Lyndon Johnson Essay, Research Paper

Lyndon Baines Johnson acquired legion jobs when he became the 36th president of the United States. In an attempt to prosecute them all, Johnson tried to conceal Vietnam foreign policy from the American people. In making so, Johnson hoped to purchase adequate clip to work out the Vietnam struggle without interfering with his domestic dockets embracing what Johnson called the Great Society plans. Johnson & # 8217 ; s determination to go close and divert attending from Vietnam would finally seal his destiny as a presidential failure. His inability to measure state of affairss and do determinations refering

foreign policy in South Vietnam is what finally led to his ruin. Johnson & # 8217 ; s most annihilating failure during his disposal was his inability to do determinations necessary to win the war.

Johnson was cognizant of the jobs his disposal would confront right from the

beginning of his presidential term. & # 8221 ; I & # 8217 ; ve got a lotta jobs. I & # 8217 ; ve got a audacious Communist

effort to suppress Asia on my custodies. I & # 8217 ; ve got Negroes revolting in America. I & # 8217 ; ve got

problems in Central America that the people don & # 8217 ; t even know about. I got ta figure out

how to pay for these bally wars and maintain my committedness to feed, educate, and attention

for the people of this state, Johnson told newsmans two months after taking office

( Gardner, 104 ) .

One of the jobs Johnson spoke of concerned South Vietnam and the

Domino theory. Keeping their religion in the Domino theory from the old

disposal, the Johnson disposal believed losing South Vietnam to

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communism would endanger other provinces in the part and endanger America & # 8217 ; s standing in

the universe ( Hall, 13 ) . They besides feared that all out war with North Vietnam might

demand a military response by China or the Soviet Union. The Domino theory was

two sided from a military point of view in South Vietnam. No affair what the Johnson

disposal was to make up one’s mind militarily, the result would probably be unattractive to the

United States. The Johnson disposal & # 8217 ; s policy on the Domino theory failed. This

was because in order to incorporate the Domino theory in South Vietnam, actions had to be

implemented rapidly to guarantee triumph or successful dialogues. Johnson didn & # 8217 ; Ts take

quick and decisive action ; hence, escalation started excessively small, excessively late.

On August 2 and 4, 1964, North Vietnamese PT boats attacked 2 United States

destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin. Three yearss subsequently, after a brief hearing before the

relevant commissions and a short argument on the floors of the Senate and House, Congress

passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. The Resolution gave Johnson authorization to take all

stairss necessary to include force to drive any armed onslaught against the forces of the United

States and to forestall farther aggression ( Porter, 307 ) . It is rumored, every bit good as believed,

that the Gulf of Tonkin incident really was a & # 8220 ; smoking gun & # 8221 ; manufactured to hike

public support for military actions against North Vietnam without declaring war

( Helsing, 31 ) . Johnson & # 8217 ; s purpose during this crisis was to acquire support for a war against

North Vietnam without interfering with support for his Great Society plans.

Revenging for the onslaughts on the American destroyers, Navy planes on August 4

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bombed North Vietnamese coastal bases and an oil installing. Johnson was be aftering to

carry the North to negociate on his footings through the influence of air foraies before a

war broke out. This was a large gamble with the menace of universe war on the threshold and

particularly since the promise of triumph could non be guaranteed by the usage of force. After

the onslaughts on North Vietnamese military bases, China and the Russians openly stated

their complete support of North Vietnam ( Sobel, 118 ) . China backed up it & # 8217 ; s statement in

early September 1964 by directing military planes to North Vietnam. Johnson & # 8217 ; s determination to

attack North Vietnam escalated tensenesss with China and the Russians. Now, in order

to halt the Domino theory from working, Johnson would necessitate both Congressional and

public support. Johnson would besides be informed by his advisers, that troop escalation

was needed in South Vietnam in order to procure Siagon and American involvements. This

would necessitate the United States military to greatly heighten its Numberss in order to run into

United States involvements in Korea, Europe, and Vietnam ( Helsing, 59 ) .

Johnson ignored clear marks that communist states supported North Vietnam and

would help in its defence when he was vice-president under the Kennedy

disposal. On February 24, 1962 the Chinese Foreign Minister released a

statement that signaled China & # 8217 ; s support to North Vietnam. The statement charged that

the United States bid in South Vietnam was in direct engagement with South

Vietnam and was already in an undeclared war. Two yearss subsequently, the Soviet Deputy

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Foreign Minister warned the United States at a UN imperativeness conference that continued

engagement could imply really unpleasant effect ( Sobel, 35 ) . By 1965 the

Russians were directing military cargos via railway and sea to North Vietnam. The

Russians furnished the armed forces of North Vietnam with military equipment such as

aeroplanes, armored combat vehicles, coastal guns, and war vessels. Russian specializers installed a

web of flak projectiles and heavy weapon about North Vietnamese metropoliss and strategic

points. They assisted in developing pilots, projectile forces, armored combat vehicle drivers, and marchers

at Russian bases ( Matthews & A ; Brown, 58 ) . Johnson and his advisers knew that

continued escalation of land military personnels and bombing foraies would merely increase the assistance

received from the Communist states.

