, Research Paper

The Battle for the Marshall Islands byPete Godbey Military History SS-305Professor BraimApril 9, 1999 The Marshall Islands consist of 32 coral atolls, which span 800 square stat mis of the Pacific Ocean. They are separated into two ironss, the Ratak on the E, and Ralik on the West. Each atoll is an enclosed or semi-enclosed reef on which islands and islets of coral, sand and stone have been built of course. They range in size from pinpoint islets, like Kili, to Kwajalein, the largest atoll in the universe. The first know white adult male to spy the Marshall Islands was a Spaniard, Garcia de Loyassa, in 1526. Spain assumed nominal ownership of the islands at the same clip she annexed the Carolines and Marianas, in 1686, but they were virtually forgotten until 1788 when two Englishmans, Captains Marshall and Gilbert, explored the Marshall atolls and those of a neighbouring group which were, logically, named the Gilberts ( Crown and Heinl 6-8 ) . In 1878, Germany, in a tardy pursuit for an imperium, became interested in Spain & # 8217 ; s Pacific ownerships, and encouraged her energetic bargainers to set up themselves in the Marshalls. Twenty-one old ages subsequently, Spain sold the Carolines, Marianas ( except for Guam ) , and Marshalls to Germany for 4 million dollars. German colonisation was interrupted in 1914 when Japan, moving as an ally of Great Britain, moved in business forces. The League of Nations in 1920 recognized Japan & # 8217 ; s control by giving that state a category C authorization over the Marshalls, a authorization which specifically forbids military and naval installings. When Japan left the League in 1935 they declared absolute sovereignty over them and prohibit visit from aliens ( Crown and Heinl 9-12 ) . The importance of the Marshalls was long recognized by both American and Nipponese contrivers. To Japan these atolls were a geographical shield, unsinkable aircraft bearers to function as a line of going for onslaught, or an outpost line of opposition in defence. America saw them as a endangering extension of Nipponese power toward the eastern Pacific and a standing jeopardy to lines of communicating into the South and Southwest Pacific. It was known that any Nipponese offense in the Middle Pacific would be supported from at that place. The American military prewar program for a war with Japan, codification named ORANGE, conceded the initial loss of the Philippines. It called for the fleet to drive due west through the Marshalls and Carolines and on to recapture the Philippines ( Crowl and Love 4 ) . However, with the beginning of belligerencies in 1941, the United States was forced onto a strategically defensive which continued until mid-1943. Victories at Midway, in the South and Southwest Pacific, and a thrust on the Aleutians eventually put the United States on an violative terms. On the other manus, the original Nipponese program for defensive, the & # 8220 ; Z & # 8221 ; program, called for a drawn-out defensive forepart across the Aleutians, Wake, Marshalls, Gliberts, and Nauru. This forepart was subsequently pulled in tighter as Nipponese experient problems in Southeast Asia. However, the Marshalls were non forgotten, the Japanese chose them to be the first line of defence in the in-between Pacific. Their map was to hinder, if non halt, any due west onslaught which might endanger the interior defensives ( Crowl and Love 65 ) . The determination to assail the Marshalls officially came in 1943. It was decided that the onslaught in the Central Pacific was needed. It would function to procure the lines of communicating to the Southwest Pacific, protect the wing of Southwest Pacific forces, and do the Nipponese farther split their militias by adding another forepart ( Crowl and Love 210 ) . This would besides let for an progress along the most direct avenue to the Nipponese mainland. & # 8220 ; Thus, & # 8221 ; Admiral Nimiz, who was commanding officer in charge of the Pacific, said & # 8220 ; We get on with the war. & # 8221 ; Before the Marshalls were to be attacked, the Gilbert Islands were to be taken. This included the invasion of Tarawa, the first existent amphibian operation taken by the U.S. A batch of lessons were learned at Tarawa, and those lessons changed many of the programs for the onslaught on the Marshalls. With these instructions, it was decided that Majuro atoll was to be taken foremost to supply communicating support and protected anchorage. Following, there was to be a barrage of Wotje, Maloelp, and Mille to neutralize them, so the gaining control of Kwajalein atoll, so the assault on Eniwetok atoll, and eventually a killing and continued bombing operation of the leftovers ( Crown and Heinl 25 ) . Majuro, which was though to be really lightly defended, was