The Pearl Harbor and the September 11 onslaught are two events that changed the United States to a great trade. December seventh 1941 and September 11th 2001 are two dark yearss that will ne’er be forgotten in the history of the United States. They are the two major onslaughts against the United States that have occurred in history. Although the purposes of the enemy in both instances were to rupture the United States apart. the responses by the disposal have resulted into the antonym.
Although many guiltless lives were lost in both onslaughts. it is of import to observe that the onslaughts left the people of America more united and more prepared for future onslaughts. However. the most of import issue that has come into the image as a consequence of the two onslaughts is the effectivity of the United States intelligence. Immediately after the ill-famed 9/11 onslaught. many observers linked the onslaught to the Pearl Harbor onslaught. There have been statements that there are similarities in intelligence failures when the two onslaughts are compared.
Observers have claimed that merely as the United States was non prepared for the Pearl Harbor onslaught in the Second World War. it failed to support itself against onslaught by terrorists taking to the ill-famed September 11 onslaught ( Griffin. 2004 ) . It is non a surprise that the two events are similar in many ways. They were both surprise onslaughts which had far making national and international deductions in relation to the United States intelligence community. This is despite the fact that the occurrence of the two events took topographic point over half a century apart.
However. the histrions in the surprise onslaught. the motivations. sequence of events and the effects of the two onslaughts are different. In both onslaughts. the United States intelligent community has been accused of disregarding marks prior to the onslaught that could hold been indispensable in protecting the Americans against the onslaughts. Despite there being seeable warning marks. the intelligence has maintained that the two events were unanticipated. There is no uncertainty that before the Pearl Harbor onslaught. the relationship between Japan and the United States had gone rancid.
President Roosevelt’s disposal had placed trade stoppages against Japan and had supported China against the Japanese. The economic countenances had affected the Nipponese economic system and they had no option but to destruct the American fleets. The Nipponese purpose was to prehend American lands in the Far East which would coerce Roosevelt’s disposal to negociate a colony. Although the American disposal recognized the magnitude of the crisis with the Asiatic power. they did non expect any danger of onslaught until it was excessively late.
The intelligence made a incorrect premise that the Japanese did non hold military ability or economic power to assail the United States. Unfortunately. the Japanese proved them incorrect by assailing Pearl Harbor and shattered the United States plans in the Pacific ( Borch. 2003 ) . In the September 11 onslaught. the warning marks were even clearer. There were assorted surveies that had concluded that the war against terrorist act by the United States towards the terminal of the twentieth century made it clear that it was certain the United States would hold a major terrorist onslaught.
In the 1990s. the United States was involved in war against terrorist groups such as al Qaeda and revenge was non unexpected. The 1995 and 1996 onslaughts in Riyadh and Dhahran severally and the August 1998 onslaughts on American embassies in East Africa by the Al Qaeda were clear marks that the continental America would surely endure terrorists attack. The American response to the onslaught by bombing suspected al Qaeda bases in Afghanistan and Sudan should hold besides been carried out with necessary cautiousness.
Furthermore. the al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden had declared his committedness to establishing an onslaught against the Americans in 1998 while Bush’s disposal had published the political docket of Taliban in Afghanistan. its confederation with al Qaeda and their panic run against the United States in 1999 ( Tobias & A ; Foxman. 2003 ) . When the intelligence pertaining to the onslaughts is considered. technological promotion comes into the image. In both incidences of onslaught. the engineering used by the enemy surprised the United States intelligence community.
The enemies in both onslaughts maximized the usage of engineering against the Americans to the surprise of the intelligence. The technological surprise in this instance is the mode in which the enemy used a hardware that made it hard or impossible for speedy counter onslaught by the efficient United States military. In this instance. the United States intelligent community was beaten in their ain game. In the Pearl Harbor onslaught. the Nipponese expeditiously demonstrated the full abilities of aerial onslaughts by incorporating new air power in their military onslaught.