Johnson & # 8217 ; s determination to slowly intensify more military personnels to the shores of South Vietnam

merely gave North Vietnam and its Alliess more clip to fix for a military confrontation.

A show of all out force by Johnson could hold secured the boundary lines of South Vietnam,

which would hold limited the infiltration of communist Rebels into the South. Then with

secured boundary lines, General Westmoreland could efficaciously contend the Vietcong interior

South Vietnam & # 8217 ; s boundary lines. Besides, an attempt to halt or decelerate the trade of weaponries from China and

Soviet union to the North Vietnamese might hold been more diplomatic and brought more

success. Johnson & # 8217 ; s determination was to be optimistic in believing that bombing would give

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him a advantage in dialogues. His determination to be close about the escalation of

events in South Vietnam enabled the Great Society plans to have support from

Congress. His determination to be cautious with military force prolonged and finally cost

him the war. These determinations instigated the possibility of universe war and ignited the rapid

growing of the Cold War weaponries race.

By bombing North Vietnam, Johnson hoped to command the escalation of land

military personnels. However, air foraies on North Vietnam didn & # 8217 ; t achieve the consequences Johnson was

anticipating. The escalation of military personnels started to mount with General Westmoreland & # 8217 ; s

petition for more military personnels and more bombing foraies on the North. On July 27, 1965,

Johnson laid out five options to his National Security Council refering the subject of

escalation. The first option was to go on the bombardment and seek to coerce North Vietnam

to the negotiating tabular array. The 2nd option was to pack up and travel place. The 3rd

option was to remain right where the United States was and go on to endure the

effects and go on to lose district and take casualties. The Forth option was to

travel to Congress and inquire for great amounts of money while naming up the militias and

increasing the bill of exchange, in kernel declaring a province of exigency. The 5th option was to

give our commanding officers in the field the work forces and supplies they say they need ( Matthews & A ;

Brown, 125 ) .

Johnson & # 8217 ; s disposal mostly supported mobilisation and proposed increasing

enlisting, larger bill of exchange calls and extensions of Tourss to raise the size of the regular

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armed forces by 375,000. However, the Forth option for mobilisation was turned down

by Johnson because a land war of that magnitude would necessitate North Vietnam to travel to

its friends, China and Russia, and inquire them for aid ( Matthews and Brown, 126 ) .

Johnson favored the 5th option to give commanding officers more work forces and supplies. In making

so, he made it clear to his advisers that the United States would non do threatening

scenes to the Chinese or the Russians by naming up the Militias in big Numberss and

mobilising forces. At the same clip, Johnson pressed hard on the diplomatic forepart to seek

to happen some way to a peaceable colony. Johnson & # 8217 ; s determination to back up General

Westmoreland with more than 100,000 military personnels was granted in July 1965. In add-on,

Johnson increased bombing runs in North and South Vietnam but withheld

blessing for unrestricted bombardment of the North for fright of Chinese intercession.

Furthermore, Johnson authorized the usage of American military personnels in independent military

actions ( Hall, 29 ) .

In order to cut down the industrial and military resources within North Vietnam,

Johnson began operation Rolling Thunder. This operation was an air war on North

Vietnam to convey Hanoi to the negotiating tabular array. Rolling Thunder became a primary,

long-run run and went good beyond the eight hebdomad program ( Glasser, 44 ) . The

operation was criticized on several counts. Targets, work stoppage paths and onslaught times and

day of the months were picked and approved by the president and/or the secretary of defence on a twenty-four hours

to twenty-four hours footing. Depending on the regulations of battle in consequence at any given clip, pilots

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were non permitted to assail certain marks or geographical countries no affair how

of import. Possibly the biggest defect of all was that Rolling Thunder was non meant to

get the better of the North Vietnamese but instead interrupt their will and deny them triumph

( Glasser, 45 ) . President Johnson made a determination that went against all military

philosophy by non leting the Air Force to let go of tremendous firepower on unfastened marks of

chance. Johnson & # 8217 ; s failure in this prospective was his willingness to contend a limited

war. Again, Johnson defended his actions by concluding that he didn & # 8217 ; t want to incite

action by China or Russia. By this clip, Johnson knew that the Communist were

providing North Vietnam with surface to air missiles and projectiles to convey U

nited States

planes down. The point being that Johnson didn & # 8217 ; t want to acquire involved with China and

Russia in a military theatre, why didn & # 8217 ; t he realize that we were already in a war with

North Vietnam and it & # 8217 ; s Alliess. Johnson & # 8217 ; s refusal to accept what was go oning and his

failure to allow travel of his domestic forepart prolonged a war needlessly.

