The Road To Pearl Harbor Essay, Research Paper
Road To Pearl Harbor
The onslaught on the military forces of the U.S. at Pearl Harbor Hawaii did non merely go on nor was it a speedy reaction to enterprises instituted by President Roosevelt. The Nipponese believed that they were being pushed into a corner by Roosevelt and felt that they must move to protect the Empire. Gordon Prange in & # 8216 ; At Dawn We Slept & # 8217 ; describes pre-attack events in item. The description of these events note the errors made on each side.
1937
July
The Nipponese Army invaded North China from Manchuria, eight old ages of combat with the Chinese began.
December
The gunboat USS Panay, while on everyday responsibility in Chinese Waterss, was attacked by Nipponese aircraft. We do non cognize if the onslaught was knowing or an accident but Roosevelt looked for ways to penalize Japan. Nothing became of this incident because the Nipponese authorities apologized, paid for all amendss, and promised to protect American subjects.
1938
October
With the continued German military rearmament plan and European leading capitulation at the Munich conference, President Roosevelt asked Congress for $ 500 Million to increase America & # 8217 ; s defense mechanism forces. This action was done because he believed that Germany was a menace to the U.S. The Nipponese proverb this build up as a direct menace to their Empire because, the U.S. was the lone state in the Pacific which could hinder their enlargement.
1939
Join the Navy Poster
February
Japan continues its conquering of China by busying Hainan Island of the Southern seashore. This business improved Japans ability to interdict nautical trade paths.
Because the U.S. was the primary military menace in the Pacific, Japan had prepared war programs to cover with this job, the U.S. had similar war programs aimed at Japan. The Nipponese program was to carry on one big naval conflict against the American Navy, destructing it, ensuing in the inability of the U.S. to interfere with Nipponese enlargement through out Asia. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto assumed bid of the Japan & # 8217 ; s Combined Fleet in August of 1939. Having lived in America for several old ages he knew Americans, the type of people we were, he knew that this war program was impractical. He needed a new program which would take the menace of U.S. intercession from his wing.
1940
January
Some clip between January and March 1940 Yamamoto devised his program to destruct the U.S. Navy in Hawaii and corrupt the American people. Prange asks the inquiry & # 8216 ; Why did Yamamoto believe that this onslaught would oppress American morale since he knew them? & # 8217 ; but he does non reply his ain inquiry. No actions were implemented to set the program in action.
July
Trade countenances followed by a trade trade stoppage were imposed ensuing in increased ill-will and extra political jobs with Japan. These trade actions were imposed because Roosevelt was trying to halt Nipponese enlargement.
1941
January
Admiral Yamamoto begins pass oning with other Nipponese officers, inquiring them if an onslaught on Pearl Harbor would be possible. The concluding result of these treatments was the onslaught was possible but would be hard.
Secrecy and surprise were the two elements which were most of import to the success of this program. With that said 1 wonders how secure was the flow of information around the Imperial Naval Staff, because on January 27, 1941 Joseph C. Grew, the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, wired Washington that he had learned information that Japan, in the event of problem with the U.S. , was be aftering a surprise onslaught on Pearl Harbor.
No 1 in Washington believed the information, if person had believed this information, the Pearl Harbor attack possibily could hold been avoided. While many thought that war was possible, no 1 believed that the Japanese could surprise us.
Most senior American military experts believed that the Japanese would assail Manila in the Philippine Islands. Manila & # 8217 ; s location threatened the sea lanes of communications as the Nipponese military forces moved south. Another idea to location of onslaught was toward the North into Russia because of the war in Europe between Germany and the Soviet Union.
February
As the Japanese were carry oning preliminary planing for the onslaught, Americans were fixing to support American belongings. Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet, and Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department prepared Hawaii for onslaught. Defense mechanism of the islands was an Army duty though the Navy did play a major function in fixing to drive an onslaught.