to be first major atoll taken. It is about 24 stat mis long and by and large extends east to west. A little force consisting of a reconnaissance platoon and a howitzer platoon were sent to seek Calalin and Eroj at dark on the 30th of January. Soon after set downing on Calalin the lookout group found a indigen that reported 300-400 Nipponese on Darrit Island. They preceded across Calalin and reached the chief native colony. There it was corrected that all Japanese had left some months before except for a Nipponese naval warrant officer and a smattering of civilians on Majuro Island. A withdrawal of the howitzer platoon so went to Eroj Island to happen it unoccupied ( Crown and Heinl 41-43 ) . However, bad intelligence travels faster than good, and the correct of the sum of Japanese was non relayed rapidly to the onslaught force commanding officer. So, early in the following forenoon, aerial and naval barrage began at 0637 and lasted until 0645 before the error was corrected. No Nipponese or indigens were found on Darrit, but abandoned Nipponese edifices and edifice supplies were located. A speedy hunt of Majuro Island located the Nipponese warrant officer, who was in the thick of dinner, and finished the opposition in the atoll ( Crown and Heinl 43-45 ) . Now that the American forces had a secure presenting country in the Majuro atoll, the onslaughts on the major islands of the Marshalls were at hand. Roi-Namur is a dual island at the top of the Kwajalein atoll. Both upper islands, and Kwajalein Island in the South, were attacked at the same clip as portion of Operation Flintlock. The ictus of Roi Island and its landing field was assigned to the 23rd Marines. On February 1st at 1100, two foot moving ridges landed easy on the beach. The undermentioned two moving ridges of armored combat vehicles had problem because they were supposed to continue through a channel West of Tokyo Pier, but since the wharf had been demolished some of the first moving ridge grounded about two hundred metres off shore. Resistance was light and scattered as the Marines started traversing the island merely coming into contact with one working toque ( Crowl and Love 316-217 ) . Despite the failing of resistance, the military personnels moved frontward carefully. This was their first experience under fire and they had expected much heavier contending. By nightfa

ll the island was captured except for a little pocket in the centre of the landing field to be mopped up ( Crowl and Love 320-321 ) .

Namur was a different narrative, it held the concrete shelters and edifices for the air power forces who flew off of Roi and was much more to a great extent vegetated. The 24th Marines were assigned to take it and launched their onslaught on it at 1145 on February 1st. Initial enemy opposition was light and largely came from ruined constructions. This luck remained with the assailing force until an American destruction squad set off a torpedo magazine, which subsequent detonations and dust killed 20 Mariness ( over half the casualties to 2nd Battalion ) . This delayed the reaching of forces and allowed Nipponese subsisters to get down forming defences against the landing now that the naval barrage had ceased. Small advancement was made off the remainder of the twenty-four hours and with these holds the regimental commanding officer ordered the military personnels to delve in for the dark. The following twenty-four hours, with support from armored combat vehicles moved from the 23rd Marines easy conquering of Roi, the terminal of formal opposition was announced at 1418 ( Crowl and Love 323-331 ) . The comparative easiness of the gaining control of these islands was due largely to the naval and aerial barrage, the onslaught from the interior of the atoll, and that the Japanese did non anticipate such a deep incursion into the Central Pacific. The seizing of Kwajalein Island, in the South, came to the Army & # 8217 ; s 7th Infantry division. After a rain of naval heavy weapon, with about 7000 shells, and air barrage, with 60 combatants and bombers doing 96 sallies, the landing started at 900 on February 1st ( Morison 255-256 ) . Merely a ineffectual gesture of little weaponries and howitzer fire welcomed the landing trade, and within 2 hours they resolutely held the beachhead. Encountering stronger opposition while traveling inland, they did non travel far from that established beachhead for the remainder of the twenty-four hours. The following twenty-four hours encountered the same overzealous, but mostly uneffective, opposition. The 3rd and 4th yearss continued with military personnels merely a few times running into lasting emplacements, the bulk of the contending due little groups of Nipponese that dug in during the twenty-four hours and either waited