They were able to contract the gunman that could run in the shallow Waterss really expeditiously. Although air power engineering was non a secret in the Second World War. the Americans were surprised by the ability of the Nipponese to integrate the engineering so expeditiously and hone their military powers. This made it impossible for the US’s intelligence to gauge the magnitude of the menace by the Nipponeses because they were unaware of their technological abilities ( Borch. 2003 ) .
Similarly. although the usage of rider plane for self-destructive missions was non a new phenomenon. the September 11 terrorist onslaught besides achieved technological surprise. It is interesting to observe how the Al Qaeda utilised modern engineering and globalisation of the universe to program and put to death their onslaught. They were able to easy establish their onslaught without the usage of conventional hardware and expertness that could hold been used for intercontinental onslaught. The Al Qaeda had secret agents in all parts of the universe including the United States with good established communicating webs to the surprise of the US intelligence.
They used the cyberspace. satellite telephones and international money transportation in the United States and other parts of the universe without pulling any attending ( Griffin. 2004 ) . There is no uncertainty hence. engineering played an of import function in the Pearl Harbor and September 11 onslaught. However. there are two surprising facets of engineering usage in the two onslaughts. First. the engineering used in the Pearl Harbor every bit good as the September 11 onslaught was non new or a secret.
The engineering was really good known if non used by the United States security systems prior to the onslaught. Second. the United States had been the greatest donee of technological promotion in the twentieth century and had the taking experts in the development and tackling technological development. However. they were unaware of the despair of their enemies which prompted creativeness. Therefore they underestimated the capableness and findings of the enemy to besiege their technological high quality and launch a technological surprise ( Hulnick. 2004 ) .
It is besides surprising to observe how the enemy exploited the structural exposure of the United States defence and intelligence to establish their onslaught. The confusion between the US Army and the US Navy created by the war warning to the armed forces in Hawaii from Washington prior to Pearl Harbor onslaught exposed the exposure of the United States military intelligence giving the enemy a room for surprise onslaught. The ground forces concentrated on guarding the aircrafts and ammos against possibility of sabotage while the navy idea that the qui vive had prompted watchfulness in air patrols by the ground forces.
While the ground forces was guarding the aircrafts and ammos. they thought that the naval intelligence was supervising the Nipponese fleets. The ground forces did non recognize that the US Navy had lost path of the enemy taking to the surprise onslaught. The structural exposure was apparent when the ground forces and the navy operating on Oahu did to unclutter the air on the duty of each group. Even if both the Naval and Army functionaries cooperated to guard the island. there were no efficient constructions to circulate the intelligence information collected to the several commanding officers.
Although there is no grounds of the Nipponese cognition on the structural failings of the United States military. there is no uncertainty that the structural and organisational exposure is an of import lesson from the Pearl Harbor onslaught ( Borch. 2003 ) . Though at a different degree. the organisation weaknesses in the United States intelligent service and security systems prior to the September 11 onslaught may hold increased the exposure of the United States. the military had a incorporate bid outside the United States such as in the gulf war. but that was non the instance in the Continental America.
The section of defence and the CIA concentrated on external menace while the FBI focused on offenses within the United States. The terrorists could hold realized the structural failing in the intelligence service. Furthermore. security in the international airdromes all over the United States was under the duty of the airdrome direction and air hose companies who hired private security houses. In other words. other than concentrating on the structural and organisational solutions to the current jobs. the United States intelligence concentrated on technological solutions which perchance resulted into the two onslaughts ( Hufschmid. 2002 ) .
There is no uncertainty that the September 11 terrorist onslaught and the Pearl Harbor onslaught had legion effects on the United States intelligence and society. More significantly. the two events changed the United States involvements in the universe personal businesss. The isolationism policies of the United States were abandoned after the Pearl Harbor onslaughts while the Bush disposal took punitory steps against terrorists. Although after every onslaught. there was an betterment in the United States intelligence. it is of import to set in proper mechanisms that would non ensue into a repetition of pasts errors.
The US intelligence should be cognizant of the despair of their enemies irrespective of their economic and military abilities. This will enable the integrating of the intelligent community in the United States into an effectual organisational construction that assistance coaction. This will travel a long manner in extinguishing the outlook of technological solutions to the security menaces confronting the continental America and the universe.
