pentagon claims that the Colombian authorities now wants to absolute bargain 14 U.S. Blackhawk military choppers at a cost of $ 221m with no official determination holding been made to this point ( CNN ) . On December 1, 1998 the U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen and Colombian defence Minister Rodrigo Lloreda announced the sign language of a cooperation understanding between armed forcess. The understanding enacted a bilateral & # 8220 ; working group & # 8221 ; of Colombian and U.S. defence functionaries and the formation of an ground forces battalion devoted entirely to counter-narcotics operations ( WOLA ) . A big portion of the U.S. financess is to be spent implementing four new & # 8220 ; counter-drug & # 8221 ; battalions. The intent of these battalions is to supply increased security to patrol counter-narcotics action in certain guerilla held countries ( Economist ) . Soon 75 U.S. Army Rangers are supervising the preparation of about 1000 Colombian battalion military personnels ( WOLA ) . The Republican-lead U.S. Congress has been a long-standing advocator of supplying extra military choppers and military trainers to Colombia ( CNN ) . Republicans have been at the forepart of suggesting statute law to direct assistance to Colombia. House of Representatives Speaker J. Dennis Hastert, House Government Reform Committee Chairman Dan Burton, and Senator Jesse Helms have developed aggressive policy to help Colombia in battling cocaine production ( Congressional Quart. Weekly Report ) . In October of this twelvemonth President Clinton released a statement which called for the redistribution of financess from the Department of Defense, from the Department of Justice, Department of State and Department of Transportation. These financess in the sum of $ 72.55 m were to be used & # 8220 ; for the intent of supplying international anti-narcotics aid to Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Panama. & # 8221 ; Harmonizing to Clinton, the financess were redirected because & # 8220 ; it is in the national involvement of the United States & # 8221 ; ( Weekly Comp. Presidential Doc. ) . In October of 1995 Clinton had declared the state of affairs in Colombia a & # 8220 ; national exigency & # 8221 ; under the National Emergencies Act. Every twelvemonth since, President Clinton has extended the act for another twelvemonth. In October the President once more extended the national exigency, as it was felt that the state of affairs in Colombia continues to present an unusual and extraordinary menace to the U.S. ( NACLA ) . White House drug tsar Barry McCaffrey testified in forepart of a U.S. congressional subcommittee stating: & # 8220 ; In Colombia, the melding of guerrilla motions, or in some instances paramilitary groups, an international drug trafficking organisations has created an unprecedented menace to the regulation of jurisprudence, democratic establishments and the really fabric of society & # 8221 ; ( CNN ) . McCaffrey has called for every bit much as $ 1 billion in exigency financess for Colombia and other states ( CNN ) . The Clinton Administration claims to pattern the policy of guaranting that aid financess are non provided to authorities forces accused of perpetrating human rights misdemeanors. This policy is found in Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act. The President has officially stated that no aid would be provided to & # 8220 ; any unit of any foreign state & # 8217 ; s security forces if that unit is believably alleged to hold committed gross misdemeanors of human rights unless the authorities of such state is taking

effective measures to bring the responsible member of that unit to justice” (Weekly Comp. Presidential Doc. ). Although the U.S. claims that it will not support human rights violators, evidence suggest that U.S. aid is actually contributing to warfare and human rights violations in Colombia. The militarization of the drug war has led to the displacement, murder and suffering of thousands of Colombians. The policy of the Clinton Administration in Colombia has been subject to many criticisms. The main concern critics have is the relationship between U.S. funding and human rights violations committed in Colombia. Several organizations ranging from the Colombian National Police to anti-guerilla paramilitary groups have been responsible for thousands of deaths in Colombia. These groups receive U.S. aid both directly and indirectly There are several arguments against U.S. aid to Colombia. One major argument says that the U.S. is further militarizing Colombia in order to serve its own purpose of maintaining stability there. This assumption buries the idea that the Colombian government uses anti-narcotics funds for other purposes, which include combating Marxist guerillas and supporting paramilitary forces to combat the guerillas as well. Another argument says that the U.S. has created the idea of “narco-guerillas” to justify its military aid increases over the past decade. South America’s longest running guerilla war has killed over 35,000 Colombians over the last decade (Amnesty International). In Colombia’s internal conflict, the organizations involved have limited direct confrontations and instead attack the opposition’s alleged sympathizers- usually unarmed civilians. Guerrillas, paramilitaries and national security forces have all been responsible for massive human rights violations. Yet it is the government forces and paramilitaries which have utilized U.S. foreign assistance (WOLA). The largest guerilla organizations in Colombia are FARC and ELN. Although FARC taxes coca cultivation and cocaine production in southern Colombia their