for ambuscade or attacked unorganised at dark. Finally at 1620, on February 4th, it was declared that all organized opposition had ceased and cleanup operations commenced ( Crowl and Love 241-295 ) . Again it was the immense sum of preassult barrage that had eased the landings and subsequent gaining control of the island. Besides the avenue of onslaught, from the West, surprised the occupying forces. With the gaining control of Kwajalein Island, the chief aim of the run had been completed, but many smaller aims remained. Cleanup operation of the captured islands and ictus of all islands near to the chief aims took clip. Besides, forming a defence force and the reorganisation of the assault forces were jobs in the wake of the combat. Seabees, who are naval applied scientists, took over mending the captured landing fields on Roi for American usage, and on February 5th planes started set downing at that place. However, a lay waste toing foray by Nipponese hydroplanes on the 14th caused many casualties as an ammo/fuel shit was destroyed ( Crown and Heinl 74 ) . Eniwetok Atoll, Operation Catchpole, consisted of four chief islands, Engebi, which held the lone flight strip, Japtan, Parry, and Eniwetok. Initially the Nipponese merely used this atoll as a theatrical production point for planes coming and traveling to Truk. But with the barrage of Roi, Mille, Wotje, and other islands, air forces were moved to it. However, after the loss of Kwajalein atoll, all air forces were being moved off of it back to Truk by hydroplane. The atoll was farther fortified as American military personnels came closer. Learning from Kwajalein, the Nipponese general peculiarly wanted emplacements confronting in towards the laguna ( Crown and Heil 79 ) . The American naval fleet steamed into the centre of the atoll, merely decelerating to direct mine sweepers out to clear in front of the fleet, with no opposition. They so took to doing each of the islands a crater filled moonscape. Each of the islands were later assaulted with first Engebi, so Eniwetok, Japtan, and Parry being taken. The small opposition there was included rifle, machine gun, and howitzer places most efficaciously positioned behind coconut log emplacements or little uncoordinated onslaughts at dark by little groups of 5 to 10 ( Crowl and Heil 80-127 ) . Again the chief jobs in these landings were interruptions in communicating, deficiency of infantry/tank co-support, and interservice jobs as ground forces armored combat vehicle, marine foot, and naval gunnery commanding officers were confused. Parry was different in that it was the first clip uninterrupted light was used, through star shells and searchlights, doing the Japanese to free one of their more feared and effectual tactics, the nighttime infiltration ( Crowl and Love 365 ) . Different smaller operations developed to tauten American appreciation on the lesser Marshalls, including assaults against smaller islands, many of which were uninhabited. Besides there were go oning bombing foraies against the other Nipponese bases in the E. g. marshalls that were & # 8220 ; hopped & # 8221 ; in operations, including Kusaie, Wotje, Maleolap, and Jaluit. The naval and air support lessons learned in the Gilberts and reaffirmed in the Marshalls went on to assist in the invasions of Iwo Jima, Guam, and eventually Okinawa. The armament and armoring of the different landing trade was justified, as the techniques of the amphibian assault was turned into bible ( Crowl and Love 371 ) . The first usage of submerged destruction squads, who would finally engender the SEAL squads of today, was in the Marshalls ( Crown and Heil 139 ) . Besides, the first usage of star shells to light the battleground at dark was used ( Crowl and Love 365 ) . The tactical effects of the Marshalls ictus were immense. It confirmed that the Central Pacific path was the best manner to Japan and allowed a continuos bombardment of Truk, taking it off the list of invasion points. The triumph allowed for a much Oklahoman move towards the Marianas, from which launch planes could be launched to assail the mainland. However, the greatest plus of the run might be that it was the first clip that Americans held a Nipponese station. Our forces were no longer merely doing up for losingss, the battle was being taken to our enemies. Bibliography Crown, Lt. Col. John A. USMC, and Lt. Col. Robert D. Heinl, Jr. , USMC The Marshalls: Increasing the Tempo Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954. Crowl, Philip A. , and Edmund G. Love Seizure of the Gilberts and the Marshalls Washington, D.C. : Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1955. Morison, Cpt. Samuel Eliot, USNR, Aleutians, Gilberts, and Marshalls Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1961.