By 1967, the state of affairs remained virtually the same as it was before the land war

started in 1965. The United States had over a half million military personnels in Vietnam and could

non accomplish political stableness in Saigon ( Hall, 37 ) . Johnson failed to do

determinations necessary to win the war because he feared the effects of get downing a war

with China or the Soviet Union. Without foreign and domestic support a state can & # 8217 ; T

successfully fight a war put on the lining lives every bit good as tremendous sums of national

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capital and resources. Johnson besides failed to see the importance of mobilisation

of the armed forces and demonstrated a deficiency of will when chances presented

themselves.

Mobilization increases the options and capablenesss of the Defense Department to

carry out national military policy, and it straight affects the timing, size, and

composing of deployments to a theatre of war ( Mathews & A ; Brown, 136 ) . It besides

stimulates the projection of a state concrete in it & # 8217 ; s political will. In add-on,

mobilisation demonstrated resoluteness to accomplish political aims over a recognized

and acknowledged enemy or menace. Thirty-eight months after the land war began for

the United States in South Vietnam, Johnson eventually made the determination to mobilise. The

13 May 1968 mobilisation for the Vietnam War occurred far excessively late and was far excessively

little to be of any political or military significance ( Matthews & A ; Brown, 137 ) . Again,

this was a failure for Johnson and his presidential term. Unwilling to stir and unwilling to

win the Vietnam War, Johnson failed to measure the importance of doing determinations to

acquire a state out of a crisis.

By 1967 Johnson besides faced jobs on the domestic forepart. Congress and

public support for the war in Vietnam was worsening. The escalation of military forces

in Vietnam raised serious inquiries and produced a turning argument in the United States

over the desirableness of the American committedness. One side of the political sphere urged

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a stronger and more aggressive military scheme to win on the battleground and the other

side argued that the war in Vietnam violated American involvements and values ( Hall, 42 ) .

By mid 1967 the Vietnam War had moved distressingly to a deadlock, a state of affairs that

favored the North Vietnamese scheme of a drawn-out guerilla war. The major turning

point in public support was the military Tet Offensive by North Vietnam. Many

telecasting intelligence ground tackles, for the first clip, saw the war up near and forces during

the Tet Offensive. The world of the violative clashed with the optimistic studies of

recent months, and Johnson & # 8217 ; s creditability began to plump. Public sentiment polls

showed a bead in support and a deficiency of assurance in Johnson & # 8217 ; s behavior of the war

( Hall, 46 ) .

In the aftermath of the Tet offensive the United States Congress reacted every bit good. The

Senate Foreign Relations Committee conducted hearings on the war and the House of

Representatives called for a complete reappraisal of Vietnam policy. These responses

reinforced the Johnson disposal & # 8217 ; s belief that extra escalation would turn out

progressively dissentious ( Hall, 53 ) . During a telecasting address in March of 68, Johnson

announced that bombing in North Vietnam would be restricted to countries merely north of the

demilitarized zone. In return for these gestures, Johnson called for North Vietnamese

military restraint and a willingness to negociate. During his address, Johnson besides made

the proclamation that he would non run for re-election.

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President Johnson systematically emphasized in public that the escalation of military personnels he

authorized was non a alteration in policy. Yet, behind closed doors, the words were really

different. Discussions at a National Security Council meeting in 1965 stressed the

importance of forestalling leaks to newspapers. When foreign policy in Vietnam changed,

Johnson advised his cabinet non to advert these policy alterations. Secretary of Defense

Robert McNamara noted that Johnson & # 8217 ; s refusal to denote determinations or policy alterations

publically finally be him in a heartfelt way ( Helsing, 81 ) . Johnson & # 8217 ; s determination devising with

respects to public examination and cover-up were failures that should hold been avoided.

Johnson & # 8217 ; s fear that public plans would non have equal support and his fright of

motivating China and the Soviet Union into universe war with the United States were all

grounds he believed justified his actions ( Helsing, 240 ) . However, when the Gulf of

Tonkin incident occurred, Johnson inherited Congressional and public support

needed and didn & # 8217 ; Ts take advantage of that chance. If he had, the American people

would most probably supported an escalation in military personnels. However, this had to be done when

the clip was right for both Congress and the populace. Johnson & # 8217 ; s deficiency of will to win the

war and his hapless determination doing all contributed to foreign policy in Vietnam being a

complete catastrophe.