Adm. Kimmel planed on taking his fleet out of the seaport and facing the enemy at sea. & lt ;
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With this in head both officers communicated with their seniors in Washington trying to obtain extra work forces and equipment to see a proper defense mechanism of all military instillments on Oahu. At this clip, war production of the U.S. was still limited ensuing with the dispersion of stuff around the universe seeking to make full everyones demands ; Britain, Russia, the Philippines and Hawaii.
March
Nagao Kita, Honolulu & # 8217 ; s new Consul General arrives on Oahu with Takeo Yoshikawa, a trained undercover agent. As the armed forces of both states prepared for possible war, the contrivers needed information about the opposition.
The U.S. knew that Hawaii was full of Nipponese intelligence officers but because of our constitutional rights really small could be done. Untrained agents like Kohichi Seki, the Honolulu consulate & # 8217 ; s financial officer, traveled around the island observing all types of information about the motion of the fleet. When the onslaught occurred the Japanese had a really clear image of Pearl Harbor and where single ships were moored.
Person Talked
April
During the clip period U.S. intelligence officers continued to supervise Nipponese secret messages.
American scientists had developed a machine, codification named & # 8216 ; Magic & # 8221 ; which gave U.S. intelligence officers the ability to read Nipponese secret message traffic. & # 8216 ; Magic & # 8217 ; provided all types of high quality information but because of preconceived thoughts in Washington some information was non followed up on and of import pieces of the pre-attack mystifier were missed.
Nipponese consular traffic was besides intercepted which provided extra intelligence. While the U.S. had all the informations needed to get at a clear image of Nipponese purposes, the Navy had an internal battle between the Office of Naval Intelligence and the War Plans Division about which section should be the primary aggregation office. When the War Plans Division was eventually designated the first in line for informations, all of the Navys intelligence aggregation was degraded.
To farther complicate this job the Army had its ain intell office, G-2. At times the Army and the Navy did non speak to each other, once more cut downing the ability to divine Japan & # 8217 ; s purposes. Finally, Washington did non pass on all the available information that was received to all bids, at times believing that such a transmittal would ensue in duplicate. All in all the U.S. knew that Japan was traveling to spread out its war but the inquiry remained, where? If U.S. Intell people had communicated, readyings for the onslaught could hold been improved,
May
Admiral Nomura informed his higher-ups that he had learned Americans were reading his message traffic. No 1 in Tokyo believed that their codification could hold been broken. The codification was non changed.
If the Japanese had changed their codification, the surprise of the onslaught would hold occurred as it did but would we have been as ill prepared or could the consequence been worse? This error would hold impacted follow on actions through 1942.
July
Thought out the summer Yamamoto trained his forces. His staff and the Naval General Staff finalized the planning of the onslaught: what path to go on, how much fuel would be required for the trip, what U.S. ships would be in the seaport and where they would be moored.
The Nipponese contrivers besides had to organize their ain demand of extra military action around Indochina. Which action was more of import and which would supply the greatest addition had to be worked out.
November
Tokyo sends Saburo Kurusu, an experient diplomat to washington as a particular minister plenipotentiary to help Ambassador Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, who continued to seek a diplomatic solution.
Japan wanted the U.S. to hold to its southern enlargement diplomatically but if they were unsuccessful, they would travel to war.
On the 16th the first units, pigboats, involved in the onslaught departed Japan.
On the 26th the chief organic structure, aircraft bearers and bodyguards, began the theodolite to Hawaii.
Nipponese Aircraft bearer
December 7th
At 0750, Hawaiian clip, the first moving ridge of Japanesee aircraft began the onslaught. Along with the ships in Pearl Harbor, the air Stationss at Hickam, Wheeler, Ford Island, Kaneohe and Ewa Field were attacked.
For two hours and 20 proceedingss, Nipponese aircraft bombed and shot up these military marks. When the 2nd moving ridge returned to their bearers, 2403 people had been killed and 1178 were wounded. Eighteen ships of different sizes had been sunk or damaged and 77 aircraft of all types had been destroyed.
merely 29 Nipponese aircraft were shot down by American return fire, most during the onslaught of the 2nd moving ridge. This figure of planes downed is important but had the defences of Hawaii been prepared the figure would hold been greater.