connections to drugs is not what U.S. foreign policy claims and does not justify counter-narcotics policy. General McCaffrey has continuously referred to Colombian insurgents as “narco-guerrillas” and has suggested that it is “silly at this point” to try to distinguish between counter-narcotics efforts and the war against insurgents. The conceived concept of “narco-guerillas” justifies U.S. funding and militarization of the counter-narcotics efforts (WOLA). With the justification that fighting the guerillas is part of the “war on drugs”, Colombian security forces and paramilitary forces have conducted operations in FARC controlled regions of Colombia. The new counter-narcotics battalions are scheduled to operate in the southern coca-growing region, an area under FARC control, and contribute to counterinsurgency efforts (WOLA). Paramilitary forces are armed civilian forces that are in conflict with right-wing Marxist guerilla groups. It is estimated that paramilitary forces carry out over 70% of human rights violations (WOLA). Although declared illegal in 1989 paramilitary forces united in 1996 to form the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Amnesty International). These paramilitary groups carry out counterinsurgency operations throughout Colombia. Several groups have been labeled “death squads” as a result of their reputations for atrocities and murders. Many are linked to the Colombian government and the Colombian National Police (WOLA). The attack on the Village of Puerto Alvira last May is an example of the most recent violence by paramilitary forces. The attack left nearly twenty villagers dead and several others “disappeared.” Also in May, paramilitary forces raided several poor neighborhoods in Barrancabermeja and nearly a dozen people were killed while over two dozen were “disappeared.” It is believed that the groups responsible for this violence have been United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia. These are only a few of the many examples of the violence committed by paramilitary organizations (Amnesty International). The Colombian National Police continue to practice severe human rights violations and deal with paramilitary forces. Colombian army forces carry out counterinsurgency operations themselves under the anti “narco-guerrilla” guise. Two army generals have been retired because alleged human rights violations yet other violators remain protected. Examples include Brigadier General Jaime Humberto Uscategui, now head of Colombia’s War College. In July of 1997 paramilitary forces attacked and massacred the town of Mapiripan leaving nearly 40 peasants dead. Uscategui served as commander of the army’s Seventh Brigade during this period and ignored calls from witnesses to the killings allowing the massacre to go on (WOLA). Human Rights groups and some political analysts argue that the Clinton Administration is seeking to get a stronger position in how the internal war in Colombia is fought by setting up the counter-narcotics battalions (CNN). The battalions will be used to give the U.S. a more direct position in the internal conflict against Marxists rebels. The Washington Office of Latin America has specifically criticized current U.S. International Drug Policy. Several factors break down U.S. policy economically exposing the most basic flaws. First supply side logic is fundamentally flawed. Supply is targeted to increase prices and dissuade drug use. Yet by increasing prices new producers are drawn into the market and supply increases increasing supply. Suppression tactics in one area of production leads to the growth of production in another. The result has been a cycle of increased supply and cheaper narcotics (WOLA). This tactic cannot economically succeed. Secondly, U.S. International Drug Policy fails to address poverty and inequality in Latin America. These issues are at the root of the drug cultivation. Peasant farmers cultivate coca because it is guaranteed to sell as opposed to legal crops, which do not have as strong of a market. These peasants earn just enough to survive cultivating coca and remain poor. U.S. policy targets these poor farmers through eradication programs and does not take into account the low level of living the farmers are experiencing. Aerial fumigation has wreaked havoc on peasant crops. The U.S. has cut developmental assistance programs by two-thirds in the 1990’s while tripling counter-narcotics programs (WOLA). The coca-cultivating farmers have been left without developmental support while their crops are destroyed in anti-drug campaign. The Clinton Administration has not veered far from other administrations in its foreign drug policy. The administration continues to fight the “war” on drugs with increased aid and involvement in the Colombian military. Through political and economic pressures, such as certification, the U.S. has forced Colombia to meet its requests. The militarization of anti-drug effort has led to increased violence in Colombia’s internal war. Human rights violations have been part of the history of the war between the Colombian government and the right-wing guerillas fighting it. Increased aid to the government has found its way into the hands of violent paramilitary forces while national security forces step up violence as well. The U.S. government must look at its morality in supporting human rights violators in the name of fighting drugs. Thousand of Colombians have been lost their homes and their lives in a battle that does not involve them. With a new administration entering the White House there is hope of finding a better way of winning the “war” on drugs. 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