Johnson had frequently stated in private his belief that the Communists had to be forced to

come to the bargaining tabular array ( Helsing, 114 ) . For Johnson it would be difficult to believe,

at least in the early old ages, that air high quality would non convey Hanoi to the negotiating

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tabular array. Under force per unit area from his advisers to earnestly prosecute dialogues, Johnson

made a address at Johns Hopkins. The address suggested negotiations or treatments

without stipulations on a Vietnamese colony. On April 8, 1965 North Vietnam

took the inaugural possibly in response to Johnson & # 8217 ; s John Hopkins address and proposed a

& # 8220 ; Four Points Program & # 8221 ; as the footing for a solution to the Vietnam struggle. The White

House flatly rejected Hanoi & # 8217 ; s overture. However, McGeorge Bundy wrote to the

president that he, Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson in Moscow, and moving CIA

manager Ray Cline felt that the proposals were at least a intimation of existent involvement from Hanoi

in eventual treatments ( Helsing, 116 ) . Johnson failed to measure the developments in

Hanoi that presented a chance for peace and alternatively continued to intensify land

military personnels.

George Ball besides urged Johnson on April 21 to research the North Vietnamese points

because they provided a footing for dialogues ( Barrett,150 ) . A month subsequently, on May

18, Mai Van Bo, a North Vietnamese diplomat in France, passed a message to

Washington via the Gallic Foreign Ministry: & # 8221 ; The four points of April 65 should non be

considered as anterior conditions but instead as working rules for dialogues ( Helsing,

116 ) . & # 8221 ; This quotation mark argues rather evidently that Hanoi wanted to get down speaking. Johnson & # 8217 ; s

failure to acknowledge or to at least entertain the invitation of Hanoi seems unacceptable.

Even with his advisers strong wants to make so, Johnson was uninterested in researching

whether Hanoi & # 8217 ; s four points provided any gap for dialogues. Johnson believed

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that any avidity to negociate would be a mark of failing. Besides, the belief that

avidity would demo the United States lacked the will to remain the class in Vietnam

( Helsing, 116 ) .

Johnson conducted his John Hopkins address for peace to appeal to the Left by

looking moderate and diplomatic while really taking no enterprise other than

keeping a stronger military committedness in order to appeal to the Right ( Helsing,

117 ) . Conducting authorities political relations in this manner is common but with so much

siting on peace, it is difficult to understand Johnson & # 8217 ; s place. Peace negotiations early in the

struggle might hold saved Johnson & # 8217 ; s presidential term every bit good as his Great Society undertakings.

Conditional dialogues for peace could hold manipulated to salvage face against the

Communist and the political orientation of the Domino theory. Last but non least, it would besides hold

saved 1000s of soldiers their lives non to advert the 1000000s of Vietnamese that lost

their lives. Johnson & # 8217 ; s failure to listen to his political experts on treatments of peace

emphasizes the presidents ineffectualness as commanding officer in head.

President Johnson continued to hold problem keeping his domestic plans

aimed at obtaining the great society. This was in big portion because of the escalation in

South Vietnam. Johnson wanted to avoid any national argument on the Vietnam War in

order to protect his domestic docket. . In theory, this was done to avoid interrupting the

enormous economic growing and prosperity every bit good as the legislative plan he hoped

to construct into the Great Society ( Herring, 122 ) . Johnson & # 8217 ; s strong desire for both guns

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and butter was a trap from which neither he nor the state could get away, a trap for

which the president was largely responsible ( Helsing, 256 ) . This trap, as it is referred to,

was ineluctable fortunes that arose as a consequence of Johnson & # 8217 ; s determination to

understate the escalation of military force in Vietnam. As a consequence of the determination,

legion failures emerged. The failure to mobilise and keep public support for the

Vietnam War really extended the war and started to gnaw economic stableness. The

failure to win the war or negociate unconditionally with the North Vietnamese enabled

the Domino theory to transport on despite U.S. attempts. As president, Johnson failed the

state as a leader, and he failed on his ain footings, losing the war and his Great Society

( Helsing, 249 ) .

Lyndon Baines Johnson was a president that frequently times lacked the determination devising

ability necessary to do confident speedy determinations. Surrounded by top military leaders

and political advisers, Johnson was unsuccessful in negociating with North Vietnam.

Johnson & # 8217 ; s Great Society plans were destroyed because of the United States prolonged

engagement with the war in Vietnam. In the terminal it was his inability to keep public

support for his policies in Vietnam that destroyed his presidential term. Johnson & # 8217 ; s most

annihilating failure during his disposal was his inability to do determinations

necessary to win the war in Vietnam.